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Instituting Innocence Reform: Wisconsin's New Governance Experiment
Abstract
The DNA exoneration cases of the past two decades have provided a window into what hasn't been working in
the criminal justice system and an agenda for criminal justice reform. The challenge currently facing the
innocence reform community is to translate this agenda into concrete reforms that institute and sustain best
practices for the investigation and prosecution of crimes, while allowing flexibility for the understanding of
best practices to continue to evolve. In 2005, Wisconsin underwent a breathtaking course of legal reform in
two of the problem areas that have plagued wrongful convictions: mistaken eyewitness identification and false
confession. The Wisconsin reforms in both areas allow - and in the area of eyewitness identification require -
local agencies to adopt and periodically revisit the policies that govern their own practices in light of social
scientific theory and in light of models developed in other jurisdictions.
Because of this institutional structure that delegates rule-making authority to local police agencies,
Wisconsin's innocence reforms fit well within a new paradigm of regulatory jurisprudence called democratic
experimentalism, which eschews top-down regulation in favor of allowing general norms to be articulated and
informed from the bottom up through a combination of benchmarking best practices and encouraging local
experimentation within a regime of public accountability based on measurable outcomes. This article explores
the Wisconsin experience as a case study within this new regulatory framework. It concludes that although
Wisconsin's innocence reforms are promising, they lack an adequate institutional structure to sustain
continued reform. In particular, their reliance on enforcing the new regulatory structure through the
exclusionary rule in individual criminal cases will be inadequate to meet the goals of continuous
improvement. However, the prospect of invoking the elaborate accountability structures of experimentalism
faces similar challenges. A careful analysis of the process of legislative reform in Wisconsin - and the national
reform networks within which it occurred - demonstrates that incremental reform designed to gain genuine
buy-in among diverse criminal justice stakeholders on a local level may ultimately be a more fruitful approach.
Although more ambitious experimentalist accountability structures may be counterproductive in the context
of regulating police investigations, the experimentalist focus on information-pooling and cross-jurisdictional
learning may prove important in a more incremental and loosely-structured reform process
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INSTITUTING INNOCENCE REFORM:
WISCONSIN'S NEW GOVERNANCE EXPERIMENT
KATHERINE R. KRUSE*
INTRODUCTION
The DNA exoneration cases of the past two decades have given us
a window into what has not been working in the criminal justice
system.1 Each exoneration demonstrates a discrete malfunction of the
criminal justice system that convicts an innocent person, leaves a crime
unsolved, and allows a guilty person to remain free. The growing
collection of DNA exonerations has also revealed deeper patterns of
dysfunction in the investigation and prosecution of crimes: false
confessions, mistaken eyewitness identifications, invalid forensic
science, police and prosecutorial misconduct, and inadequate
representation by criminal defense attorneys.2 Building on the lessons
* Associate Professor, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of
Nevada Las Vegas; B.A., Oberlin College; M.A., University of Wisconsin-Madison
(Philosophy); J.D., University of Wisconsin Law School. I am grateful for the
generosity and insight of the following people who read earlier drafts of this Article,
engaged me in conversation, sent me to new sources, questioned my assumptions, and
helped reframe my thinking in important ways: Bret Birdsong, Keith Findley, Brandon
Garrett, Mike Guttentag, Joan Howarth, Richard Leo, Leticia Saucedo, Bill Simon,
Michael Smith, Andrew Taslitz, and the participants in the Potomac Valley Workshop.
I thank Keith Findley, Mark Gundrum, and Cheri Maples for sharing their perspectives
on the Wisconsin reform process in which they played a part. I am grateful for the
opportunity to present and further develop the ideas in this Article at the Preventing
Wrongful Convictions Symposium at the University of Wisconsin Law School and in
the faculty enrichment series at Boyd School of Law. Finally, I thank Laura Bielinski
for her outstanding research assistance.
1. Keith A. Findley, Learning from Our Mistakes: A Criminal Justice
Commission to Study Wrongful Convictions, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 333, 333 (2002).
2. The Innocence Project at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law has
been the leading force in cataloguing and identifying the causes of wrongful
convictions. The Innocence Project was founded in 1992 by professors Barry Scheck
and Peter Neufeld. JIM DWYER, PETER NEUFELD & BARRY SCHECK, ACTUAL
INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION AND OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY
CONVICTED, at xiii (2000). In 1999, Scheck and Neufeld analyzed sixty-two of the first
sixty-seven DNA exonerations that their project had gained and published a book that
laid out and illustrated nine distinct factors leading to wrongful convictions with
journalist Jim Dwyer. Id. at 246, 257, 258 (listing as the nine factors: mistaken
eyewitness identification, false confession, fraudulent science, jailhouse snitches,
invalid forensic science, prosecutorial misconduct, inadequate defense representation,
race, and the death penalty). In 1996, the U.S. Department of Justice conducted a
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learned from the DNA exonerations, innocence advocates have devised
a detailed agenda for criminal justice reform, drawing on social
scientific research to endorse "best practices" for avoiding wrongful
convictions in a variety of problem areas.3
The challenge currently facing innocence advocates-and the
subject of this Article-is how to embed proposed innocence reforms
within institutional structures that will sustain them over time. As
innocence advocates have pointed out, the window into the criminal
justice system that DNA exonerations currently provide "will not
remain open forever."' It was created by a sudden surge in the
advancement of technology that allowed new and more definitive
analyses of biological specimens languishing in crime labs or police
vaults.5  However, technology has caught up and DNA testing is now
being conducted as part of the initial investigation of crimes.6 As a
result, the era of postconviction DNA exonerations-the dramatic and
public reopening of cases based on clear evidence of actual innocence-
will eventually pass. Before the window closes, innocence reformers
urge criminal justice system reforms based on lessons taught by DNA
exonerations.
In 2005, Wisconsin underwent a breathtaking course of reform in
two of the problem areas that have plagued wrongful convictions:
mistaken eyewitness identification and false confession. In July 2005,
study of twenty-eight wrongful convictions. EDWARD CONNORS ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, CONVICTED BY JURIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF
DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL (1996), available at
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/dnaevid.pdf. The most comprehensive study, conducted
by lead investigator Samuel Gross, a professor at the University of Michigan Law
School, compiles data and analyzes the causes of wrongful convictions in 340
exoneration cases from 1989 to 2003. Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the
United States 1989 Through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523 (2005).
3. DWYER ET AL., supra note 2, at 255-60 (providing an appendix with a
"short list of reforms to protect the innocent"). More detailed information about
reforms, including model state legislation in areas identified as leading to wrongful
convictions, is widely shared through innocence project Web sites. See, e.g.,
Innocence Project: Policy, http://www.innocenceproject.org/policy/ (last visited Mar.
3, 2006).
4. Findley, supra note 1, at 337; see also DWYER ET AL., supra note 2, at 250
(noting that because of the growing use of DNA before trial, "[iun a few years, the era
of DNA exonerations will come to an end"); James S. Liebman, The New Death
Penalty Debate: What's DNA Got to Do with It 33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 527,
547 (2002) (noting that as DNA testing becomes more widespread, the unsettling effect
of exonerations on the sense of fairness in the criminal justice system may dissipate
without motivating reform to address the underlying causes of wrongful convictions).
5. Keith A. Findley, New Laws Reflect the Power and Potential of DNA,
Wis. LAW., May 2002, at 20, 21.
6. See DWYER ET AL., supra note 2, at 250; Findley, supra note 1, at 337.
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the Wisconsin Supreme Court handed down a pair of decisions that
responded explicitly to the risk of wrongful conviction by reaching
outside the boundaries of federal constitutional law to create new
standards for excluding identification and confession evidence.7 In
December 2005, the Wisconsin State Legislature enacted a criminal
justice reform bill that mandates local law enforcement agencies to
develop written policies for eyewitness identification procedures. The
bill is designed to minimize the risk of mistaken identification,
mandates the electronic recording of all juvenile custodial
interrogations, and declares a state policy that all custodial
interrogations of adults in felony cases should be electronically
recorded s
As a result of these changes to the law governing police
investigatory practices, Wisconsin has launched itself onto the cutting
edge of innocence reform. The Wisconsin reforms to police
identification and interrogation procedures share a similar structure:
although social scientific understanding of best investigatory practices
forms the backdrop for reform, the content of police practice was
neither legislatively nor judicially dictated to local law enforcement
7. In State v. Dubose, the court departed from the federal due process
standard that allows an impermissibly suggestive identification to be introduced into
evidence if the court finds that it is nonetheless reliable, and interpreted its state
constitutional due process provision to require a more exacting inquiry based on
whether it was necessary for police to rely on the identification procedure they
deployed. 2005 WI 126, I 24, 25, 33, 285 Wis. 2d 143, 11 24, 25, 33, 699 N.W.2d
582, 11 24, 25, 33. In In re Jerrell CJ., the court invoked its supervisory authority
over the lower courts to require the electronic recording of custodial interrogations in
juvenile cases as a precondition to the admissibility of any confession arising from
police interrogation. 2005 WI 105, 3, 283 Wis. 2d 145, 1 3, 699 N.W.2d 110, 1 3.
8. Assemb. B. 648, 2004-2005 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2005). The reform
bill is now codified in several sections of the Wisconsin Statutes. WIS. STAT. § 175.50
(2005-2006) (outlining eyewitness identification procedures); WIs. STAT. § 938 .195
(2005-2006) (providing for mandatory recording of juvenile interrogations); WIS. STAT.
§ 938.31 (2005-2006) (rendering inadmissible juvenile statements derived from
unrecorded custodial interrogation); WIS. STAT. § 968.073 (2005-2006) (declaring a
state policy that custodial interrogations of adults in felony cases should be recorded);
WIs. STAT. § 972.115 (2005-2006) (providing for a mandatory jury instruction when
the statement of an adult in a felony case is introduced into evidence in the absence of a
recorded custodial interrogation).
In addition to addressing eyewitness identification and custodial interrogation
procedures, the criminal justice reform bill included measures regulating the retention
of and testing of biological crime scene evidence, and extending the statute of
limitations for bringing sexual assault charges when DNA testing excludes the person
initially identified as the perpetrator. Assemb. B. 648, 2004-2005 Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Wis. 2005).
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agencies.' Rather, the Wisconsin reforms in both areas allow-and in
the area of eyewitness identification require-local agencies to develop
and periodically revisit the policies that govern their own practices in
light of social scientific theory and in light of models developed in other
jurisdictions. 0
Because of an institutional structure that delegates rulemaking
authority to local police agencies, Wisconsin's innocence reforms fit
well within a new paradigm of regulatory jurisprudence called
"democratic experimentalism" or "new governance."" Democratic
experimentalism eschews top-down "command-and-control" regulation
in favor of allowing practices to be developed from the bottom-up
through provisional and localized problem solving, and embeds these
local problem-solving efforts within larger structures of transparency
that promote accountability and cross-jurisdictional learning.' 2 A
9. See infra Part II.C.
10. Law enforcement agencies are required to adopt written eyewitness
identification policies that "shall be designed to reduce the potential for erroneous
identifications by eyewitnesses in criminal cases." WIS. STAT. § 175.50(2) (2005-
2006). Agencies are required to review these policies biannually. Id. In developing
and revising their policies, agencies are mandated to "consider model policies and
policies adopted in other jurisdictions" and must also consider "practices to enhance the
objectivity and reliability of eyewitness identification and to minimize the possibility of
mistaken identification." WIs. STAT. § 175.50(4)-(5). With respect to custodial
interrogation practices, the mandates for learning about investigative practices are less
specific. However, the legislation declares a state policy that all custodial
interrogations in felony cases should be electronically recorded and mandates that
juvenile interrogations must be recorded. The resulting record of interrogation
practices developed by interrogation tapes can be used in Wisconsin as they have been
used in other jurisdictions to study and improve interrogation techniques. See THOMAS
P. SULLIVAN, POLICE EXPERIENCES WITH RECORDING CUSTODIAL INTERROGATIONS 16-17
(2004), available at www.law.northwestern.edu/wrongfulconvictions/Causes/
Custodiallnterrogations.htm (noting the benefit of using recorded interrogations to
enhance police training about interrogation techniques).
11. For articles that theorize experimentalism or "new governance" broadly as
a new or emerging paradigm, see Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution
of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 267 (1998); Orly Lobel, The
Renew Deal The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary
Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REv. 342 (2004); Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon,
Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARv. L. REv. 1015
(2004); William H. Simon, Solving Problems vs. Claiming Rights: The Pragmatist
Challenge to Legal Liberalism, 46 WM. & MARY L. REv. 127 (2004). Brandon Garrett
has already begun the process of analyzing innocence reforms in light of the
experimentalist paradigm by examining the reformist potential of suits brought under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 by the wrongfully convicted as part of a larger project analyzing
innocence commissions and legislative and administrative reform. See Brandon L.
Garrett, Innocence, Harmless Error, and Federal Wrongfil Conviction Law, 2005 WIs.
L. REv. 35, 39 n. 16.
12. See infra Part II.A.
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growing body of scholarship studies the emergence of experimentalist
regulatory methods-to one degree or another-in sectors as diverse as
environmental law, 3 health and safety regulation,' 4 employment
discrimination, 5 community organizing,' 6 public school reform, 7 and
community policing.' 8
This Article considers the Wisconsin innocence reforms as a case
study in emerging experimentalist governance, illustrating both its
promise and the challenge of experimentalist reform. Part I lays the
background and context for Wisconsin's reforms by showing how
social scientists understand the problems of mistaken eyewitness
identification and false confession, and how this understanding has
shaped the direction of proposed innocence reforms. It also examines
how the constitutional doctrine governing eyewitness identification and
confession evidence has evolved in ways that mute the concern for
truth-finding and disregard what social science teaches about the effects
of investigatory practices on juries' ability to accurately determine
guilt. Part II offers a different way of looking at the possibilities of
using law to stimulate reform in the investigatory practices of law
enforcement agencies by examining the Wisconsin reforms within the
democratic experimentalist governance paradigm. Part II explains the
paradigm and demonstrates how the legislative and judicial reforms in
Wisconsin-particularly to eyewitness identification procedures-could
work together to create an institutional architecture of pressure and
incentive for local law enforcement agencies to engage in the kind of
continuous reform of their practices that experimentalist governance
envisions.
However, the potential for an experimentalist regulatory regime to
emerge from the Wisconsin reforms does not ensure that such a regime
will become a reality. Reform under the democratic experimentalist
paradigm faces two practical challenges: (1) the challenge of gaining
13. Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the AdMinistrative State, 45
UCLA L. REv. 1 (1997); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information as Environmental
Regulation: TRI and Performance Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm?, 89
GEO. L.J. 257 (2001).
14. Freeman, supra note 13.
15. Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A
Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 458 (2001).
16. Julissa Reynoso, Putting Out Fires Before They Begin, 24 LAW & INEQ.
(forthcoming 2006).
17. James S. Liebman & Charles F. Sabel, A Public Laboratory Dewey
Barely Imagined." The Emerging Model of School Governance and Legal Reform, 28
N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 183 (2003).




genuine buy-in to a problem-solving process of systemic reform by
diverse stakeholders; and (2) the challenge of creating institutional
structures that will sustain reform as a continuous process into the
future. The remaining parts of this Article explore the implications of
those challenges in the specific context of the Wisconsin reforms. Part
III analyzes how Wisconsin was able to make significant progress
toward meeting the first challenge-gaining genuine buy-in to systemic
reform-by explaining the specific interactions between national
networks, local pilot projects, and political processes that created the
conditions for major judicial and legislative changes to the criminal
procedural law governing law enforcement investigations in Wisconsin.
Part IV concludes that although Wisconsin's innocence reforms are
promising, they lack an adequate institutional structure to sustain a
process of continuous reform. The only mechanism that the reforms
provide for holding local law enforcement agencies accountable to the
experimentalist goals of cross-jurisdictional learning and public
accountability is the exclusionary rule in individual criminal cases. I
argue that the exclusionary rule will be inadequate to serve these
experimentalist purposes. I argue that if the experimentalist potential of
the Wisconsin reforms is to come to fruition, administrative agencies-
specifically the Wisconsin Department of Justice-will need to take a
more active role in creating structures of information coordination.
However, if it embarks on this task, Wisconsin faces challenges that
point to deeper tensions within the democratic experimentalist paradigm
itself.
I. CAUSES OF WRONGFUL CONVICTION AND CONSTITUTIONAL
REGULATION OF POLICE INVESTIGATIONS
Wisconsin's innocence reforms address two of the known causes
of wrongful conviction that have emerged from the study of DNA
exonerations: mistaken identifications and false confessions. With
regard to mistaken identifications, the Wisconsin reforms make two
significant changes to the law governing eyewitness identification.
First, the Wisconsin Supreme Court announced a new state
constitutional standard for excluding suggestive eyewitness
identification evidence. 9 This new standard rejects the flawed federal
due process standard, which allows courts to admit identification
evidence if it is deemed reliable based on factors that have been
criticized by social scientists as insensitive to the dangers of mistaken
19. State v. Dubose, 2005 WI 126, 285 Wis. 2d 143, 699 N.W.2d 582
(2005).
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identification." The new Wisconsin state constitutional standard
focuses instead on whether the police's use of a suggestive
identification procedure was necessary under the circumstances.2
Second, criminal justice reform legislation mandates local law
enforcement agencies to develop written policies regarding eyewitness
identification in light of social-scientifically sound practices, model
policies, policies adopted in other jurisdictions, and to review these
policies biannually.22 With respect to custodial interrogations, the
criminal justice reform legislation declared a state policy that custodial
interrogations should be recorded. 3 In juvenile cases, it codified a
Wisconsin Supreme Court case holding that statements arising from
unrecorded custodial interrogations are inadmissible; 24 in adult cases, it
required that juries be instructed that they "may consider the absence"
21of recording in evaluating the evidence.
These Wisconsin reforms to the law governing police identification
and interrogation practices respond to lessons that social science teaches
about the causes and cures of wrongful convictions, and confront the
failure of constitutional doctrine to engage courts and law enforcement
in what should be a shared truth-seeking mission. The next section lays
the background and context for understanding the significance of the
Wisconsin reforms by examining what social scientists understand
about how flawed investigatory practices can lead to mistaken
eyewitness identifications and false confessions, and how these
practices can be changed to lower the risk that they will result in
wrongful convictions. It also examines the constitutional doctrine that
governs the admissibility of identification and confession evidence,
showing how the Warren Court understood the potential for police
practices to contaminate evidence presented at trial, and both half-
heartedly tried and ultimately failed to respond by regulating police
investigations with constitutional doctrine.
20. See infra notes 113-18 and accompanying text.
21. Dubose, 285 Wis.2d, 33, 699 N.W.2d, 33.
22. WIs. STAT. § 175.50 (2005-2006).
23. WIS. STAT. § 968.073(2) (2005-2006).
24. WiS. STAT. § 938.31(3) (2005-2006). This requirement codified the ruling
in In re Jerre]] C.f., 2005 WI 105, 283 Wis. 2d 145, 699 N.W.2d 110.
25. WIS. STAT. § 972.115(2) (2005-2006).
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A. Causes of Wrongful Conviction and Proposed Innocence Reforms
1. MISTAKEN IDENTIFICATION
Mistaken eyewitness identification has emerged as the most
prevalent cause of wrongful convictions.26 Social scientific research
helps explain why. Beginning in the 1970s, psychologists began to
study the malleability of eyewitness memory, showing that
eyewitnesses' accounts of past events could be manipulated by
suggestive questioning.27 Psychologists have applied these insights to
specific police procedures that lead to the mistaken eyewitness
identification of an innocent suspect.2s
Laboratory studies have shown that it is surprisingly easy to induce
a mistaken identification from a lineup procedure when the real
perpetrator is not present as long as people in the lineup match the
general description of the perpetrator and the lineup administrator
instructs the eyewitness that the suspect might be present.29 Under such
26. Gross et al., supra note 2, at 542 (reporting that 64 percent of the 340
exoneration cases in their study involved mistaken identifications); CONNORS ET AL.,
supra note 2 (reporting that twenty-four out of twenty-eight cases involved mistaken
eyewitness testimony presented at trial).
27. Elizabeth F. Loftus et al., Effects of Questioning Upon a Witness' Later
Recollections, 3 J. POLICE SCI. & ADMIN. 162, 165 (1975); Elizabeth F. Loftus & John
C. Palmer, Reconstruction of Automobile Destruction: An Example of the Interaction
Between Language and Memory, 13 J. VERBAL LEARNING & VERBAL BEHAV. 585
(1974); Elizabeth F. Loftus et al., Semantic Integration of Verbal Information Into a
Visual Memory, 4 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUM. LEARNING & MEMORY 19
(1978).
28. One of the leading researchers in this field is Gary Wells, who in 1978
published a paper that distinguished between "estimator variables" and "system
variables." Gary L. Wells, Applied Eyewitness-Testimony Research: System Variables
and Estimator Variables, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1546 (1978). Estimator
variables are conditions that affect eyewitness memory, but over which law
enforcement has no control, such as the length of time that the witness had to view the
perpetrator, the lighting conditions, or whether a gun was present. Gary L. Wells et
al., From the Lab to the Police Station: A Successful Application of Eyewitness
Research, 55 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 581, 582 (2000) [hereinafter Wells et al., Lab to
Police Station]. System variables are conditions relating to the conduct of identification
procedures that affect eyewitness memory, such as the selection of "fillers" in a lineup
or the suggestiveness of instruction or feedback to an eyewitness. Id. at 582, 584-85.
Because system variables are within the control of law enforcement, understanding their
effect on eyewitness memory can lead to reform of investigatory practices in ways that
minimize mistaken identifications. Id. at 582.
29. Gary L. Wells & Amy L. Bradfield, "Good, You Identified the Suspect"."
Feedback to Eyewitnesses Distorts Their Reports of the Witnessing Experience, 83 J.
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 360, 363 (1998) (reporting a 100 percent false identification rate
652
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conditions, eyewitnesses tend to base identifications on relative
judgments, comparing lineup members to one another to determine
which one most closely resembles the perpetrator.3 °  Confirming
feedback from the administrator after the identification, which indicates
that the eyewitness has chosen the "right" suspect from a lineup or
photo array, has the further distorting effect of raising the witness's
confidence level in the mistaken identification.31 Confirming feedback
not only inflates eyewitnesses' levels of confidence in their mistaken
identifications, it also distorts their reports of the witnessing experience
itself, inflating their estimates of how good a view they had of the
culprit, how attentive they were to the culprit's face, and how well they
were able to discern specific facial features.32
Building on the momentum generated by DNA exonerations,
innocence reformers have coalesced around a set of reforms to
eyewitness identification procedures based on existing psychological
research.33 To ensure that administrators do not unintentionally signal
to the eyewitness which person in a lineup or photo array is the suspect,
researchers suggest double-blind procedures, in which the administrator
does not know which person the police suspect.34 To guard against the
danger of eyewitnesses' tendency to rely on relative judgments and pick
the person who looks most like the culprit-whether or not the culprit is
present-researchers recommend that eyewitnesses be given neutral
instructions that inform them that the suspect "might or might not" be
included in a lineup or photo array.3" To combat the inflationary
effects of confirming feedback on eyewitness confidence levels, social
using this method in a study that involved 172 participants, and referring to a previous
study that obtained a 97 percent false identification rate when these three factors were
present).
30. Gary L. Wells, The Psychology of Lineup Identifications, 14 J. APPLIED
SOC. PSYCHOL. 89 (1984).
31. Carolyn Semmiler et al., Effects of Postidentification Feedback on
Eyewitness Identification and Nonidentification Confidence, 89 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL.
334 (2004); Wells & Bradfield, supra note 29.
32. Wells & Bradfield, supra note 29, at 366-68.
33. A set of four recommendations was published in a "white paper" prepared
by a subcommittee of leading researchers in the area of eyewitness identification
appointed by the Executive Committee of the American Psychology and Law Society.
Gary L. Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures: Recommendations for
Lineups and Photospreads, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 603, 627-29 (1998) [hereinafter
Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures]. For a discussion of seven
suggested reforms, see Gary L. Wells, Eyewitness Identification: Systemic Reforms,
2006 Wis. L. Rv. 615 [hereinafter Wells, Systemic Reforms].
34. Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures, supra note 33, at 617-
19, 627-29.
35. Id. at 615, 629-30.
653
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
scientists suggest that police record witness confidence levels
immediately after the identification occurs.36 This practice provides a
tool for combating the distortions in the level of confidence that an
eyewitness may naturally experience by the time he or she is asked to
testify at trial, simply by virtue of the fact that the decision by police
and prosecutors to institute criminal proceedings against a suspect will
inevitably provide feedback that confirms the identification.37
One of the more controversial suggested reforms has been the
recommendation by researchers that subjects be presented to an
eyewitness sequentially rather than simultaneously.3" The settled
practice in most law enforcement identification procedures is to present
the suspect in a lineup or photo array simultaneously with known-
innocent fillers.39 When the actual culprit is not present in the lineup,
this simultaneous style of presentation can lead to mistaken
identifications by facilitating the eyewitness's reliance on relative
judgments, leading the eyewitness to pick the person in the lineup or
photo array who most closely matches his or her memory of the
culprit. 4' Sequential procedures, in which the suspect and fillers are
presented one at a time, have been shown in multiple studies to reduce
the rates of mistaken identifications.4' However, when the culprit is
present in the lineup, the sequential procedure has led to some loss of
36. Id. at 624-27, 635-36.
37. In real world prosecutions, the confirming feedback may not be
immediate, as it may take days or even months for an eyewitness to find out charges
have been brought against the suspect. However, laboratory study has shown that
delays of forty-eight hours between identification and confirming feedback do not
diminish its effects. Gary L. Wells et al., Distorted Retrospective Eyewitness Reports
as Functions of Feedback and Delay, 9 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 42 (2003). The
process of preparing an eyewitness to respond to questioning at trial has also been
shown to distort the confidence level that a witness expresses during testimony. Wells
et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures, supra note 33, at 624-25.
38. The psychologists whose consensus paper provided the basis for many of
the reforms did not include sequential lineup and photo arrays as one of their
procedural recommendations, though they included a discussion of it. Wells et al.,
Eyewitness Identification Procedures, supra note 33, at 639-40. The U.S. Department
of Justice stopped short of endorsing sequential methods of presentation as a preferred
procedure. TECHNICAL WORKING GROUP FOR EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE: A GUIDE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT 9 (1999), available
at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/178240.pdf. Gary Wells, whose research with
Amy Bradfield has provided the impetus for sequential identification procedures,
continues to recommend them. See Wells, Systemic Reforms, supra note 33.
39. Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures, supra note 33, at 640.
40. Nancy Steblay et al., Eyewitness Accuracy Rates in Sequential and
Simultaneous Lineup Presentations: A Meta-Anaytic Comparison, 35 LAw & HUM.
BEHAV. 459, 468 (2001).
41. Id. at 460.
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correct identifications because eyewitnesses are more hesitant to make
any choice at all using the sequential procedure.42 The hesitancy to
make an identification choice aids accuracy if the police have arrested
the wrong person, but may inhibit accuracy if the police have arrested
the right person.43  Because sequential presentation procedures
represent a significant departure from current police practices and raise
questions about implementation and the loss of correct identifications,
they have been slower to gain support.'
2. FALSE CONFESSION
The idea that someone would confess to a crime that he or she did
not commit is "counterintuitive and startling."45  Yet wrongful
conviction studies demonstrate that it happens with some frequency,'
and that when it does, the effect on juries is powerful.47 Social
scientific studies have shown that evidence that a defendant has
confessed, perhaps more than any other kind of evidence, is "likely to
42. Id. at 463. Among those who do make a choice, the accuracy between
simultaneous and sequential procedures is not significant. Id. at 464.
43. However, researchers have noted that in real-world conditions, the loss of
correct identifications was less likely to be a problem than it has been in laboratory
settings because one of the factors that minimizes the loss-asking the eyewitness to
provide a description of the suspect prior to the identification procedure-is likely to
occur in the course of an actual investigation. Id. at 468-69.
44. See, e.g., Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures, supra note
33, at 640 (declining to recommend sequential procedures in part because their adoption
without also adopting double-blind procedures might increase the problem of mistaken
identification); Wells et al., Lab to Police Station, supra note 28, at 595 (speculating on
the reasons for resistance within the DOJ's working group to declaring a sequential
procedure superior).
45. Keith Findley, Taping Would Help Prevent Wrongful Convictions,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Feb. 13, 2005, at 1J.
46. Studies of wrongful convictions demonstrate that false confessions occur
in anywhere from 14 to 25 percent of the total number of wrongful convictions
identified in the study. See Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False
Confessions in the Post-DNA World, 82 N.C. L. REv. 891, 907 (2004) (summarizing
the results of four studies). Drizin & Leo's own study examined 125 cases of proven
wrongful convictions that included a false confession by the defendant. Id. at 924-25;
see also Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions:
Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of Psychological
Interrogation, 88 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429, 432-34 (1998) (analyzing sixty false
confessions that occurred in wrongful conviction cases).
47. Richard A. Leo et al., Bringing Reliability Back in: False Confessions and
Legal Safeguards in the Twenty-First Century, 2006 Wis. L. REv 479.
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dominate all other case evidence and lead a trier of fact to convict the
defendant. ,
48
Unlike mistaken identifications, which are fairly simple to simulate
in a laboratory setting, it is difficult to artificially create a situation with
the unique psychological pressures and incentives that attend police
interrogation. However, social psychological analyses of the
interrogation techniques that police regularly employ,5 ° as well as
studies of confessions later conclusively proven to be false,5" have
shown how psychologically coercive techniques by police interact with
personality factors of suspects to result in the phenomenon of false
confession.52
The decision to confess falsely can best be understood within the
context of techniques that police employ to manipulate a suspect's
assessment of the situation so that he or she concludes-contrary to the
suspect's actual interests-that confessing is the most rational option.1
3
Psychologically based interrogation techniques follow a multistage
process that first convinces the suspect that the interrogator already has
overwhelming evidence of guilt and that continued denial is pointless.
The process then seeks "to motivate a now resigned and despairing
suspect to admit guilt" by focusing on the incentives attendant to
48. Leo & Ofshe, supra note 46, at 429 (citing studies by Saul M. Kassin and
Lawrence S. Wrightsman).
49. See Saul M. Kassin & Lawrence S. Wrightsman, Confession Evidence, in
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EVIDENCE AND TRIAL PROCEDURE 67, 90 (Saul M. Kassin &
Lawrence S. Wrightsman eds., 1985) (stating that "[t]o date. .. the uncorroborated
anecdote is our only source of data," and suggesting the need for a "creative
experimental paradigm" to test the risk of false confessions from the use of
psychological interrogation techniques).
50. See Richard J. Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely.-
Rational Choice and Irrational Action, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 979 (1997). Psychologists
Saul Kassin and Lawrence Wrightsman provided an important early typology of false
confessions, dividing them into voluntary, coerced-compliant, and coerced-internalized.
Kassin & Wrightsman, supra note 49, at 76-78; see also GISLI H. GUDJONSSON, THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS: A HANDBOOK 173-216 (2003)
(surveying the psychological literature broadly and refining the typologies of false
confessions).
51. Drizin & Leo, supra note 46; Leo & Ofshe, supra note 46.
52. Leo et al, supra note 47.
53. Ofshe & Leo, supra note 50, at 985. Getting the suspect to that point is
the explicit premise on which leading police interrogation manuals are based. See,
e.g., FRED E. INBAU ET AL., INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 332 (3d ed. 1986)
("The goal of interrogation ... is to decrease the suspect's perception of the
consequences of confessing, while at the same time increasing the suspect's internal
anxiety associated with his deception . . ").
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confession 4.5  These incentives can range from weak incentives, such as
an assuaged conscience or the investigator's respect, to stronger
incentives, such as predictions or threats of punishment if the suspect
continues to maintain innocence and predictions or promises of leniency
if the suspect confesses.5" This process of breaking down a suspect's
resistance to admitting guilt and then building up the motivation to
confess can-and in taped interrogation sessions does-involve a range
of heavy-handed tactics that include yelling, swearing, and other
dominating behavior;56 exaggeration or outright fabrication of evidence
that investigators have against the suspect;57 and exaggerated threats,
predictions, or promises regarding how the suspect will be treated in
the criminal justice system.58
Although good evidence of what actually occurred inside the
interrogation room in proven wrongful conviction cases is sometimes
lacking,59 social psychologists have identified some recurring patterns
that result in false confessions. One recurring scenario involves high-
profile cases where the pressure on police to find the perpetrator pushes
54. Ofshe & Leo, supra note 50, at 989-90; see GUDJONSSON, supra note 50,
at 12-21 (describing the nine steps of the Reid Method of interrogation).
55. Ofshe & Leo, supra note 50, at 990. Ofshe & Leo note that because using
explicit threats or promises is more likely to result in successful suppression motions,
police have become more sophisticated about using "more subtle and camouflaged
threats and promises to elicit confessions of guilt." Id. at 999 n.71.
56. Id. at 1004-08.
57. Id. at 1008-41 (detailing and illustrating, with examples drawn from actual
interrogation tapes, ploys such as untruthfully suggesting that eyewitnesses have
identified the suspect, that co-perpetrators have confessed and implicated the suspect,
that polygraph examiners can read the suspect's mind, that police can lift and match
prints off of a variety of surfaces, or that fictitious new technology can otherwise
identify the suspect). For a general discussion of deceptive police tactics in reported
cases, see Welsh S. White, Police Trickery in Inducing Confessions, 127 U. PA. L.
REv. 581 (1979).
58. Ofshe & Leo, supra note 50, at 1072-88. As previously noted, explicit
threats are no longer as common as they perhaps once were, and are generally not
favored techniques. However, Ofshe and Leo use transcripts of police interrogations to
demonstrate how police gradually move from less direct to more explicit threats and
promises to induce admissions of guilt. Ofshe & Leo, supra note 50, at 1060-1106
(describing and illustrating indirect threats and promises, more or less explicit threats
and promises, high-end threats and promises, and the use of the "accident scenario
technique" to suggest that if the suspect confesses others will understand that it was just
an accident, but if the suspect maintains denial the system will mete out the harshest
possible punishment).
59. The failure to collect statistical data on the number of interrogations and
confessions nationally, the failure to record what actually occurs in most police
interrogations, and the failure to agree on the "ground truth" of what really happened
in a particular case, all lead to difficulty in assessing the extent of the false confession
problem. Leo & Ofshe, supra note 46, at 431-32.
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interrogators to invoke high-end strategies to elicit a confession from a
suspect in custody, even in the face of scant evidence indicating guilt. 6
Another trend in false confession cases is the "multiplying effect,"
where the real or fabricated cooperation of one suspect is used to
induce admissions from other suspected co-perpetrators.61 In some
false confession cases, suspects simply give in to the pressures of the
interrogation process, producing what researchers call "stress-
compliant" confessions.62 Children, juveniles, mentally retarded, and
mentally ill suspects appear to be disproportionately vulnerable to
giving this kind of false confession, even if it is induced through normal
or low-end interrogation techniques.6 3 In other cases, especially when
the police have claimed that irrefutable physical evidence ties the
suspect to the crime, the suspect confesses because of a belief that he or
she must have committed the crime, though the suspect cannot
remember doing so. 4
Legal scholars disagree about what types of reform would best
protect against the danger of an innocent person falsely confessing
without hampering law enforcement's ability to elicit true confessions
from the guilty. Some advocate the creation of bright-line rules that
would use the exclusionary rule to bar the use of confessions gained
through specific psychological interrogation techniques known to
60. Welsh S. White, False Confessions and the Constitution: Safeguards
Against Untrustworthy Confessions, 32 HAnv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 105, 133 (1997)
(hypothesizing that "false confessions are most likely to occur in a small but significant
category of cases-high-profile cases in which the police have no suspects other than
the one who is subjected to interrogation"); see also Ofshe & Leo, supra note 50, at
1060 (speculating from a social-psychological perspective that low-end incentives such
as "reducing guilt, doing the right thing, showing empathy for the victim's family,
straightening things out with God, and appearing honorable" are not likely to work with
an innocent person).
61. Drizin & Leo, supra note 46, at 974-76. Other aspects of the multiplying
effect include the inculpation of other innocent suspects as co-perpetrators and false
confessions to additional unsolved crimes. Id. at 981-95.
62. Kassin & Wrightsman, supra note 49, at 77-78; see also Ofshe & Leo,
supra note 50, at 997-98.
63. See Drizin & Leo, supra note 46, at 963-74; White, supra note 57, at 131.
64. Kassin and Wrightsman call these type of confessions "coerced-
internalized" false confessions. Kassin & Wrightsman, supra note 49, at 78. Ofshe
and Leo de-emphasize the aspect of police coercion and call these "persuaded false
confessions." Ofshe & Leo, supra note 50, at 1107. Believing that they must have
committed the crime in a blackout or that they are blocking out the traumatic memory
of committing it, suspects who give this type of confession rely on objective details
about the crime fed to them by police to reconstruct how the crime must have been
committed. Id. at 1107-10.
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correlate with false confessions.65 Such rules might include forbidding
police from using deceptive tactics like fabricating or misrepresenting
the strength of evidence against a suspect," reducing the psychological
pressure of interrogation by requiring police to announce at the outset
how long the interrogation will last.67 Others favor broad rules
excluding any statement gained through police interrogation, preferring
a regime in which statements could be compelled, but only in the
context of pretrial judicial proceedings.68
The social science researchers, on whose work these proposed
legal remedies are often based, tend to favor better training for police
investigators in the methods they already employ. For example,
Professors Richard Ofshe and Richard Leo suggest that police officers
can learn to treat a suspect's admission that "I did it"-coming after the
deployment of psychological interrogation techniques-as an indication
merely that the suspect's resistance has been overcome, not as
conclusive evidence of guilt.69 They argue that police should go on to
test its validity by analyzing the "fit" between the details in the
suspect's ensuing narrative while confessing to the crime and
corroborating facts from other sources.70
Despite some divergence, legal scholars from all camps have
reached overwhelming consensus with social scientists regarding one
65. Albert W. Alschuler, Constraint and Confession, 74 DENy. U. L. Rv.
957, 973 (1997).
66. Id. at 974. Welsh White would also support a due process standard
prohibiting police from "[dieceiving the suspect into believing that forensic evidence
establishes his guilt," and encouraging courts to "closely scrutinize any tactic that
misleads the suspect as to the strength of the evidence against him." White, supra note
57, at 149. Like Alschuler, he would prohibit the use of promises of leniency, and
would have courts closely scrutinize less direct "[i]nducements that suggest the
possibility of substantial leniency." Id. at 153.
67. Id. at 143-45. White would also limit police to nonleading questions with
particularly vulnerable suspects. Id. at 142-43.
68. See, e.g., Donald A. Dripps, Foreward: Against Police Interrogation-
and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimnation, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 699, 731
(1988).
69. Ofshe & Leo, supra note 50, at 991.
70. Id. at 990-93. In response, some have argued that courts should
determine the reliability of statements as a condition of admissibility based on whether a
suspect's postadmission narrative fits the facts of the case, includes facts that were not
made public or otherwise divulged to the suspect by interrogators, or led police to
evidence that the police did not already know. Leo et al., supra note 47. It is also
possible to make such arguments about corroboration and fit directly to a jury. See Leo
& Ofshe, supra note 46, at 495 (suggesting that, in addition to police officers, judges
and juries can be trained to assess the reliability of a confession according to the
criterion of fit between the postadmission narrative and the facts of the case not
otherwise known to the suspect).
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particular reform: the mandatory electronic recording of police
interrogations. 7 The benefits of mandatory recording appeal to diverse
constituents for different reasons. Researchers like recording because it
promises rich data for testing more accurately how and why police
interrogation sometimes leads to false confessions, which can be
incorporated into better police training.72 Courts like the recording of
interrogations because it alleviates the frustration of deciding "swearing
contests" in suppression hearings between police officers and criminal
defendants about what happened in the interrogation room.73 Although
less enthusiastic about the practice because it often does not help their
clients,74 criminal defense attorneys suggest that exposing interrogation
tactics to judges and juries may deter police from engaging in the more
egregious forms of misconduct that would otherwise occur in secret.75
Perhaps most importantly, law enforcement agencies-at least those that
have tried it-voice "virtually unanimous support" for the practice of
recording custodial interrogations.76 Law enforcement agents
employing the practice like to record interrogations because it protects
71. See, e.g., JOSEPH D. GRANO, CONFESSIONS, TRUTH, AND THE LAW 221
(1993) (describing mandatory recording as "[o]ne reform that deserves consideration");
Alschuler, supra note 65, at 977 (noting consensus among legal scholars on videotaping
police interrogations and calling it the "first step in implementing these rules (or any
others)"); Gerald M. Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 VAND. L. REv. 1417, 1475
(1985) ("A rule mandating recording would confine extensive questioning to those
cases in which it mattered most and would provide an accurate record by which the
judiciary could evaluate the police pressure on the suspect."); Paul G. Cassell,
Miranda 's Social Costs: An Empirical Reassessment, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 387, 486-97
(1996) (advocating replacing Miranda with a more limited regime of warnings and
videotaping); Drizin & Leo, supra note 46, at 997-98 (advocating for mandatory
electronic recording of the entirety of all custodial interrogations to help decide
"swearing contests" between police and criminal defendants, deter police from using
improper tactics, and assist both internal and external monitoring of the quality of
interrogation and the reliability of confession statements); Ofshe & Leo, supra note 50,
at 1120-22 (recommending mandatory taping of interrogations to help courts assess
their reliability and whether more subtle psychological tactics had the effect of coercing
a statement); White, supra note 57, at 153-55 (advocating videotaping of interrogations
along with other reforms to specific police procedures).
72. Ofshe & Leo, supra note 50, at 1120.
73. See Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156 (Alaska 1985).
74. WILLIAM A. GELLER, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, VIDEOTAPING
INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS 12 (1993).
75. Interview with Keith Findley, Co-Director of the Wisconsin Innocence
Project, in Madison, Wis. (Dec. 29, 2005).
76. See Thomas P. Sullivan, Police Experiences with Recording CustoLIl
Interrogations, 88 JUDICATURE 132-33 (2004). Sullivan undertook an informal study
that surveyed more than 260 local police agencies that had already implemented
recording of custodial interrogation. Id at 133. For Sullivan's report, see SULLIVAN,
supra note 10.
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them against spurious claims of coercion, reduces the number of
suppression motions that defense attorneys file, enhances their
investigatory power by creating a permanent record of all the details a
suspect has provided, and provides a useful training tool to help
improve interrogation methods."
As a result of the recent wave of DNA exonerations, states are
beginning to turn their attention to reforms that respond to the problems
identified in the social scientific literature. Commissions studying the
causes of wrongful convictions increasingly recommend reforms to
eyewitness identification procedures that incorporate social
scientifically recognized methods,78 and such reforms are being
implemented in some police departments.79 In addition, a growing
number of states mandate electronic recording of custodial interrogation
in at least some types of cases s8 and the practice has gained widespread
77. Sullivan, supra note 76, at 132-33. However, as the experience of
Wisconsin legislative reform demonstrates, it is .sometimes difficult to sell the idea of
mandatory electronic recording on law enforcement agencies that have not tried it. See
infra notes 343-47 and accompanying text (discussing how electronic recording was at
first rejected and then gained acceptance in the Avery Task Force).
78. In October 1999, the U.S. Department of Justice issued national
recommendations for collecting eyewitness evidence that grew out of a working group
composed of geographically diverse representatives of law enforcement, prosecutors,
defense attorneys, and researchers. TECHNICAL WORKING GROUP FOR EYEWITNESS
EVIDENCE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE: A GUIDE FOR LAW
ENFORCEMENT 6 (1999), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/178240.pdf.
The report of Illinois Governor George Ryan's Commission on Capital Punishment
specifically relies on psychological literature as the basis for recommending double-
blind and sequential lineup and photo array procedures in homicide cases, and requiring
neutral instructions. COMM'N ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S
COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 32-34 (2002), available at
http://www.state.il.us/Defender/report.pdf. In March 2005, the Innocence
Commission of Virginia issued a set of recommendations that include double-blind
procedures, neutral instructions, avoidance of feedback, and sequential presentation.
THE INNOCENCE COMM'N FOR VA., A VISION FOR JUSTICE: REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS IN THE COMMONWEALTH OF
VIRGINIA 8-9 (2005), available at http://www.nicic.org/Library/020531.
79. See COMM'N ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 78, at 33; see also
Wells, Systemic Reforms, supra note 33, at 641-43 (detailing eyewitness identification
reforms in a variety of jurisdictions).
80. In 1996, only two states mandated electronic recording, each by judicial
rule. Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156, 1162 (Alaska 1985); State v. Scales, 518
N.W.2d 587, 592 (Minn. 1994). In the past two years, five other states in addition to
Wisconsin have legislatively mandated recording in some cases. D.C. CODE § 5-116.01
(2005) (mandating electronic recording of the entire custodial interrogation of suspects
in crimes of violence, unless the suspect makes a voluntary consent expressly
conditioned on ceasing electronic recording); D.C. CODE § 5-116.03 (2005)
(establishing a rebuttable presumption that a statement is involuntary when the
statement is not acquired according to § 5-116.01); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, §
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use in many police departments that are not mandated to do it.8
Unfortunately, as we will see in the following section, the constitutional
doctrine within which these reforms are occurring does little to support
the social scientific understanding of how mistaken identification and
false confessions come about and how they affect trial processes. The
reforms are happening despite-and in some instances in opposition
to-legal standards designed to protect the integrity of trial processes.
B. Criminal Procedural Rights and the Shared Truth-Seeking Mission
of Police and Courts
The sharpest critics of the Warren Court's criminal justice
procedure revolution decry its deployment of the exclusionary rule to
regulate the way police interact with citizens in a zero-sum game that
sacrifices convictions by excluding otherwise reliable evidence from use
at trial.82 Critics object to the Warren Court's intrusion into state
criminal procedure through what they view as the unprincipled
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment to invoke individual rights
as barriers against effective law enforcement, checking the power of
states to investigate crime by methods that encroach upon the privacy,
2803-B(1)(K) (2004) (mandating law enforcement agencies to adopt written policies "to
deal with" electronic recording "of law enforcement interviews of suspects in serious
crimes and the preservation of investigative notes and records in such cases"); 725 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/103-2.1(b) (West 2004) (mandating that an adult suspect's
statement made in a custodial interrogation is presumed inadmissible unless it is
electronically recorded and "substantially accurate and not intentionally altered"); 725
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/5-401.5(b) (West 2004) (making a minor suspect's
unrecorded statement inadmissible); Tnx. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 38.22(3)
(Vernon 2005) (mandating that a statement is inadmissible unless it is recorded in its
entirety); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-14-4.5 (LexisNexis 2005) (requiring law enforcement
to electronically record the entire custodial interrogation in felony investigations "when
reasonably able to do so" unless the officer has "good cause" not to record).
Courts have also used their supervisory authority to regulate the recording of
custodial interrogation. The Massachusetts Supreme Court has mandated a cautionary
jury instruction when the prosecution introduces evidence of a defendant's unrecorded
custodial confession or statement. Commonwealth v. DiGiambattista, 813 N.E.2d 516,
533-34 (2004). The Supreme Court of New Jersey recently enacted a supreme court
rule declaring the failure to record a custodial interrogation in cases involving several
serious felonies to be a factor for consideration by trial courts in determining the
admissibility of the statement and as the basis for a cautionary jury instruction. N.J.
SuP. CT. R. 3:17 (adopted Oct. 14, 2005).
81. See GELLER, supra note 74, at 1; Sullivan, supra note 76, at 133.
82. See generally Donald A. Dripps, Beyond the Warren Court and Its
Conservative Critics: Toward a Unified Theory of Constitutional Criminal Procedure,
23 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 591 (1990) (describing the two premises of the conservative
critique as insufficient attention to the truth-finding function of criminal trials and
disregard of principled constitutional interpretation).
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autonomy, or dignity of citizens. 3 The common understanding of this
Warren Court jurisprudence puts the role of courts as protectors of the
rights of citizens in opposition to the role of law enforcement agencies
as the protectors of public safety.
However, another thread relating more specifically to the shared
interest of police and courts in accurate fact-finding wove its way in
and around the Warren Court criminal procedure reforms. Rather than
pitting the courts against law enforcement interests, the concern for
truth-seeking points to the criminal justice system as a shared enterprise
involving both the police and the courts in the common task of finding
and punishing the true perpetrators of crime and exonerating the
wrongfully accused. The role of the courts in this truth-seeking thread
of Warren Court jurisprudence is not primarily to regulate the way
police interact with citizens, but to keep police from contaminating
evidence that will eventually be presented at trial. The exclusionary
rule functions in this regard as a guarantor rather than an inhibiter of
truth-seeking by excluding evidence that has been rendered unreliable
by the actions of the police.
The next section follows the truth-seeking thread as it traveled
through the Court's constitutional regulation of police eyewitness
identification and custodial interrogation practices. It first examines the
importance of truth-seeking to the Warren Court as it attempted to
regulate the integrity of police investigations by extending one of the
protections of trial-the presence of counsel-to lineups and custodial
interrogations. It then turns to the Court's due process jurisprudence,
which addressed concerns of both the reliability and fairness of police
investigatory practices under "totality of circumstances" tests. Finally,
it turns to the Warren Court's own experimentalist impulse to use
criminal procedural rules to encourage local and experimental reform of
police investigatory practices.
1. TRUTH-SEEKING AND THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL AT INVESTIGATORY
STAGES
It would in some ways be comforting to think that the social
scientific evidence on which the currently proposed innocence reforms
are based represents a new advancement that was unknown to the Court
83. See id. at 592-93; see also George C. Thomas III, When Constitutional
Worlds Collide: Resurrecting the Framers' Bill of Rights and Criminal Procedure, 100
MICH. L. REv. 145 (2001) (discussing the historical illegitimacy of the view that the
Fourteenth Amendment incorporates provisions of the Bill of Rights by making them
directly applicable to the states).
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as it developed constitutional standards that have ultimately frustrated
the ability to protect against wrongful convictions. However, in both
the areas of eyewitness identification and custodial interrogation, the
Court demonstrated full awareness of the dangers that police
investigatory practices posed for the truth-seeking mission of courts. It
was simply unable to craft legal standards that could sustain meaningful
attention to the problem of wrongful convictions.
In the area of eyewitness identification, the Warren Court's
commitment to engaging police in a common truth-seeking mission was
expressed clearly and directly. Its decision in the seminal case of Wade
v. United States--where it held that postindictment lineups are a critical
stage at which counsel must be present-was based on the view that
identification procedures are "peculiarly riddled with innumerable
dangers and variable factors which might seriously, even crucially,
derogate from a fair trial."' The Court viewed its rule extending the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel as a way to assist, rather than
impede, legitimate law enforcement by helping to prevent "the
infiltration of taint in the prosecution's identification evidence," which
"cannot help the guilty avoid conviction but can only help assure that
the right man has been brought to justice. "85
With regard to custodial interrogation, the Court's protection of
the common truth-seeking mission is less evident because the Court
concerned itself primarily with issues of fairness and dignity at the
heart of the privilege against self-incrimination. Nevertheless, the
Court's Fifth and Sixth Amendment jurisprudence governing police
interrogations evinces a muted concern for whether a suspect's
confession is reliable, and whether trial procedures could adequately
test a false confession. The well-known Miranda rule prescribes a
specific procedure that police must employ to protect a defendant's
Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights: informing suspects in custody of
their constitutional rights to remain silent and to have an attorney
present during interrogation, and ceasing questioning if a suspect
84. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967). The Court noted that
the "vagaries of eyewitness identification are well-known," that the "identification of
strangers is proverbially untrustworthy," and that there is "suggestion inherent in the
manner in which the prosecution presents the suspect to witnesses for pretrial
identification." Id. On the same day, the Court decided Gilbert v. California, 388
U.S. 263 (1967). In Wade, the Court had vacated the conviction and remanded it to
the district court to determine whether the witnesses' in-court identification testimony
originated independent of the lineup, or whether the introduction of the evidence was
harmless error. Wade, 388 U.S. at 242. In Gilbert, the Court applied the independent-
source rule to the witnesses' in-court identifications, but announced a per se
exclusionary rule for their testimony about the lineup. Gilbert, 388 U.S. at 272-73.
85. Wade, 388 U.S. at 238.
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invokes those rights.8 6 The Miranda decision was primarily based on
the Court's concern that coercing someone to confess is an affront to
the basic dignity and integrity of citizens,87 and referred only
incidentally to the unreliability of coerced confessions.8"
Nonetheless, at least part of the Warren Court's reasoning in
developing its regulation of custodial interrogations addressed the
concern that coerced confessions were unreliable. The Miranda
warnings were intended to enforce the Court's Sixth Amendment ruling
in Escobedo v. 11inois that custodial interrogation is a critical stage of
the criminal adversarial process at which defendants are entitled to
counsel.8 9 The Court's reasoning in Escobedo was based in part on a
concern that investigatory techniques that depend on confessions are
unreliable and subject to abuse because they create incentives for police
to extract confessions from suspects, rather than develop "extrinsic
evidence independently secured through skillful investigation. "9 As it
had in Wade, the Miranda Court recognized the dangers that flawed
police interrogation practices pose for the integrity of trials.
Specifically, juries may hear compelling confession evidence gathered
outside the protections that the adversary system affords. 91 In later
cases, the Court continued to decry the powerful downstream effects of
unreliable confessions on truth-finding at trial, noting that when it
86. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966).
87. See id. at 460 (discussing the fundamental importance, in an accusatory
system of justice, that the government gain evidence "by its own independent labors,
rather than by the cruel, simple expedient of compelling it from [a suspect's] own
mouth").
88. In Miranda the Court mentoned in only one footnote that the
psychological interrogations employed by police "may even give rise to a false
confession." Id. at 455 n.24. Although the Court mentioned that the presence of an
attorney at interrogation would enhance the "integrity of the fact-finding processes in
court," it did not otherwise draw a connection between the compulsion of self-
incriminating statements and the accuracy of the fact-finding process. Id. at 466
(emphasis added).
89. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 486, 490-91 (1964).
90. Id. at 488-89.
91. The Court expressed a concern about the inability of the adversarial
process during a trial to combat the powerful effect of a false confession on the jury. It
noted that "all the careful safeguards erected around the giving of testimony ... would
become empty formalities in a procedure where the most compelling possible evidence
of guilt, a confession, would have already been obtained at the unsupervised pleasure of
the police." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 466 (quoting Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 685
(1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
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comes to its effect on a jury, "[a] confession is like no other
evidence. "2
In both the areas of eyewitness identification and custodial
interrogation, the Warren Court expressed anxiety over what it deemed
to be essential trial rights that were threatened by investigatory
procedures going on in secrecy behind the closed doors of the station
house.93 Its answer in each case was to offer the presence of counsel to
make the stationhouse more like a courthouse. In lineups, counsel was
offered as a set of eyes and ears to record potentially suggestive
procedures for later use during cross-examination at trial.94 In custodial
interrogations, counsel was offered ostensibly-though implausibly-to
allow the accused to gain the ability, as at trial, "to tell his story
without fear, effectively, and in a way that eliminates the evils in the
interrogation process." 95 It was assumed that the presence of counsel
would bring procedural regularity to an investigative process that the
Court understood to be critically important to the fairness of later
proceedings, but over which it felt little control.9 6
However, as critics have noted, announcing a right to counsel has
done little to actually protect against the effects of flawed police
procedures.97 With regard to eyewitness identification, the Court's
ruling in Wade requires the presence of counsel only after a suspect has
been indicted, and then only at lineup procedures.98 This limited right
has left police free to dispense with the right to counsel by conducting
lineups prior to indictment and does not regulate other methods of
identification such as photo arrays or "show-up" procedures, in which
the suspect is displayed alone to the eyewitness for identification.99
92. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 296 (1991). The Court went on to
elaborate: "'[T]he defendant's own confession is probably the most probative and
damaging evidence that can be admitted against him.... [T]he admissions of a
defendant come from the actor himself, the most knowledgeable and unimpeachable
source of information about his past conduct.'" Id. at 296 (second alteration in
original) (quoting Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 139-40 (1968) (White, J.,
dissenting)).
93. See, e.g., Miranda, 384 U.S. at 448 ("Privacy results in secrecy and this
in turn results in a gap in our knowledge as to what in fact goes on in the interrogation
rooms."); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 230 (1967) ("[A]s is the case with
secret interrogations, there is serious difficulty in depicting what transpires at lineups
and other forms of identification confrontations.").
94. Wade, 388 U.S. at 236-38.
95. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 466.
96. See id.
97. See Donald A. Dripps, Miscarriages of Justice and the Constitution, 2
BuFF. CRiM. L. REV. 635, 656-57 (1999).
98. Wade, 388 U.S. at 237.
99. Dripps, supra note 97, at 657.
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With regard to custodial interrogation, Miranda excludes only those
statements gained while a suspect was in custody, and then only as the
result of noncompliance with the formalities of its procedural
requirements."o As a result, it does not protect defendants when police
have adhered strictly to the Miranda requirements and then gone on to
use interrogation methods that coerced an unreliable confession.' °
Moreover, police interrogation studies show that in the wake of
Miranda, interrogators have worked their techniques around its
requirements by developing psychological methods to induce Miranda
waivers at a preliminary stage of interrogation-a stage at which
innocent suspects have little incentive to invoke their rights. 02
2. DUE PROCESS, RELIABILITY, AND THE LOST LESSONS OF SOCIAL
SCIENCE
Because the due process clause focuses on the reliability and
fairness of procedures, it is a natural source of constitutional authority
to protect against the taint that police investigations may put on the
truth-seeking function of the courts."0 3 However, with regard to
protecting against the problem of wrongful conviction, the Court's due
process jurisprudence in both the areas of false confession and
eyewitness identification is disappointing.
In the case of false confession, the Court's concern for the
reliability of coerced confessions-though promising-has been eclipsed
100. See Richard A. Leo, Miranda and the Problem of False Confessions, in
THE MIRANDA DEBATE: LAW, JUSTICE, AND POLICING 271, 275 (Richard A. Leo &
George C. Thomas III eds., 1998). As later cases have clarified, Miranda is a
prophylactic rule that requires compliance only with its warnings and procedures, and
not the underlying Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights that those warnings and
procedures were designed to protect. Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 203 (1989)
(holding that because the Miranda warnings are prophylactic in nature, police need not
follow their language with precision); Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 690-92
(1993) (acknowledging the Miranda warnings as prophylactic, but extending habeas
review to their violation on the ground that they nonetheless protect important trial
rights).
101. Cassell, supra note 71, at 477-78.
102. See Ofshe & Leo, supra note 50, at 1001-03 (discussing techniques that
include treating the warning as a mere technicality or clarifying to the suspect that he or
she is free to leave at any time as a technique for later claiming that the interrogation
was not custodial).
103. See, e.g., Dripps, supra note 97, at 647-48 (noting that "[f]rom the
standpoint of protecting the innocent," the Warren Court's incorporation of the Bill of
Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment is "disappointing" and that "[t]o go beyond the
important but inadequate safeguards in the Bill of Rights, an innocent defendant must
look ... to the Due Process Clause").
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by its concern for preventing police misconduct. The Court's due
process analysis of confessions prohibits the use at trial of statements
that have been gained involuntarily when the defendant's "will has been
overborne. "1 °" To judge the voluntariness of a defendant's statements,
the Court relies on a "totality of the circumstances" test that looks
broadly at both the circumstances of the interrogation and the
characteristics of the defendant." 5 The flexibility of this test creates the
potential for courts to use it in response to social scientific findings
about the kinds of psychological interrogation techniques and
personality factors that have been found to lead to false confessions.
Moreover, the due process test has historic roots in concerns about the
reliability of involuntary confessions," and the Court has repeatedly
paid lip service to a concern about admitting coerced confessions into
evidence based on "the risk that the confession is unreliable, coupled
with the profound impact" that confession evidence has on the jury.107
However, the Court's due process jurisprudence in the area of
confessions has developed away from questions of reliability and
focused on a half-hearted commitment to deterring police overreaching.
Early on in the development of its due process jurisprudence, the Court
leaned away from reliability, cautioning that the voluntariness test was
designed "not to exclude presumptively false evidence, but to prevent
fundamental unfairness in the use of evidence, whether true or false. "'0 '
Reliability took a backseat to fairness when the Court decided Colorado
v. Connelly, which required a showing of police overreaching as a
necessary prerequisite for suppressing a statement on due process
grounds.' 09 However, despite this concern for police overreaching, the
Court has been unwilling or unable to craft bright-line rules that limit
104. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225-26 (1973) (citing Culombe
v. Colorado, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961)). The involuntariness test was first articulated
as an aspect of due process in Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286 (1936).
105. Sctmeckloth, 412 U.S. at 226.
106. Leo et al., supra note 47; see also Caplan, supra note 71, at 1427-32
(reviewing the history of the voluntariness test and how it evolved from being a proxy
for the reliability of a statement to encompassing concerns for fair treatment of
suspects, whether their statements were true or false).
107. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 296 (1991) (making this statement
in the context of announcing that harmless error analysis will apply to the introduction
of coerced confessions); see also Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 182 (1986)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Because the admission of a confession so strongly tips the
balance against the defendant in the adversarial process, we must be especially careful
about a confession's reliability.").
108. Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941).
109. 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986).
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what it perceives as law enforcement's need to deploy manipulative and
even deceitful interrogation tactics in some cases."'
In the area of eyewitness identification, the Court's due process
jurisprudence is perhaps even more disappointing. The problem is not
that the Court has disregarded concerns for reliability, but that its tests
for reliability disregard the social science lessons that demonstrate how
a suggestive eyewitness identification procedure will contaminate the
reliability of eyewitness identification evidence at trial. In Stoval v.
Denno, the Court declared an independent due process violation for
using identification evidence gained by a procedure that is
"unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken
identification." 1 ' According to Stovall, whether a particular procedure
is "unnecessarily suggestive" is determined by a "totality of the
circumstances" test that looks both at the suggestiveness of the
procedure and the necessity of using it." 2
In two later cases, Neil v. Biggers"3 and Manson v. Brathwaite, 4
the Court narrowed its due process standard in the area of eyewitness
identification to focus more centrally on reliability, allowing a judicial
determination of "reliability" to trump a finding that the eyewitness
identification procedures employed by police were impermissibly
suggestive.1 5 In both cases, the Court set out five factors for courts to
consider in determining whether an eyewitness's statement is reliable:
(1) "the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of
the crime;" (2) "the witness' degree of attention;" (3) "the accuracy of
110. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 224-25 (1973) (describing
the voluntariness test as "an accommodation of the complex of values implicated in
police questioning of a suspect" including "the acknowledged need for police
questioning as a tool for the effective enforcement of criminal laws" on one end of the
spectrum, and "society's deeply felt belief that the criminal law cannot be used as an
instrument of unfairness" on the other end of the spectrum); see also Culombe v.
Colorado, 367 U.S. 568, 601 (1961).
[I]n light of the wide divergence of views which men may reasonably
maintain concerning the propriety of various police investigative procedures
not involving the employment of obvious brutality .... [iut is impossible
for this Court, in enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment, to attempt precisely
to delimit, or to surround with specific, all-inclusive restrictions, the power
of interrogation allowed to state law enforcement officers in obtaining
confessions.
Id.
111. 388 U.S. 293, 301-02 (1967).
112. Id. at 302.
113. 409 U.S. 188 (1972).
114. 432 U.S. 98 (1977).
115. Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199; Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 106.
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the witness' prior description of the criminal;" (4) "the level of
certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation;" and (5)
"the length of time between the crime and the confrontation." 116
The problem with the Brathwaite/Biggers reliability standard is
that most of its factors bootstrap the court's determination of the
reliability of eyewitness identification evidence with the suggestiveness
of the identification itself. For example, relying on the level of
certainty that the witness demonstrates in the identification is flatly
refuted by social scientific evidence, which shows that eyewitness
confidence levels are inflated by suggestive procedures.117 Not only do
eyewitnesses become more confident in their identifications of a
suspect, their memories of the conditions under which they identified
the suspect can become distorted by confirming feedback that solidifies
their confidence.118 A suggestive identification procedure thus becomes
the source of the very factors that are used by a judge to test its
reliability in the post hoc setting of a completed investigation,
effectively insulating an unduly suggestive eyewitness identification
from legal challenge.
C The Warren Court's Experimentalist Impulse
When viewed from the vantage point of protecting against the risk
of wrongful conviction, the Court's constitutional jurisprudence
governing police investigatory practices is a disappointment, if not a
failure. 1 9 The Court's early impulse to provide counsel to protect
against procedural irregularities in police investigations was an
ineffectual remedy. Similarly, its due process jurisprudence pays lip
service to concerns about reliability but does little to incorporate social
scientific findings into its standards for excluding unreliable evidence at
trial.
Moreover, protecting the integrity of the trial process is only part
of the problem. Once the police have gained a mistaken identification
or false confession-however inadvertently-the game is virtually over.
116. Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199; see also Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 114.
117. Gary L. Wells et al., The Confidence of Eyewitnesses in Their
Identifications from Lineups, 11 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 151, 151-53
(2002).
118. For example, confirming feedback can lead an eyewitness to believe he or
she must have had a good view of, or paid close attention to, the perpetrator's face.
Gary L. Wells & Amy L. Bradfield, Distortions in Eyewitnesses' Recollections: Can
the Postidentification-Feedback Effect Be Moderated?, 10 PSYCHOL. SCI. 138, 140-42
(1999).
119. See GRANO, supra note 71.
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Either a positive eyewitness identification of a suspect or a suspect's
own confession tends to solidify the criminal investigation around the
suspect. The search for other suspects dampens, and investigatory
efforts are directed toward finding evidence that corroborates the guilt
of the suspect who has confessed or been identified.' z Should the
eyewitness or confessing suspect seek to correct a mistaken
identification or false confession, the specter of cross-examination at
trial looms large. The evidentiary strength of any later identification of
a different suspect is weakened by the existence of the prior mistaken
identification, and any recantation is open to impeachment by the prior
confession. Because it is difficult to build a case that rebuts the
inferences created by a false confession or mistaken identification,
defense lawyers assessing the prospects of success at trial are likely to
pressure their clients simply to plead guilty. 121
Thus, the stakes for reforming the police practices themselves are
quite high. The Warren Court's jurisprudence demonstrates that the
Court understood this from the start. Even as it interpreted the Sixth
Amendment to extend trial protections to lineups and custodial
interrogations, the Court voiced a caution that the presence of counsel
was a pale substitute for improving the police procedures themselves. 
1 2
The Court announced its rules in both Miranda and Wade with the
explicitly stated goal of encouraging legislatures and law enforcement
agencies to take their own steps to improve police investigatory
practices.12  The Miranda Court wrote, "It is impossible for us toforesee the potential alternatives for protecting the privilege which
120. Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel
Vision in Criminal Cases, 2006 Wis. L. REv. 291.
121. Leo, supra note 100, at 274.
122. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 235 (1967).
123. Id. at 239 (encouraging "[liegislative or other regulations, such as those of
local police departments, which eliminate the risks of abuse and unintentional
suggestion at lineup proceedings"). Likewise, in Miranda, although the holding was
directed at the concern for compelled self-incrimination rather than accurate fact-
finding, the Court encouraged Congress and the states to "develop their own safeguards
for the privilege, so long as they are fully as effective ... in informing accused
persons of their right of silence and in affording a continuous opportunity to exercise
it." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 490 (1966).
We encourage Congress and the States to continue their laudable search for
increasingly effective ways of protecting the rights of the individual while
promoting efficient enforcement of our criminal laws. However, unless we
are shown other procedures which are at least as effective in apprising
accused persons of their right of silence and in assuring a continuous
opportunity to exercise it, the following safeguards must be observed.
Id. at 467.
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might be devised by Congress or the States in the exercise of their
creative rule-making capacities."' 2 4 The Court suggested in Wade that
other regulatory bodies taking up the challenge of improving eyewitness
identification procedures might "remove the basis for regarding the
stage as 'critical,"' causing the Court to withdraw its constitutional
regulation entirely.' 5
In these intimations, the Warren Court sent local law enforcement
agencies what might be deemed an experimentalist message: show us
that you have developed procedures that do a better job of producing
reliable evidence and treating suspects in accord with constitutional
norms, and we will cut your investigations loose from the bonds of our
constitutional scrutiny.'26 However, in what Professor Paul Cassell has
called "Mianda's greatest cost," localities never took the Court up on
its invitation.'27 Instead, police agencies begrudgingly learned to live
with and work around the threshold standards set in the Court's Fifth
Amendment jurisprudence, rather than seeking to improve upon
them. 128
Attention to the problem of wrongful conviction certainly calls on
innocence reformers to question how the Court's constitutional doctrine
could or should be amended to create exclusionary rules more
responsive to truth-seeking concerns. However, if we view the Warren
Court's attempts to regulate police investigatory procedures as
experimental in spirit-though not ultimately in effect-the failure of
constitutional doctrine poses another kind of question as well. It asks
innocence reformers to consider why the Warren Court's attempts to
stimulate experimental reform of police procedures failed, and how
124. Id.
125. Wade, 388 U.S. at 239 (suggesting that effective "[llegislative or other
regulations" of lineups might vitiate the need for counsel and "remove the basis for
regarding the stage as 'critical'").
126. Professors Dorf and Sabel discuss Miranda in just such experimentalist
terms. Dorf & Sabel, supra note 11, at 453. Dorf and Sabel find in Miranda a viable
experimentalist model for a more general approach to rights articulation. Id. at 459.
According to Dorf and Sabel, the Warren Court's use of prophylactic rules in both the
Fourth and Fifth Amendment can be seen as the Court's use of provisional threshold
standards designed to stimulate more specific local articulation of the general norms
that the prophylactic rules protect, but do not attempt to define with precision. Id. at
453-59.
127. Cassell, supra note 71, at 498.
128. Perhaps the Court's jurisprudence simply lacked the institutional structure
to give local agencies incentives to risk further reform. Dorf & Sabel, supra note 11,
at 453; see also Cassell, supra note 71, at 498 (stating that "the undeniable tragedy of
the Miranda decision is that it has blocked the search for superior approaches to
custodial interrogation" by the Court's failure to "specify what alternatives would be
deemed acceptable").
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legal institutions might be structured to engage and support local police
agencies in the process of reforming their own investigatory practices to
comport with the truth-seeking goals they share with courts. Part II
examines what has been identified as a new or emerging paradigm in
regulatory jurisprudence that attempts to answer this question about
how to institute systemic change as a continuous and participatory
process of reform and it assesses the Wisconsin reforms within this
paradigm.
II. DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMENTALISM AND THE WISCONSIN REFORMS
Democratic experimentalism, and the larger body of "new
governance" scholarship of which it is a part, theorize what many view
as a sea change in regulatory methods and approaches.129 The sea
change is a turn away from the methods of "command and control
style" regulation, in which experts decide and then dictate rules from
the top down, and a turn toward decentralized, flexible, and pragmatic
approaches that seek participation from regulated industries or agencies
in formulating the rules that govern them.13° The most ambitious
rendering of the democratic experimentalist paradigm would
reformulate all governmental institutions-legislative, judicial and
administrative-in what Professors Michael Dorf and Charles Sabel
have called a "constitution of democratic experimentalism" designed to
reinvigorate the ideals of Madisonian democracy in the conditions of
the post-New Deal regulatory state.' 31 Less ambitious but more detailed
case studies map the emergence of democratic experimentalist
regulatory regimes, to one degree or another, in diverse sectors.132
This Article joins this growing body of literature by analyzing the
Wisconsin innocence reforms as a case study in democratic
experimentalist reform. The purpose of viewing the Wisconsin reforms
through the lens of democratic experimentalism is twofold. The first
purpose exploits the visionary aspects of democratic experimentalism
by revealing the possibilities of thinking about reform and regulation of
police investigatory practices in a new way. As Part I suggests,
thinking about using legal institutions to stimulate local reform in police
investigatory practices is not entirely new; there are intimations even in
129. Bradley C. Karkkainen, "New Governance" in Legal Thought and in the
World: Some Splitting as an Antidote to Overzealous Lumping, 89 MINN. L. REV. 471
484-85 (2004).
130. Id. at 473-75.
131. SeeDorf& Sabel, supra note 11, at 283.
132. See sources cited supranotes 13-18.
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the early Warren Court cases toward such an approach. However, as I
argue, repeating the old way-relying entirely on the exclusionary rule
to enforce police conformity to constitutional truth-seeking norms-
threatens to undermine rather than advance systemic reform, at least
with regard to protecting against wrongful convictions. The democratic
experimentalist paradigm provides a theoretical framework for thinking
hopefully about how a different approach to reform that is built on
problem solving and mutual gain might be implemented to enhance the
truth-seeking mission in the criminal justice system.
The second purpose of viewing the Wisconsin reforms through a
democratic experimentalist lens is cautionary: to confront some of the
tensions within the democratic experimentalist paradigm generally by
looking at the challenges and obstacles to its full implementation in the
specific context of the Wisconsin innocence reforms. There is a
tendency in some of the democratic experimentalist case studies to see
the world in terms of the paradigm of democratic experimentalist
governance spelled out by Dorf and Sabel,' 33 even while acknowledging
that a full-blown experimentalist regulatory regime has not fully
emerged in the world. 134  This tendency invites a critique that
experimentalist governance exists primarily in the eyes of its beholders,
rather than in the world itself.1 35 This critique is perhaps bolstered by
133. See, e.g., James S. Liebman & Charles F. Sabel, The Federal No Child
Left Behind Act and the Post-Desegregation Civil Rights Agenda, 81 N.C. L. REv.
1703, 1713-15 (2003); Liebman & Sabel, supra note 17, at 279 (describing the new
accountability movement in school reform in terms of the democratic experimentalist
ideals of new civic government); see also Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, Drug
Treatment Courts and Emergent Experimentalist Governance, 53 VAND. L. REv. 831,
832-34 (2000) (differentiating drug treatment courts from other courts of specialized
jurisdiction and stylizing them as a kind of administrative body performing an
experimentalist regulatory function over treatment service providers).
134. See Karkkainen, supra note 13, at 476 ("Innovations occur here and there,
discernible within a number of disparate policy domains but dominant in few, and the
outcomes of these scattered policy experiments remain ambiguous and contested.");
Sabel & Simon, supra note 11, at 1067 ("None of the cases we have examined fully
expresses all these features, but some come close, and the model systematically
connects the distinctive and promising aspects of all of them."); Simon, supra note 11,
at 206 (describing the democratic experimentalist scholarship as consisting of "a set of
theoretical intuitions . . . [that] are explicitly tentative and incomplete," and a "series of
case studies ... [that] are necessarily ambiguous").
135. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, A New Constitutionalism for Liberals?, 28
N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 357 (2003) (decrying the tendency in Liebman and
Sabel's school reform analysis to "see the world in a grain of sand" by abstracting
general characteristics that do not exist in the case studies themselves); Martha Minow,
School Reform Outside Laboratory Conditions, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE
333, 334 (2003) (arguing that framing school reform within the democratic
experimentalism paradigm "obscures large practical problems and also understates the
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the tendency of some democratic experimentalists to err on the side of
optimistic overstatement. 136 However, the sheer diversity of sectors in
which similar patterns of governance are appearing supports the claim
that deeper change is afoot, and it seems difficult even for the critics to
avoid getting a little bit excited about the possibilities that these patterns
portend. 1
37
The tendency to view the- world in terms of the paradigm is of
greater concern because it blurs the distinction between descriptive
claims that purport to document the emergence of new forms of
governance in practice and normative claims that these new forms of
governance possess the democratic legitimacy spelled out by Dorf and
Sabel in their rendering of the theoretical paradigm. With the lines
between descriptive and normative claims blurred, it becomes difficult
to differentiate legitimate reform efforts from those that lack legitimacy
because they do not measure up to the democratic ideals expressed in
the paradigm. 13  Blurred lines also make it difficult to examine the
question of whether the practical obstacles to achieving a full-blown
experimentalist governance regime in particular contexts are problems
in the world or problems with the theoretical paradigm.' 39
complexity of competing goals"). But see James S. Liebman & Charles F. Sabel, The
Fragile Promise of Pro visionality, 29 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 369, 378 (2003)
(responding to the "lawyers' gloom" that these critiques represent).
136. See, e.g., Liebman & Sabel, supra note 133, at 1714-15 (acknowledging
that the "stylization" of specific reforms within the democratic experimentalist
paradigm "reeks of utopianism"); Richard F. Elmore, Details, Details, Details, 29
N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 315, 315 (2003) (taking "friendly exception" to the
optimistic tone of Liebman and Sabel's account of the promise of school reform).
137. Tushnet, supra note 135, at 357 ("Experimental constitutionalism has
precisely the forward-looking vision that liberal constitutional theory needs."); Minow,
supra note 135, at 334 (characterizing democratic experimentalism as reflecting "the
most promising new ideas in public law").
138. See, e.g., Liebman & Sabel, supra note 17, at 262-63 (acknowledging that
their case study of the Kentucky school reforms admits of competing normative
interpretations of legitimacy within the paradigm); id. at 250 (advancing an "optimistic
reading" of their case study of school reform in Texas, but also noting that if early
signs of success do not continue, "the Texas system and the general accountability
regime of which it is a leading example will have failed by their own standards, and
ours"). But see Freeman, supra note 13, at 82 (clearly delineating how the studied
cases of negotiated rulemaking fail to embody a collaborative governance ideal).
139. The democratic experimentalist case studies provide a rich analysis of the
barriers, obstacles, and challenges to implementing experimentalist regulatory methods.
See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 13, at 66-82 (discussing the obstacles to the
collaborative governance ideal presented in case studies of negotiated rulemaking);
Karkkainen, supra note 13, at 331-45 (discussing problems with using plant emissions
as a metric for environmental performance rulemaking); Sturm, supra note 15, at 537-
53 (detailing some "countertendencies" to the emergence of the structural approach to
workplace regulation that she advocates and illustrates with three case studies).
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This Article does not claim that the Wisconsin reforms exemplify a
fully developed democratic experimentalist regulatory regime. Like the
reforms discussed in other case studies, the Wisconsin reforms show
promise and potential rather than the actualization of such a regulatory
regime. However, the obstacles to full-blown realization of the ideal in
Wisconsin, though particular to the context of police investigatory
practices, are not unique. They arise out of and point to deeper
tensions in the experimentalist paradigm, discernible in other case
studies as well. If the proponents of democratic experimentalism can
be held to their aspiration to apply their methodology to their own
model-viewing the paradigm itself as provisional and revisable in light
of how well it performs in the world-careful examination of the
obstacles to implementing experimentalist reform in specific contexts
will assist the goals of democratic experimentalist scholarship.
A. Explaining the Ideal: The Democrafc Experimentalist Paradigm
The primary goal of democratic experimentalist governance is to
set into motion and then sustain a style of governance that promotes
continuous learning and improvement in a middle ground between top-
down command-and-control methods of traditional regulation and the
undisciplined free-for-all of deregulation." 4  The "core architectural
principle" of democratic experimentalist governance is the grant by
governing authorities to regulated agencies of the autonomy to
experiment with methods of achieving broadly stated goals in ways that
will best fit local circumstances. 141 In return for this autonomy, local
agencies give the governing authorities detailed information about their
specific goals, the methods they are employing to meet those goals, and
However, there has been little analysis of whether the barriers, obstacles, and
challenges that the world reveals might reflect back on the efficacy of the paradigm
itself. For a limited exception, see Simon, supra note 11, at 206-11 (generalizing some
of the "ambiguities and limitations" of implementing the paradigm). To avoid a similar
blurring between theory and implementation, I use the phrase "democratic
experimentalist paradigm" to refer to a theoretical construct that explains how
democratic experimentalist governance is supposed to work and why it has democratic
legitimacy. When discussing an example of governance that puts this theoretical
construct fully into operation, I refer to it as a democratic experimentalist "regime" or
"regulatory regime."
140. Liebman & Sabel, supra note 133, at 1714 (describing democratic
experimentalism as a "'continuous improvement' approach to governing institutions");
Sturm, supra note 15, at 567 (describing the "structured approach" to employment
discrimination law that the author advocates as a "third way" between court control and
deregulation).
141. Liebman & Sabel, supra note 17, at 184 (describing the tenets of the basic
paradigm within the context of school reform).
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their performance. 4 2 The feedback of information serves two purposes
in the democratic experimentalist paradigm. First, it allows the broadly
stated goals to be more specifically articulated and continuously revised
in light of experience. 143 Second, it allows information to be pooled
and disseminated in ways that compare the performance of similarly
situated agencies or entities against each other.' This comparative
performance data both enhances cross-jurisdictional learning and allows
for public accountability.145
Several elements give structure to the vision of this "continuous
improvement" model of governance, combining to create what I call
the democratic experimentalist paradigm: local experimentation,
provisional rules, benchmarking of best practices, and structures of
accountability based on transparency. These elements work together to
create a model of governance with both pragmatic and democratic
benefits over the command-and-control model of regulation it is said to
supplant.
1. LOCAL EXPERIMENTATION
The ideal of democratic experimentalism is based on the belief that
the openness of decentralization and experimentation will ultimately
lead to the advancement of knowledge.'" It builds on Brandeis's
optimism that states can contribute to the evolution of the law by
becoming "laboratories of experimentation" via testing reforms and
learning, not only from their own experience, but from the experiences
of other local jurisdictions. 47 Rather than seeing experimentation as "a
temporary strategy before choosing the superior solution," however,
the experimentalist paradigm is built on a vision of "continuous change
and improvement."4 Indeed, the ideal of setting into motion a cycle
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Dorf & Sabel, supra note 11, at 345-46.
145. Sabel & Simon, supra note 11, at 1071-73.
146. See id. at 381.
147. Id. at 382. Brandeis wrote:
It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try
novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the
country .... If we would guide by the light of reason, we must let our
minds be bold.
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
148. Lobel, supra note 11, at 380; see also Dorf & Sabel, supra note 11, at 315
("A central lesson of the limitations of New Deal institutions is that effective
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of "permanent innovation" is said to mark democratic experimentalism
as a paradigm shift and not just as a pendulum swing between the poles
of governmental control and deregulation. 149
The decentralization of local experimentation serves the additional
pragmatic goal of multidisciplinary problem solving. 5 ° The problems
addressed through regulation are seen as complex and variable,
involving localized interactions between multiple and interconnected
systems. 5 ' The remoteness of top-down regulation makes it
unresponsive to the variability and complexity with which systems
interact at the local level.' 52 Moreover, a top-down regulatory model
fragments problems into doctrinal or disciplinary categories,' 53 while
local experimentation promotes the integration of multiple disciplines
around the local sites in which they come into play in interconnected
ways.'5 4 Local experimentation allows for innovation in solving local
problems through face-to-face coordination among local agents who
combine expertise from different areas of specialization and bring this
combined expertise to bear in solving a local problem.' 55
The local nature of experimentation has the additional democratic
feature of providing maximum opportunity for community stakeholder
participation in setting and revising policies that affect them directly. 1
56
The traditional top-down regulatory model tends to prefer regulators
who are independent of local interests because of the concern that close
relationships between the regulator and the regulated will subject
regulators to capture by the very industries whose behavior they are
government services and regulations must be continuously adapted and recombined to
respond to diverse and changing local conditions ... .
149. Lobel, supra note 11, at 354.
150. Id. at 385.
151. Dorf & Sabel, supra note 11, at 315 ("[E]ffective government is first and
foremost local government; local government itself is a complex service product
composed of discrete programs so mutually dependent that difficulties or successes in
one may suggest or require changes in the others ... .
152. Id. at 315.
153. Lobel, supra note 11, at 385; see also Doff & Sabel, supra note 11, at
292-97 (analogizing regulatory fragmentation to the division of labor in systems of mass
production).
154. Lobel, supra note 11, at 385; see also Dorf & Sabel, supra note, 11 at 286
(drawing on the pragmatic idea that "through problem solving by collaborative,
continuous reelaboration of means and ends.... advances in accommodating change in
one area often have extensive implications for problem solving in others").
155. Dorf & Sabel, supra note 11, at 317.
156. Id.
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supposed to be monitoring.'5 7 By contrast, democratic experimentalism
views stakeholder participation as integral to effective regulation by
providing necessary local knowledge, and engaging local agents in the
process of creating and sustaining meaningful reform of local practice
through self-reflection, collaboration, and deliberative participation in
problem solving. 158
2. PROVISIONAL RULES
In contrast to command-and-control regulation, where detailed
rules are formulated through expertise and dictated from the top down,
in the experimentalist paradigm, rules are developed collaboratively
with those subject to them and are understood as provisional in nature.
A provisional rule regime strikes a middle ground between the rigidity
of top-down command and the informality of deference to the discretion
of local officials.'59 Provisional rulemaking allows local actors to
develop their own standards, but requires them to specify the practices
they intend to employ to achieve their stated goals, as well as the
measures by which their performance is to be judged, in as much detail
as possible. Although they are stated with specificity, there is an
understanding that both practices and measures of performance will
need to be revised in light of experience."
Like other features of the democratic experimentalist paradigm,
provisional rulemaking is supported by both pragmatic and democratic
considerations. Its pragmatic appeal is based in part on a distrust of the
ability of experts to generalize the measures that are necessary to
respond effectively to local conditions. 161  The more detailed and
routinized the directives from the top are, the less efficient they are in
addressing the problems faced by street-level service providers.
162
Provisional rules also provide the flexibility needed for change over
time. 163 The process of provisional rule creation adds to the democratic
157. Lobel, supra note 11, at 373. Or, more subtly, the problem is captured by
a limited group of stakeholders with more concentrated power, at the expense of a more
dispersed constituency. Sabel & Simon, supra note 11, at 1065.
158. Sabel & Simon, supra note 11, at 1077-80.
159. Id. at 1070.
160. Id. at 1070-71.
161. Lobel, supra note 11, at 382 (discussing the pragmatic ideal of
"subsidiarity, including the localness and partiality of human knowledge, and the
difficulty of translation between localities").
162. Id. ("Central authorities should leave the widest scope possible for local
discretion to fill in the details of broadly defined policies.").
163. Sabel & Simon, supra note 11, at 1069.
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legitimacy of the rules by committing local agents to the project of self-
regulation and reform of their own practices." 6 Articulating specific
practices forces local agents to reflect on what they are doing and why
they are doing it, providing the opportunity for genuine buy-in to
occur.165 At the same time, it allows others to understand and assess
the behavior of local agents and to hold them accountable to their
articulated goals. "
3. BENCHMARKING BEST PRACTICES
Although democratic experimentalism derives much of its
pragmatic force from the proposition that different localities require
different approaches, its methods also rely crucially on the idea that the
problems faced in different locations are comparable. 167 In particular, it
relies on the idea that local jurisdictions, each engaged in its own
experimental problem solving, can learn from other jurisdictions
through the process of benchmarking. In its simplest form, local
decision-makers engage in benchmarking by identifying promising
reform models from other jurisdictions that are similarly situated and
conforming those models or practices to local conditions. 6 ' In the
absence of a fully institutionalized system for coordinating and
disseminating pooled information, informal benchmarking occurs when
jurisdictions analogize and replicate successful practices that are being
tried elsewhere. 1
69
In its more ambitious form, benchmarking occurs when cross-
jurisdictional, or even national, coordinating agencies gather
information about different localized problem-solving practices and
evaluate their efforts according to a common metric. 7 ' This common
metric is usually directed toward outcomes such that the relative
effectiveness of different practices can be accurately assessed against
one another.'71 Again, outcome or performance measures strike a
middle ground-described as "disciplined comparison" or "measured
164. Id. at 1071.
165. Id. at 1076-77.
166. Id. at 1071 (stating that provisional rules are designed "not so much to
coerce obedience as to induce internal deliberation and external transparency").
167. Dorf & Sabel, supra note 11, at 315-16.
168. Id. at 322 ("Although benchmarking is formalized in a fully fledged
system of democratic experimentalism, it can begin informally as a rough comparison
of competing models and alternative performance measures.").
169. Id. at 336-37.
170. Id. at 345-48.
171. d; Sabel & Simon, supra note 11, at 1072.
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accountability"-between top-down dictation of specific practices and
complete deference and delegation of authority to local actors. 17 2 By
focusing on achieving outcomes, localities are free to experiment with a
variety of different practices that may be effective in achieving
comparable outcomes, but that are sensitive to the challenges posed by
differing local conditions.'73
The ultimate goal of benchmarking is to improve learning about
effective practices by setting up systems of monitoring to detect
practices that lag in performance as demonstrated by comparatively
inferior outcomes, and by "rolling" the benchmarked standards higher
as local jurisdictions learn from each other about what practices are
most effective.'74 Regulatory standards "require regulated entities to
use processes that are at least as effective in achieving the regulatory
objective as the best practice identified. . . at any given time."' 75
Rather than setting minimum standards for acceptable performance,
these rolling-rule regimes direct localities to continue to define and
improve practices based on their own experience and the experiences in
other jurisdictions. '76
4. TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY
Democratic experimentalist regulation places a high premium on
systems of transparency, information sharing, and information pooling.
As Dorf and Sabel note, "the price communities must and should want
to pay in this world for the right to experiment is to provide individuals
in their own and other jurisdictions with information to judge their
performance."' 77 Transparency plays a dual role in the experimentalist
regime. In addition to facilitating the process of benchmarking and
cross-jurisdictional learning,' transparency also serves the goal of
accountability by making the measured success or failure of particular
institutions available to both institutional monitors and community
stakeholders. '79
However, the importance of information sharing in an
experimentalist governance regime raises problems for enforcement,
172. Id. at 1019.
173. Simon, supra note 11, at 189-91.
174. See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 11, at 350.
175. Id.
176. Sabel & Simon, supra note 11, at 1069-70.
177. Dorf & Sabel, supra note 11, at 288.
178. Sabel & Simon, supra note 11, at 1072.




particularly with regard to responses to entities that perform poorly in
comparison with their peers. Experimentalists recognize the delicate
balance between sanction and support that is needed to maintain the
transparency on which experimentalism so critically depends. They
have noted that "commitment to transparency implies a corresponding
disposition against harsh punitive sanctioning. "18 0 This is because the
prospect of sanctions based on comparatively poor performance may
create incentives to hide or obfuscate practices or their outcomes."'
Rather than favoring high-stakes sanctioning, experimentalism tends to
"pin[] its hopes largely on the effects of transparency" to create
informal pressure for participation through publicity and
accountability. '82
Because of its perceived regulatory "softness," democratic
experimentalism can be seen as an informal system of governance that
trades rights-enforcement for more organic systems of accountability
that depend on a level of cooperation and civic engagement that may
never fully materialize.8 3  However, it is perhaps more fair-and
probably more accurate-to compare the dream of collaborative
governance in an experimentalist regime with the illusion of control in a
traditional regulatory regime."8  In a regime of top-down directives,
rules may be ignored or avoided by street-level actors "operating in a
cloudy zone of informality equally inaccessible to organizational
reform, judicial oversight, and public scrutiny."18' When compared
with this de facto deregulation that flourishes in the gaps between the
law on the books and the law in action, accountability that depends
primarily on the effects of transparency rather than sanction may be
better understood as an attempt to "formalize[] the informal" by
180. Simon, supra note 11, at 194.
181. Id. at 195-96; see a/soDorf & Sabel, supra note 11, at 348.
182. Sabel & Simon, supra note 11, at 1073. Dorf and Sabel have noted that if
even a few jurisdictions become genuinely committed to experimental problem solving,
it can have the effect of engaging recalcitrant jurisdictions through "the pressures of
competition for influence and place," which are seen as ultimately more effective than
legal sanctions for noncompliance. Dorf & Sabel, supra note 11, at 349.
183. See generally Lobel, supra note 11, at 458-61 (discussing the dangers of a
regime built around decentralization and informality that does not account for
differences in power); Simon, supra note 11, at 212 ("It would be reckless to ignore
[legal liberalism's] warning that the search for collective gain risks coercing the most
vulnerable or underappreciating their interests"); Sturm, supra note 15, at 553 (flagging
the dangers of "incomplete implementation" of experimentalist governance that
"threatens both to dilute the law's normative impact and to interfere with employers'
economically motivated initiatives to address second-generation bias").
184. See Lobel, supra note 11, at 388.
185. Doff & Sabel, supra note 11, at 321 (commenting specifically about police
officers).
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bringing greater structure to what currently amounts to ungoverned
spheres of public life.' 6
B. Democratic Experimentalism as a Jurisprudence of Hope
It is true in both a top-down or an experimentalist regulatory
regime that compliance depends to some degree-and in an
experimentalist regime perhaps to a large degree-on the good faith
commitment of governed entities to the norms that underlie the rules
with which they are asked to comply. The experimentalist governance
paradigm promises that by being more closely involved in a
collaborative and ongoing process of creating and revising the rules that
govern their behavior, local actors will be more invested in complying
with them."8 7 This investment is achieved partially as a result of the
process of formulating provisional rules, a process during which local
actors are forced to confront and interpret the underlying norms that the
rules are intended to institutionalize."'8 The investment is also achieved
because the norms in an experimentalist governance regime are being
articulated in the context of their application, and are thus made more
responsive to the experience and needs of the entities subject to
regulation. 9
The vision at the heart of the democratic experimentalist
paradigm-of systemic reform as a continuous process of improvement
based on ongoing local experimentation-is based largely in a
jurisprudence of hope. It hopes that local industries or agencies will
take up the challenge of participating in experimental governance,
rather than using delegated authority as an opportunity for self-
interested gaming.19  It hopes that governed entities will feed
information transparently into systems designed to permit cross-
jurisdictional learning and public monitoring, rather than obstructing or
186. See id.
187. Freeman, supra note 13, at 23-24.
188. Id. at 28-29.
189. Id. at 29.
190. Id. at 69-72 (discussing the potential-though not the guarantee-that
negotiated rulemaking can transform what begins as interest bargaining into problem-
solving deliberation); Simon, supra note 11, at 208-09 (discussing generally the
challenge that the incomplete subordination of distributive bargaining poses for
deliberation in the democratic experimentalist model); Sturm, supra note 15, at 543
(noting that "[e]mployers vary widely in their capacity and motivation" to take a
problem-solving rather than a "command-and-compliance" approach to addressing
issues of sexual harassment and inclusion).
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manipulating the facts. 91 It hopes that citizens will be able to access
and utilize that information to hold local industries and authorities
accountable to concerns from a wide range of affected community
members. 92  It hopes that the machinery set in motion by
experimentalist reform will continue to churn upward in the process of
continuous learning, instead of stagnating into the stasis of retrenched
interests. 193
Each of these hopes is subject to question by clearheaded realists,
and the case studies tracking experimentalist reform in various sectors
demonstrate the fragility and contingency of nascent experiments as
much as they demonstrate the promise that those experiments might
evolve into widespread systemic reform.' 9 4  Like the tentative
experimentalism evident in other sectors of governance, Wisconsin's
recent innocence reforms hold out the hope of providing space for law
enforcement agents to internalize the truth-seeking norms that animated
the Warren Court's regulation of police investigation, building a set of
practices around these norms, and doing so within a framework of
flexibility and accountability that can help sustain ongoing criminal
justice reform as understandings of best practices evolve. Whether this
hope will become a reality remains to be seen. However, the next
section explores the promise and potential of the specific reforms
enacted in Wisconsin to create an institutional structure that could
support experimental governance.
191. See Garrett, supra note 18, at 86-87 (describing the data on police stops
collected pursuant to laws designed to address racial profiling as a "sham" that
degenerates into squabbling between law enforcement and civil rights groups over the
meaning of statistics); Karkkainen, supra note 13, at 332 (describing the possibilities of
"gaming" in plant emission reporting requirements by exploiting the limitations of the
data that must be reported).
192. See Freeman, supra note 13, at 77-82 (discussing the structural problems
that lead to underinclusion of stakeholders in negotiated rulemaking); Liebman & Sabel,
supra note 17, at 258-59 (noting initially low rates of overall participation, low minority
parent participation, and the inability to engage in substantive policy work in local
stakeholder groups mandated through the Kentucky school reforms); Reynoso, supra
note 16 (documenting the important intermediary role that community organizers can
play in ensuring stakeholder involvement in the regulatory efforts that affect them).
193. Liebman & Sabel, supra note 17, at 272 (assessing the dangers of
reasserting centralized control over reform by legislatures or courts, or reasserting
technocratic control by professional insiders who may come to dominate decentralized
governance in school reform); see also Joel Handler et al., A Roundtable on New Legal
Realism, Microanalysis of Institutions, and the New Governance.- Exploring
Convergences and Differences, 2005 Wis. L. REv. 479, 503-04 (offering "cautionary
notes" about the problems of reversion to old patterns in the wake of grass-roots reform
efforts that are not continually renewed).
194. See examples cited supra notes 191-94.
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C. The Experimentalist Potential of Wisconsin's Innocence Reforms
The specific reforms enacted in Wisconsin are promising from the
perspective of democratic experimentalism because they create a
potentially effective infrastructure for experimentalist governance of
police investigatory practices to emerge. Wisconsin legislation enacted
in 2005 delegates rulemaking to local law enforcement agencies
regarding mistaken identification practices and promotes transparency
in custodial interrogation practices. Judicial opinions in each area have
supported this legislation by creating newly formulated exclusionary
rules. I later argue that even with these experimental institutional
structures in place, there are significant obstacles facing the full
realization of an experimentalist regulatory regime under the Wisconsin
reforms. However, this section explores their experimentalist potential
by showing how legislative, administrative, and judicial reforms to the
law governing eyewitness identification and custodial interrogation
could work together to support a system of experimentalist governance.
1. EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION REFORMS
The Wisconsin reforms to the law governing eyewitness
identification procedures create a clearly defined structure of
interlocking legislative, administrative, and judicial support for local
provisional rulemaking. Legislatively, the Wisconsin reforms mandate
local law enforcement agencies to develop written policies for
eyewitness identification in light of evolving best practices from social
science. Administratively, they provide model guidelines that serve as
an initial benchmark. Judicially, they institutionalize the practice of
continuous improvement by amending the exclusionary rule for
eyewitness identification evidence to focus courts on comparative
judgments between the practice employed by a law enforcement official
in an individual case and less suggestive practices that the agent could
have used.
The cornerstone of the Wisconsin eyewitness identification reforms
is legislation requiring each local law enforcement agency to adopt its
own written policy for eyewitness identification.195  Although the
legislation does not dictate what the content of local agency policies
should be, it requires that they "shall be designed to reduce the
potential for erroneous identifications by eyewitnesses in criminal
195. WIS. STAT. § 175.50(2) (2005-2006). The act, 2005 Wis. Act 60, created
section 175.50 and was signed into law on December 16, 2005. Id.
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
cases." 196  Moreover, the legislation mandates local agencies to
"consider model policies and policies adopted by other jurisdictions" as
well as "practices to enhance the objectivity and reliability of
eyewitness identifications. "197 Finally, the legislation requires biennial
evaluation of such procedures, providing the opportunity for agencies to
revise their policies according to evolving experience in their
jurisdiction and elsewhere. 98 In experimentalist terms, this reform
decentralizes rulemaking authority and invites localities to create
provisional rules that are revisable in light of practices benchmarked
through social scientific research or experience in other jurisdictions.
Assisting the experimental efforts of this legislation, the Wisconsin
Department of Justice's ("DOJ") Bureau of Training and Standards for
Criminal Justice unveiled a new Model Policy and Procedure for
Eyewitness Identification for statewide dissemination in March 2005. '99
The DOJ based its policy on its assessment of the available social
scientific research about reliable eyew'-'--- is' - 200
Consistent with reforms endorsed by the innocence advocates, the
model policy recommends "double-blind, sequential photo arrays and
lineups with non-suspect fillers chosen to minimize suggestiveness,
non-biased instructions to eyewitnesses, and assessments of confidence
immediately after identifications." 20' Each component of this model
policy is separately explained and defended on the basis of its social
scientific rationale.20 2 Local agencies are not required to adopt the DOJ
policy, but it has been circulated to local law enforcement agencies in
196. Id.
197. WIs. STAT. § 175.50(4), (5). These include, if feasible, double-blind
identification procedures, sequential rather than simultaneous presentation of possible
suspects, and minimized verbal and nonverbal reactions by the person administering the
procedure. WIS. STAT. § 175.50(5).
198. WIS. STAT. § 175.50(3).
199. Wis. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, MODEL POLICY AND PROCEDURE FOR EYEWITNESS
IDENTIFICATION (2005), available at http://www.doj.state.wi.us/dles/tns/Eyewitness
Public.pdf; see also Wis. Innocence Project, New Policy on Eyewitness Identification,
http://www.law.wisc.edu/fjr/innocence/attorney-general-eyewitness.htm (last visited
Mar. 14, 2006).
200. Citing Gary Wells, the leading psychological researcher on eyewitness
identification procedures, the policy noted that "eyewitness evidence is much like trace
evidence left at a crime scene," which can be contaminated "if not handled properly."
Wis. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 199, at 2 (citing Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth A.
Olson, Eyewitness Testimony, 54 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 277, 286-89 (2003)).
201. Id. at 1; see also Wis. Innocence Project, supra note 199 (describing the
new policy as "spring[ing] from a partnership between the Remington Center and the
Training and Standards Bureau of the Wisconsin Department of Justice").
202. Wis. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 199, at 3-6.
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the state and become the basis for law enforcement training. 3 In
experimentalist terms, the policy benchmarks a particular set of
practices using social science to supply the initial measure of their
efficacy. Because these practices are articulated in the context of an
agency training policy rather than ensconced in a legislative mandate,
they are more easily revisable in light of developing social science and
the experience of local law enforcement agencies.
The decision to delegate the responsibility for adopting eyewitness
identification policies to local law enforcement agencies, rather than
simply mandating known "best practices" such as double-blind and
sequential administration of eyewitness identification from the top
down, may seem unnecessarily deferential. After all, the justifications
for decentralized and localized decision-making that animate
experimentalist regulation are strongest where the effectiveness of
particular procedures is likely to vary with local conditions and to
require interdisciplinary expertise to address the complexity of that
local variation. If the psychological evidence clearly points to certain
practices as optimal, one might wonder why they would vary according
to local circumstances.
However, this view overlooks the points of ambiguity and
disagreement contained within the package of reforms recommended by
the leading social scientists that make eyewitness identification policies
well-suited to an experimentalist model. First, what works well in
laboratory settings may not translate well into police investigatory
practices. For example, because double-blind identification procedures
require additional personnel, law enforcement agencies in smaller
counties may find them infeasible.2" Moreover, while psychological
research can provide information about what enhances or reduces the
risk of mistaken identification, it cannot determine what judgment calls
to make when procedures that protect against mistaken identifications
also risk the loss of accurate identifications.2 5
The legislation invites local law enforcement agencies to conform
those questions as they engage in the process of developing and
evaluating their own practices for eyewitness identification. To the
extent that they take-up this invitation, law enforcement agencies can
develop their own understanding of the principles of social science as
they relate to the preservation of evidence in human memory. They
203. Interview with Keith Findley, supra note 75.
204. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, EYEwITNESs
EVIDENCE: A GUIDE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT 9 (1999)(declining to recommend blind
procedures because they may be "impractical for some jurisdictions to implement").
205. See supra notes 38-44 and accompanying text.
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can also move the innovative methods for handling eyewitness memory
out of the carefully controlled psychology laboratory environment and
into the conditions of real-world police investigation. Delegating
policymaking also provides the opportunity for law enforcement
agencies to deliberate with other criminal justice stakeholders about the
normative questions inherent in the trade-offs between losing accurate
identifications and preventing mistaken identifications.2 An agency
that takes advantage of these opportunities would be exercising a high
level of engagement in experimentalist reform, and there is nothing in
the legislation that mandates agencies to engage in such serious
reflective study. Yet, even prior to the legislative mandate, at least one
local law enforcement agency was pursuing this level of engagement
regarding its eyewitness investigation practices.2"7 The new legislation
creates opportunities for other agencies to follow suit.
In July 2005, the Wisconsin Supreme Court decided State v.
Dubose, which can be seen as providing the final piece in the
institutional architecture that promotes experimental reform in
eyewitness identification. 2 8 Dubose replaced the flawed reliability test
in the federal due process standard for excluding out-of-court
identification evidence with a state constitutional due process test that
bars from evidence any out-of-court identification arising from an
"unnecessarily suggestive" procedure. 209 As we have already seen, the
federal standard, as articulated in Neil v. Biggers and Manson v.
Brathwaite, allows courts to admit identification evidence even if police
used a suggestive identification procedure, as long as the court
determines for itself that the identification was nonetheless reliable.210
However, the factors used to judge reliability under the
206. As Andrew Taslitz points out in a forthcoming article, there are normative
questions embedded within the articulation of eyewitness identification standards arising
from the need to strike a balance between protecting against wrongful convictions and
losing accurate identifications. Andrew E. Taslitz, Eyewitness Identfication,
Democratic Deliberation, and the Politics of Science, CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y &
ETHICS J. (forthcoming 2006) (on file with author).
207. See discussion of the Madison Police Department pilot project infra notes
262-68 and accompanying text.
208. 2005 WI 126, 285 Wis. 2d 143, 699 N.W.2d 582.
209. Id. 36. In so doing, the Wisconsin Supreme Court followed the lead of
New York and Massachusetts in applying the state constitutional due process provision
to provide different and greater protection against suggestive identification procedures.
Id. 42; see Commonwealth v. Johnson, 650 N.E.2d 1257 (Mass. 1995); People v.
Adams, 423 N.E.2d 379 (N.Y. 1981). The Wisconsin Supreme Court explicitly based
its standard on the U.S. Supreme Court's older Warren Court ruling in Stovall v.
Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967). Dubose, 285 Wis. 2d, 33, 699 N.W.2d, 33. For
further discussion of Stovall, see supra notes 106-11 and accompanying text.
210. See supra notes 113-16 and accompanying text.
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BrathwaitelBiggers standard depend on testimony, such as the witness's
level of confidence in the identification and his or her memory of the
conditions under which the identification occurred, which have likely
been altered by a suggestive procedure. 2
By adopting the "unnecessarily suggestive" standard, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court interpreted the state constitutional right to
due process to eliminate the escape-hatch that the Braithwaite/Bigers
reliability standard provides for admitting identifications gained by
suggestive procedures. Instead, courts compare the identification
procedure that police employed in a particular case with other less
suggestive procedures that were available to police under the
circumstances. 212  This test takes away courts' authority to judge
whether a particular identification is reliable and directs them to enforce
the police's use of the least suggestive procedure for eyewitness
identification available to them under the circumstances.213
The new state constitutional due process standard announced in
Dubose can be seen as reinforcing the experimentalist structure of the
legislation. By jettisoning the federal Brathwaite/Biggers standard,
which relied on flawed assessments of reliability, the Dubose standard
responded to the social scientific literature that the legislation directed
local agencies to consider.2" 4 By focusing lower courts on the choice
made by law enforcement agents about what identification procedure to
employ, the Dubose test is well-designed to promote compliance with
211. See supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text.
212. Dubose, 285 Wis. 2d, 1 33, 699 N.W.2d, 1 33. The extent to which the
court's ruling extends beyond "show-up" identification procedures is unclear. Id. J1
33-37. The defendant in Dubose was apprehended by police in the vicinity of an armed
robbery, and was identified by the robbery victim in a show-up procedure, in which
Dubose was placed alone in the backseat of a squad car with the dome light turned on.
Id. 1 9. About ten to fifteen minutes later, he was identified again by the victim, this
time at the police station. Id. 10. The second identification was also a show-up
procedure in which Dubose was placed alone in a room, and the victim viewed him
through a two-way mirror. Id. Following this identification, the victim was shown a
mug shot of Dubose, and identified him for a third time. Id. The test articulated by the
Wisconsin Supreme Court referred specifically to show-up identification procedures,
ruling that evidence of any out-of-court show-up identification procedure is
inadmissible, unless it can be shown to have been necessitated by the circumstances of
the case. Id. 1 33. However, in applying the rule, the court also referred to the photo
identification of Dubose, suggesting a broadly comparative standard applicable to all
forms of eyewitness identification. Id. 37 ("While our focus is on the two show-ups
that occurred here, the photo identification by showing [the witness] a mug shot of
Dubose, was also unnecessarily suggestive and that out-of-court identification should
have been suppressed.").
213. See id. 1 35-36.
214. See id. 129-32.
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the internal written policies of local agencies. In fact, the local
agency's written policy on eyewitness identification would be the first
natural place for a court to look in ruling whether a police officer's use
of a particular procedure had been "unnecessarily suggestive."
If courts look to local agency policies as the source for evaluating
whether the procedures used by an individual officer were the least
suggestive procedures available under the circumstances, it would give
agency policies the force of rules backed by sanctions. In this case, the
sanction would be excluding out-of-court identification evidence. More
expansively, the Dubose standard could be used to promote the
experimental goals of cross-jurisdictional learning and continuous
improvement by encouraging comparisons between eyewitness
identification policies from different agencies. To the extent that a
local agency had a substandard policy, and a comparable jurisdiction
had a policy that better comported with social scientific evidence, the
"unnecessarily suggestive" standard could potentially be deployed to
hold that the substandard agency's eyewitness identification policy was
itself "unnecessarily suggestive."
Taken together, the Wisconsin reforms to the law governing
eyewitness identification can be seen as creating an architecture of
legislative, administrative, and judicial support for an experimentalist
governance regime. The legislation delegated policymaking authority
to local agencies, with the requirement that they continue to examine
and revise the policies they create.215 The DOJ supplied an initial
benchmark through its model policy, which tied eyewitness procedures
to their measured success in social scientific studies.2"6 The courts
arguably supplied the final piece of the puzzle by reconfiguring the
exclusionary rule to promote both the compliance of individual law
enforcement agents with local agency policies and possible cross-
jurisdictional comparisons between agency policies.
2. CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION
In the area of custodial interrogation, the experimentalist potential
of Wisconsin's recording requirements is less clear, but still present.
In its 2005 criminal justice reform legislation, Wisconsin declared a
statewide policy in favor of recording all custodial interrogation
procedures in felony cases .217 This statewide policy is enforced by a
215. WIS. STAT. § 175.50(2) (2005-2006).
216. Wis. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 199, at 3-6.
217. Assemb. B. 648, 2004-2005 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 31 (Wis. 2005) (to be
codified at Wis. STAT. § 968.073(2)) ("It is the policy of this state to make an audio or
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rule requiring courts to instruct juries, in any felony case in which an
unrecorded custodial statement is admitted into evidence, that the jury
may consider the absence of a recording in evaluating the evidence of
the case.218 In addition, the legislation requires recording of any
interrogation of a juvenile in a detention center.21 9 It also mandates,
with limited exceptions, that any statement made by a juvenile during
an unrecorded custodial interrogation will be inadmissible .220 For both
juveniles and adults, the legislation specifies that the subject of the
interrogation need not be informed that the statement is being
recorded, 221 and need not consent to having a recording made as a
prerequisite to admissibility.222
This Wisconsin legislation codified and extended a 2005 Wisconsin
Supreme Court decision, In re Jerrel C.., which required that
custodial interrogations of juveniles be recorded when feasible.223 In
Jerre]], a fourteen-year-old eighth-grader had been arrested as an
accomplice in an armed robbery at a Milwaukee McDonald's
restaurant. 224  He had been left alone and handcuffed to a wall for
approximately two hours in the Milwaukee police station before being
audio and visual recording of a custodial interrogation of a person suspected of
committing a felony.").
218. Id. § 40 (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 972.115(2)(a)). The jury need not
be so instructed if the State asserts and the court finds good cause for not providing the
instruction, or if one among a limited set of conditions exists. Id. The conditions are:
the person refused to cooperate in the interrogation if it was recorded, the statement
was made spontaneously or in response to a routine booking question, the recording
equipment either malfunctioned or was inadvertently not operated, exigent public safety
circumstances existed that made recording infeasible, or the law enforcement officer
conducting the interrogation or responsible for observing it reasonably believed that the
crime was not a felony. Id. (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 972.115(2)(a)(1)-(6)).
219. Id. § 27 (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 938.195(2)(a)). It also requires
audio or audio visual recording, if feasible, if the custodial interrogation is conducted
elsewhere. Id. (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 938.195(2)(b)).
220. Id. § 28 (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 938.31(3)(b)-(c)). The exceptions
include when the juvenile would only cooperate if no recording was made, if the
statement was made spontaneously or during the routine processing of the juvenile, if
the recording equipment malfunctioned or the officer inadvertently failed to use it, or if
exigent public safety circumstances rendered recording infeasible. Id. (to be codified at
WIS. STAT. § 938.31(3)(c)).
221. Id. § 27 (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 938.195(3)); id. § 31 (to be
codified at Wis. STAT. § 968.073(3)).
222. Id. § 28 (to be codified at WIS. STAT. § 938.31(3)(d)); Id. § 40 (to be
codified at Wis. STAT. § 972.115(4)).
223. In re Jerrell C.J., 2005 WI 105, 1 59, 283 Wis. 2d 145, 1 59, 699
N.W.2d 110, 1 59; see Assemb. B. 648, 2004-2005 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2005)
("This bill codifies the Jerrel recording requirement.").
224. Jerrell, 283 Wis. 2d, 11 4-6, 699 N.W.2d, 11 4-6.
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interrogated for 5.5 hours. His repeated requests that his parents be
present were deliberately ignored by the police.225 Under the existing
due process "totality of the circumstances" test, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court unanimously held that the written confession resulting from
Jerrell's interrogation was involuntary and that it should have been
suppressed. 226
The court's unanimous holding that Jerrell's confession was
involuntary, and therefore a due process violation, disposed of the
case. 227 However, a slim majority of the court went on to adopt a per
se rule requiring the electronic recording of all custodial interrogations
of juveniles as a prerequisite to the admission of statements gained from
an interrogation.228 In announcing this rule, the court invoked its
supervisory power over lower courts by "regulat[ing] the flow of
evidence in state courts.,
229
Although the Wisconsin reforms to the law governing custodial
interrogation procedures do not mandate that law enforcement agencies
consider any particular changes in interrogation techniques, the
pressure they put on local agencies to record custodial interrogations
holds the promise of assisting localized and experimental reform. In
experimentalist terms, recording requirements mandate nothing except
225. Id. 6-11. One of the officers testified that in his twelve years as a
police officer he never allowed juveniles to contact their parents during interrogation
because "it could stop the flow or jeopardize it altogether." Id. 10.
226. Id. 36.
227. Id. 59.
228. Id. 44-58. The court also considered whether it should adopt a per se
rule excluding any admissions resulting from custodial interrogations of a child under
sixteen who had not been afforded the opportunity to consult with a parent or other
appropriate adult. Id. 37-43. The court previously rejected a per se rule requiring
that a juvenile's parents be present during interrogations, and admonished instead that
the lack of parental presence would be considered as "strong evidence that coercive
tactics were used to elicit the incriminating statements" for suppression purposes. Id.
30 (citing Theriault v. State, 66 Wis. 2d 33, 48, 223 N.W.2d 850, 857 (1974)).
Despite evidence that the police conducting Jerrell's interrogation had deliberately
flouted both this earlier admonition and a statutory requirement that parents be
promptly notified, the court declined to enact a per se rule that police provide an
opportunity for the presence of an adult during custodial interrogations of juveniles. Id.
43.
229. Id. 49. In support of its mandatory recording rule, the court cited
Minnesota and Alaska, each of which mandate recording, and the numerous benefits
reported in jurisdictions that routinely record custodial interrogations. Id. 50.
Among the benefits cited by recording jurisdictions were the reduction in disputes over
suppressing motions based on due process or Fifth Amendment violations, the more
accurate record created for judicial review when suppression issues arose, and the
protection of both the constitutional rights of the accused and the individual interests of
police officers wrongfully accused of improper tactics. Id. 51-53, 55.
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transparency. However, because transparency plays a critical role in
both internal learning and external monitoring in an experimentalist
governance regime, transparency alone may serve experimentalist
goals. 23  It may spur voluntary experimental reform by facilitating
internal learning about the effectiveness of psychological interrogation
techniques and by exposing police interrogations to public scrutiny in
ways that hold them accountable to shared norms of fair treatment.231
3. THE LARGER EXPERIMENTAL POTENTIAL OF THE WISCONSIN
REFORMS
In addition to their role within an institutional structure supporting
experimentalist reform of law enforcement practices, the Wisconsin
reforms can be seen as experimental in the larger sense because they
are a state-level experiment in criminal procedural regulation. For
example, in each of the Wisconsin Supreme Court cases that enacted
reforms, the court stepped out of the bounds prescribed by federal
constitutional standards and looked to other authority to address what it
perceived as the pressing problem of wrongful conviction.232 By
stepping away from the federal standards, Wisconsin positioned itself as
a laboratory for criminal procedural reform in a way long advocated by
its Chief Justice, Shirley Abrahamson.233 To the extent that it is
successful in improving the criminal investigatory apparatus in the
state, Wisconsin's experimentation stands as a positive example for
other jurisdictions to follow in a broader national framework in which
states contemplate how they can tailor legislative and judicial rules in
230. See generally Karkkainen, supra note 13 (examining how the federal law
requiring only that plants report their emission of certain hazardous substances creates
possibilities for spurring an experimentalist response). But see Garrett, supra note 18,
at 83-92 (describing the limitations of legislation that addresses the problem of racial
profiling by requiring only that police keep statistics regarding traffic stops without
specifying the nature of the data to be gathered or requiring that the data be made
publicly available).
231. See GELLER, supra note 74, at 5-6 (describing the effect of recording on
police methods); see also Sullivan, supra note 76, at 133-35 (listing the benefits of
recording to police departments).
232. In Dubose, the court took note that recent studies of wrongful convictions
"strongly support[] the conclusion that eyewitness misidentification is now the single
greatest source of wrongful convictions in the United States." State v. Dubose, 2005
WI 126, 30, 285 Wis. 2d 143, 30, 699 N.W.2d 582, 30. In Jerrell, the court
endorsed a call from the lower appellate court decision that "it is time for Wisconsin to
tackle the false confession issue" and explicitly stated that its electronic recording rule
was "a means to that end." Jerrell, 283 Wis. 2d, 57, 699 N.W.2d, 57.
233. See Shirley S. Abrahamson, Criminal Law and State Constitutions: The
Emergence of State Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REv. 1141 (1985).
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ways that more carefully respond to concerns about wrongful
convictions .234
Understanding the Wisconsin judicial reforms within the context of
an experimentalist governance structure also sheds a different light on
their legitimacy. Both cases were decided by the same slim majority of
the Wisconsin Supreme Court, with three of the seven justices
dissenting.235 The dissenters in each case chastised the majority for
abandoning its proper judicial role and legislating from the bench.236
234. The Wisconsin Supreme Court noted that it gained encouragement for its
reform efforts from the existence of other states willing to engage in these experiments.
Dubose, 285 Wis. 2d, 1 42, 699 N.W.2d, 1 42. Both New York and Massachusetts
state courts have interpreted their state constitutions to deviate from the
Brathwaite/Biggers reliability test for eyewitness identification procedures.
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 650 N.E.2d 1257 (Mass. 1995); People v. Adams, 423
IL d,~ - .j17 ki1.l• 17O1). DUVUI t'U~bltd, WLLU I¥1HIIII;bVLd llIVU; JULtMaltya~ llIII I I Ul
recording of custodial interrogations. Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156 (Alaska 1985);
State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587 (Minn. 1994). Massachusetts recently adopted a jury
instruction for cases with unrecorded confessions that provided the blueprint for the
Wisconsin legislation. Commonwealth v. DiGiambattista, 813 N.E.2d 516 (Mass.
2004).
235. Dubose, 285 Wis. 2d, 11 54, 68, 79, 699 N.W.2d, 11 54, 68, 79
(Wilcox, J., Prosser, J., and Roggensack, J., dissenting); Jerrell, 283 Wis. 2d, 11 132,
160, 177, 699 N.W.2d, 11 132, 160, 177 (Prosser, J., Roggensack, J., and Wilcox, J.,
dissenting). It should be noted that Justices Prosser, Roggensack, and Wilcox
concurred with the majority in Jerrell that Jerrell's confession was involuntary. Jerrell,
283 Wis. 2d, 11 132, 160, 177, 699 N.W.2d, 11 132, 160, 177 (Prosser, J.,
Roggensack, J., and Wilcox, J., dissenting).
236. All three dissenters in Dubose criticized the majority for invoking the state
constitution to deviate from well-established federal due process jurisprudence on
eyewitness identification on the basis of contested social scientific evidence. Dubose,
285 Wis. 2d, 11 61-66, 699 N.W.2d, 11 61-66 (Wilcox, J., dissenting); id. 1 75
(Prosser, J., dissenting); id. 1 79 (Roggensack, J., dissenting). In doing so, one
dissenter argued that the court was invading the province of the legislature by
substituting its own notion of "good social policy based on data from social science
'studies.'" Id. 1 66 (Wilcox, J., dissenting). The dissent also pointed out that the
social science on which the court relied was itself disputed, and was "presented by
advocacy groups," thus making it a questionable source for constitutional doctrine. Id.
1 65 (Wilcox, J., dissenting). Finally, in abandoning the federal due process standard
for eyewitness identification procedures, the court was criticized for striking out on its
own, creating uncertainty in the meaning of constitutional rights, and being
unjustifiably "confident in the wisdom and superiority of its analysis," rather than
following the "substantial experience" developed by the Supreme Court in interpreting
constitutional requirements. Id. 11 76-77 (Prosser, J., dissenting).
As in Dubose, the three dissenters in Jerrell accused the majority of overstepping
the bounds of judicial restraint and legislating from the bench. See Jerrell, 283 Wis.
2d, 1 155, 699 N.W.2d, 1 155 (Prosser, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
id. 11 160-76 (Roggensack, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The
dissenters cited the uncertainties inherent in working out the details of recording
practices and the danger of making decisions on grounds that circumvent the "checks
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However, the democratic experimentalist paradigm would recognize the
court's reforms as legitimate under a different kind of analysis. In the
view of democratic experimentalism, courts as well as legislatures play
the role of background institutions in both motivating participation and
ensuring compliance with local experimentalist efforts. Consistent with
the locus of authority and significant autonomy delegated to localities,
background institutions like legislatures, courts, and administrative
agencies play less prominent, less directive, and more facilitative roles
in ensuring that experimentalist processes work.237  Rather than
adhering to traditional notions of separation of powers, the legitimacy
of these efforts depends on their efficacy in finding the right balance
between flexibility and accountability necessary to motivate and sustain
local experimentation without clearly differentiated institutional roles
between legislatures and courts.23s
To the extent that the Wisconsin innocence reforms provide an
exemplar of the potential for experimental governance, they also face
two challenges of experimentalist reform: (1) the challenge of gaining
genuine engagement in reform as a problem-solving endeavor among
diverse stakeholders; and (2) the challenge of instituting systems that
will sustain reform as a continuous process into the future. Parts III
and IV examine both the achievements gained and the obstacles facing
Wisconsin in meeting these challenges.
and balances" of legislative accountability. Id. 159 (Prosser, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part); id. 176 (Roggensack, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
237. For example, in Dorf and Sabel's more fully articulated democratic
experimentalism ideal, they envision legislatures as authorizing and funding local
experimentalism, and envision administrative agencies as "provid[ing] the infrastructure
of coordination" needed to facilitate experimental reform. Dorf & Sabel, supra note
11, at 340. "[Clourts in this system," they write, "are charged with the familiar tasks
of policing government and safeguarding rights." Id. In more specific contexts,
legislative and judicial encouragement has been able to spark arguably successful
examples of experimentalist reform. For example, Congress's authorization for
industries to negotiate the rules that govern them has provided opportunities for
localized problem solving to address environmental and workplace safety issues. See
generally Freeman, supra note 13 (discussing two examples of successful problem
solving under the federal Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1996). In employment
discrimination, the Court's recognition of internal systems for addressing workplace
harassment as an affirmative defense to Title VII liability has spawned private efforts to
address workplace harassment. See generally Sturm, supra note 15 (discussing the
efforts of some private employers to institute anti-harassment policies).
238. See Liebman & Sabel, supra note 17, at 279-81 (discussing "non-court-
centric judicial review" as a new model of judicial oversight of institutional reform).
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III. LESSONS FROM THE WISCONSIN EXPERIENCE: GAINING
INNOCENCE REFORM
The Wisconsin innocence reforms of 2005 represent a significant
advance in the first challenge of experimentalist reform, that of gaining
genuine engagement in addressing the problem of wrongful convictions
by diverse stakeholders by enacting legislation that significantly
changed the law governing police investigatory practices. This Part
examines the process through which those legislative reforms came
about.
A. National Infrastructure Supporting Local Innocence Reform
The innocence reform in Wisconsin was not a sudden or isolated
event. It occurred within the context of two larger national networks,
each of which tied together localized reform efforts within a national
infrastructure designed to share information about how different
jurisdictions were addressing the problem of wrongful convictions.
The national network of innocence projects, housed primarily at law
schools, combines legal representation of wrongfully convicted persons
with academic study of the criminal justice system. The other national
infrastructure, created by two national workshops hosted by the
American Judicature Society and the Justice Management Institute,
brought together multidisciplinary teams of criminal justice
participants-judges, law enforcement officers, prosecutors, defense
attorneys, and legislators-from scattered local jurisdictions to learn
about criminal justice reform from national experts and from one
another. 239
1. THE INNOCENCE PROJECT NETWORK AS A PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN
ACADEMICS, PRACTITIONERS, AND POLICYMAKERS
The idea promoted by innocence advocates-that DNA
exonerations point to systemic flaws in the criminal justice system that
239. It should also be noted that other national organizations have taken an
interest in addressing the problem of wrongful convictions. In particular, under the
leadership of former Attorney General Janet Reno, the U.S. Department of Justice
studied twenty-eight DNA exonerations. CONNORS ET AL., supra note 2. It also
published a research report on eyewitness identification. TECHNICAL WORKING GROUP
FOR EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE, supra note 38. The American Bar Association has also
studied the issues, publishing recommendations relating to eyewitness identification.
AM. BAR ASs'N, STATEMENT OF BEST PRACTICES FOR PROMOTING THE ACCURACY OF
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES (2004).
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can be studied and addressed with specific reform measures-is the
product of a partnership between academics, policymakers, and
criminal justice practitioners, created largely in law schools through a
national innocence project network. This network was the result of a
vision promoted by Barry Scheck and Peter Neufeld, who founded the
first Innocence Project at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law in
1992.240 After gaining exonerations in a number of cases at the original
Innocence Project, Scheck and Neufeld sought to expand their ability to
respond to the overwhelming demand for service by calling on other
law schools to develop similar innocence projects.24'
Established in 1998, the Wisconsin Innocence Project was among
the first formed in response to this call. 242  The Wisconsin Innocence
Project was created within a long-established law school clinical
program devoted to serving the legal needs of prison inmates.243
Because of its location within a clinical program that had pedagogical as
well as service objectives, its founders couched their representation of
clients claiming to have been wrongfully convicted within a broader
academic study of the criminal justice system. 2" This dual mission to
both represent clients and teach students created a natural impulse
240. The creation of an "innocence network at law schools" was among many
recommendations for reform published in Scheck and Neufeld's book entitled Actual
Innocence, which was the first comprehensive attempt to illustrate the causes of
wrongful convictions and set out a concrete agenda for criminal justice reform in light
of DNA exonerations. See DWYER ET AL., supra note 2, at 255-60.
241. See id. at xiii-xiv.
242. See Dianne Molvig, DNA Evidence: Freeing the Innocent, Wis. LAW.,
Apr. 2001, at 14, 16. At the time the Wisconsin Innocence Project was established, the
only other established projects were the Innocence Project at the Benjamin N. Cardozo
School of Law and the Innocence Project Northwest, housed at the University of
Washington. Interview with Keith Findley, supra note 75. However, individual
professors at other schools, such as Larry Marshall at Northwestern University School
of Law and Richard Rosen at the University of North Carolina School of Law, had
been involved in exoneration work, representing individuals in high-profile cases. Id.
243. In this program, students are encouraged to study the criminal justice
system from the perspective of incarcerated offenders. See Walter Dickey, The
Lawyer and the Quality of Legal Services to the Poor and Disadvantaged Client: Legal
Services to the Institutionalized, 27 DEPAUL L. REV. 407, 409 (1977). Representing
incarcerated individuals on a variety of legal issues that affect their lives-child support
debts, outstanding warrants, wrongly calculated jail credit, and new factors affecting
their sentences-is used as a springboard for discussing the practical and human effects
of criminal justice system policies. Id. at 411-18; see also Katherine R. Kruse, Biting
Off What They Can Chew: Strategies for Involving Students in Problem-Solving
Beyond Individual Case Representation, 8 CLINICAL L. REV. 405, 411-12 (2002).
244. Keith A. Findley, The Pedagogy of Innocence: Reflection on the Role of
Innocence Projects in Clinical Legal Education, 13 CLINICAL L. REV. (forthcoming
2006) (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
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toward identifying systemic problems that arise in innocence cases and
using theory in the service of specific and practical reform.245
Also in 1998, Northwestern Law School hosted the first of what
have become annual national innocence conferences that bring the
members of the innocence project network together.2" In addition to
providing legal representation to individual clients claiming wrongful
conviction, Scheck and Neufeld's innocence network has focused
attention on how the criminal justice system can be reformed to address
the causes of wrongful convictions. In 2000, Scheck and Neufeld
published a book analyzing and illustrating a series of factors that
contributed to wrongful convictions in the first sixty-two DNA
exoneration cases handled by their program, which has become a
blueprint for innocence reform.247 The national innocence conferences
have served as a clearinghouse for information about the substance of
these reforms and the progress occurring in different states.
Because of their drive to combine theory, practice, and policy
reform, innocence projects have provided a welcoming audience for
academics engaged in applied research in the area of criminal justice.
The most widely recommended reforms in the areas of eyewitness
identification and custodial interrogation have drawn concretely from
the scholarly research of psychologists and sociologists on police
practices. For example, many of the eyewitness identification reforms
have grown directly from the work of University of Iowa psychologist
245. As part of its reform efforts, the Wisconsin Innocence Project filed amicus
briefs in both Wisconsin Supreme Court cases discussed in the previous section,
Dubose and Jerre]]. Nonparty Brief of the Wis. Innocence Project of the Frank J.
Remington Ctr., Univ. of Wis. Law Sch., State v. Dubose, 2005 WI 126, 285 Wis. 2d
143, 699 N.W.2d 582 (No. 03-1690-CR), 2005 WL 1534559; Nonparty Brief of the
Wis. Innocence Project of the Frank J. Remington Ctr., Univ. of Wis. Law Sch. et al.,
In re Jerrell C.J., 2005 WI 105, 283 Wis. 2d 145, 699 N.W.2d 110 (No. 02-3423),
2004 WL 3248504. Wisconsin Innocence Project codirector Keith Findley was a
member of the jurisdictional team that Wisconsin sent to the national American
Judicature Society conference in Alexandria, Virginia, in January 2003, discussed infra
Part III.A.2. He was also a member of the Avery Task Force that proposed the
eyewitness identification and custodial interrogation legislation that was enacted in
2005. News Briefs: Task Force Looks at Ways to Reduce Wrongful Convictions, Wis.
DEFENDER, Winter 2004, at 10, 10. The work of this task force arose in response to
the exoneration of Steven Avery, a client who had been represented by the Wisconsin
Innocence Project for the purpose of investigating and reopening his case. See infra
Part III.C.
246. Liebman marks the Northwestern conference as one of the seminal events
in the DNA exoneration movement. See Liebman, supra note 4, at 537; see also
Thomas F. Geraghty, Legal Clinics and the Better Trained La wyer (Redux): A History
of Clinical Education at Northwestern, 100 Nw. U. L. REv. 231, 253 (2006).
247. DWYER ET AL., supra note 2.
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Gary Wells.2" While endorsed by a broad consensus of academics,
recording custodial interrogations has benefited specifically from the
social psychological studies of interrogation techniques conducted by
sociologists Richard Leo and Richard Ofshe.2 49
The uniquely experimental character of the Wisconsin eyewitness
identification reforms is also directly traceable to the Wisconsin
Innocence Project's location within the legal academy. The template
for that reform-delegating authority to local law enforcement agencies
to write their own policies-was suggested to Wisconsin Innocence
Project codirector Keith Findley, then a member of the legislative task
force working on reform, by University of Wisconsin Law School
Professor Emeritus Herman Goldstein, the leading academic in the field
of problem-oriented policing.250 Goldstein's work in problem-oriented
policing is only part of the University of Wisconsin Law School's
longstanding tradition in the study of criminal justice institutions, which
is in turn part of a more general commitment to law-in-action
research.25 This commitment to supporting research about the way law
interacts with real-world institutions, though not unique, is certainly
prominent as an institutional value at Wisconsin, and allows meaningful
partnerships between academics and policymakers to flourish in the
state.
252
248. See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
249. See supra notes 46-64 and accompanying text.
250. See Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public
Places: Courts, Conmunities, and the New Policing, 97 CoLUM. L. REv. 551, 573-75
(1997) (providing an overview of problem-oriented policing and Goldstein's work); see
also HERMAN GOLDSTEIN, PROBLEM-ORIENTED POLICING (1990). Problem-oriented
policing emphasizes many of the aspects of experimentalist governance. It focuses
police on engaging in partnerships to identify public safety issues in terms of problem
solving rather than law enforcement. GOLDSTEIN, supra, at 44-45. It has developed
through the methodology of experimentation and information sharing about local
problem-solving experiments. Id. at 50-64. The creation of written policies by police
agencies is promoted within problem-oriented policing as a mechanism by which police
agencies can be held accountable for the exercise of their discretion by articulating the
reasons for their policies. Id. at 47-48. Problem-oriented partnerships between the
police and community members are suggested as a model for experimentalist reform in
the area of racial profiling. Garrett, supra note 18, at 115-40.
251. Kenneth B. Davis, Law in Action: The Dean's View, http://www.law.
wisc.edu/Davislawinactionessay.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2006).
252. See generally Paul D. Carrington & Erika King, Law and the Wisconsin
Idea, 47 J. LEGAL EDUC. 297, 315-16 (1997) (recounting the history of the Wisconsin
Idea, that the "boundaries of the campus simply extend to the boundaries of the state,"




2. NATIONAL WORKSHOPS AS A SPRINGBOARD FOR LOCAL REFORM
Although the innocence network provides a well-developed
clearinghouse for information and resources, it is comprised primarily
of programs devoted to representing wrongfully convicted persons. As
such, its recommendations for reform do not necessarily have
credibility with local law enforcement agents, prosecutors, and
legislators who may be inclined to treat the reform proposals of
attorneys for criminal defendants with suspicion. Other national
organizations have played an important role in reaching these other
constituencies through national conferences that bring together
participants from various states in jurisdictional teams to learn from one
another.
In January 2003, the American Judicature Society ("AJS"), a
nonprofit agency devoted to nonpartisan measures to preserve and build
trust il tetgity of tile jusuice ....................... Systei, IOS1teu a niational uruina"
justice conference in Alexandria, Virginia. The society invited
interdisciplinary teams composed of diverse criminal justice
stakeholders from eleven states to "consider the lessons that can be
learned from examining cases that have been determined to involve the
wrongful conviction of an innocent person."253 The articulated purpose
of this first conference was to create an atmosphere of problem solving
in which participants could "explore reform in a cooperative fashion,
setting aside the traditional barriers imposed by the adversarial
process."254  Jurisdictional teams were deliberately constituted to
represent a cross-section of criminal justice system stakeholders: law
enforcement officers, defense attorneys, prosecutors, judges, victims'
rights advocates, forensic and crime lab investigators, and legislators.2"'
In December 2004, the Justice Management Institute ("JMI"), in
collaboration with the AJS and other organizations, sponsored a follow-
up workshop for jurisdictional teams from eight states to promote peer
learning and "expand the beachhead already established" in states that
had made significant progress in undertaking potentially controversial
253. Allan D. Sobel, At the Very Core of Why AJS Exists, 86 JUDICATURE 65,
65 (2002).
254. John A. Stookey, A Cooperative Model for Preventing Wrongful
Convictions, 87 JUDICATURE 159, 160 (2004). The AJS conference was built around a
"cooperative model" of problem-solving reform, based on the idea that the pursuit of
truth was a common goal of diverse stakeholders in the criminal justice system. Id. at
159.
255. Id. at 159-60 ("The unique character of the conference.., was not the
geographic diversity of the teams; rather it was the diversity within the teams.").
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reforms.256  The conference organizers hoped to bring together
jurisdictions engaged in successful reform efforts to serve as
"embryonic models" for jurisdictions in which the situation was ripe
for reform. 7
The methodology of both of these national workshops was
deliberately designed to engage participating jurisdictions in local
problem solving. Over the course of several days, participants heard
from a mix of national experts on the causes of wrongful convictions,
as well as criminal justice officials from jurisdictions engaged in reform
who touted the efficacy of the specific reform measures with which
they were experimenting.258 Each jurisdictional team was required to
internalize and locally apply the lessons it learned by developing an
action plan of concrete steps that it would carry out in its home
jurisdiction. 59
Wisconsin sent jurisdictional teams to each of these national
conferences. The AJS team that attended the first conference, in
January 2003, formulated three goals in their action plan: (1) create a
demonstration project in the Madison Police Department to implement
the social scientific studies on effective eyewitness identification
techniques, and use that model to help guide other law enforcement
agencies around the state; (2) "[rlaise consciousness among criminal
justice system participant[s]" about the "risks and causes of wrongful
convictions;" and (3) "[s]upport efforts to create a criminal justice
256. BARRY MAHONEY, JUSTICE MGMT. INST., ENSURING A RELIABLE AND
EFFECTIVE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: REPORT ON A WORKSHOP FOR TEAMS FROM
EIGHT STATES 7 (2005).
257. Id. at 7. Organizers of the follow-up conference in North Carolina sought
to focus their efforts narrowly on "getting states and local jurisdictions to address issues
[relating to wrongful convictions that] can help lead to broader system change," and to
choose teams from jurisdictions "where there is a real prospect of significant change."
Id. The conference organizers deliberately chose teams composed of a "range of
perspectives needed to address the problems" as well as "key leaders whose buy-in will
be necessary to achieve significant changes in policy and practice." Id. at 8. In
addition, they looked for states with "established mechanisms for collaboration in
criminal justice system improvement" or a "recent history of collaborative criminal
justice system problem-solving," leadership, and staff support. Id.
258. Id. at 160-61; see also MAHONEY, supra note 256, app. A.
259. Stookey, supra note 254, at 161-62. To facilitate this process, the
conferences provided a variety of sessions, including plenary and concurrent sessions
that addressed specific topics in a broad way, peer-group sessions in which practitioners
who held similar positions in their own criminal justice system met in cross-
jurisdictional groups, and jurisdictional team sessions with structured exercises to
facilitate problem identification, goal setting, identification of obstacles, and the
preparation of action plans that each team would bring home with them. MAHONEY,
supra note 256, at 6.
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study commission.. . to study errors in the criminal justice system and
recommend reforms. ,260
The team's follow-up on their action plan helped to lay the
foundation for the later and more widespread law reform in the state.26
For example, the Madison Police Department eventually developed an
eyewitness identification policy with some novel elements, such as
special procedures for child eyewitnesses and an innovative "folder
system" to allow double-blind administration of photo arrays to be
conducted by an investigating officer familiar with the details of the
case. 
262
Gaining support for the Madison Police Department policy was
neither simple nor automatic, and involved a process of convincing
multiple and diverse stakeholders of the benefits of change. The effort
was led by AJS team member Cheri Maples, who was then the Director
of Training and Personnel for the Madison Police Department.263
Maples worked internally to gain the support of Madison Police
Department detectives for changing their eyewitness identification
procedures to comport more closely with social scientific evidence.
Local district attorneys initially balked at the idea of city and county
law enforcement officials using substantially different procedures to
identify witnesses, and Maples worked collaboratively with Dane
County Sheriff Gary Hamblin to encourage the county agency to
develop similar and consistent eyewitness identification policies.265 She
brought a proposal to craft social scientifically based eyewitness
260. See Keith A. Findley, Re-Imagining Justice, Wis. DEFENDER, Winter
2004, at 11, 13 (reporting on the Wisconsin AJS team and its three goals). It was
because of the "significant progress" Wisconsin had achieved in meeting its goals from
2003 that Wisconsin was the "unanimous choice" of the organizers of the December
2004 conference to be the one team invited back to assist in catalyzing change in other
jurisdictions that had not participated in the first conference. MAHONEY, supra note
256, at 8.
261. In addition to creating the Madison Police Department eyewitness
identification policy, team member Keith Findley's follow-up work on creating a
Wisconsin Criminal Justice Study Commission helped shape the character and mission
of the legislative task force that eventually proposed Wisconsin's legislative reforms.
See infra notes 314-19 and accompanying text. Team member Judge Frederic
Fleishauer put together a half-day program in May 2003 on the causes of wrongful
conviction as part of the annual state judicial education conference, which helped to
raise judicial awareness of the problem. Findley, supra note 260, at 13.
262. Interview with Keith Findley, supra note 75.
263. Findley, supra note 260, at 13. Telephone Interview with Cheri Maples,
former Director of Training and Personnel for the Madison Police Department (Mar. 8,
2006).
264. Interview with Cheri Maples, supra note 263.
265. Id.
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identification protocols to the ongoing discussions of the Dane County
Criminal Justice Group, a group of key city and county officials who
had convened to address public safety and justice concerns.266 The
group did not immediately embrace Maples's enthusiasm, engaging
instead in its own review of the social scientific literature, and making
an independent assessment of the strengths and drawbacks of commonly
touted features, such as sequential and double-blind administration.267
Maples also worked statewide to raise awareness of the relationship
between eyewitness identification and wrongful conviction by hosting a
conference that brought leading researcher Gary Wells to Wisconsin to
train law enforcement agents, district attorneys, and defense attorneys
on the issues.268
In establishing the Madison Police Department eyewitness
identification pilot project as one of its goals, the Wisconsin AJS team
had hoped that it would spark an incremental process of reform in the
state. 269 By demonstrating that social scientifically based identification
procedures were both desirable and feasible, the hope was that other
local law enforcement jurisdictions would follow the lead of the
Madison Police Department and consider the ways in which methods
shown in the laboratory to reduce the risk of mistaken identification
might be translated into station house practices .27 The work of the
Madison Police Department on its eyewitness identification policies
exemplifies the slow-growing process of overcoming initial skepticism
and gradually gaining the buy-in of local law enforcement participants
through a combination of internal persuasion and public dialogue.
However, the process of slow-growing incremental reform
envisioned by the AJS team was suddenly accelerated by the September
266. The Dane County Criminal Justice Group was formed in May 2002 by
Dane County Sheriff Gary Hamblin and Dane County Chief Circuit Court Judge
Michael Nowakowski. Minutes of the Criminal Justice Planning Committee, May 24,
2002 (on file with the author). The Group was convened without an agenda to address
any particular public safety or justice issue for the purpose of facilitating open-ended
discussion of cross-cutting problems. Telephone Interview with Michael Smith,
Professor of Law, Univ. of Wis. Law Sch. (Feb. 10, 2006).
267. Memorandum from Michael Smith, Univ. of Wis. Law Sch., and Lt. Jeff
Hook, Dane County Sheriffs Dep't, to the Dane County Criminal Justice Group:
Effects of Eyewitness Identification Procedures on the Accuracy of Identifications
(Mar. 17, 2003) (on file with author).
268. Telephone Interview with Cheri Maples, supra note 263. Maples reported
that the decision to include defense attorneys in this statewide training was controversial
because of the fear that they would use the knowledge gained in the training to
challenge the introduction into evidence of eyewitness identification testimony not
gained through the best methods that social science would recommend. Id.




11, 2003 DNA exoneration of Wisconsin native Steven Avery.2 7' The
Avery exoneration put a public spotlight on the problem of wrongful
convictions and gained a new and powerful ally for innocence reform in
State Assembly Representative Mark Gundrum. 272  With Gundrum's
involvement, Wisconsin moved beyond a strategy of incremental
reform based in pilot projects and onto a statewide legislative reform
project. As we have seen, this statewide reform resulted in legislation
mandating local law enforcement agencies to develop written
eyewitness identification polices and pressuring them to electronically
record custodial interrogations through the exclusionary rule and jury
instructions.
B. The Steven A very Exoneration as a Destabilizing Event
Public attention to innocence reform in many states begins with a
local exoneration that raises public awareness of deeper flaws in the
criminal justice system. 273 Although Avery was not the first Wisconsin
Innocence Project exoneration, his case painted a clear and compelling
picture of criminal investigatory dysfunction. 74 Avery was convicted
of the 1985 assault and rape of a Manitowoc woman, Penny Beernsten,
who had been attacked while jogging along a Lake Michigan beach one
afternoon. 275  Although Avery presented sixteen alibi witnesses who
testified that he had spent the afternoon of Beernsten's attack helping
his father pour concrete for a sheep barn, he was convicted based
largely on the victim's mistaken identification of him in a photo array
and subsequent lineup.276 Eighteen years later, DNA testing of hair
samples pressed by law students in the Wisconsin Innocence Project
271. Wisconsin Innocence Project, Case Profiles: Steven Avery,
http://www.law.wisc.edu/fjr/innocence/avery_Surnmary2.htm (last visited Mar. 28,
2006).
272. See Brenda Ingersoll, Rape Victim Criticizes Officials in A very Case,
WIs. STATE J., Feb. 18, 2004, at Al.
273. See COMM'N ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 78, at 1; THE
INNOCENCE COMM'N FOR VA., supra note 78, at 13-24.
274. Previously, the Wisconsin Innocence Project had been involved in the
2001 exoneration of Chris Ochoa, a Texas man wrongfully convicted in a rape and
murder case. Keith A. Findley & John Pray, Innocence Project.- Lessons from the
Innocent, Wis. ACAD. Rv., Fall 2001, at 33, 33-34. After being exonerated, Ochoa
eventually pursued an interest in law and enrolled at the University of Wisconsin Law
School. Dianne Molvig, Chris Ochoa, IL, Wis. LAW., May, 2004, at 12, 12-13.
275. Tom Kertscher, UW Professor Calls for Probe of 1985 Sheriffs
Investigation, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Sept. 12, 2003, at IA.
276. Tom Kertscher & Jesse Garza, DNA Clears Prisoner 17 Years Into His
Term, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Sept. 11, 2003, at 1A.
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excluded Avery and matched another man in Wisconsin's felony DNA
database.277 This other suspect, Gregory Allen, had a history of sexual
offenses. By the time Avery was exonerated, Allen had gone on to
commit another sexual assault of a Green Bay woman, for which he
was serving sixty years in prison.278
The Avery case was a classic illustration of how flawed police
procedures can distort the search for truth in both a police investigation
and a later trial. Avery was awakened and arrested on the night of
Beernsten's assault when the description she gave of her attacker was
thought to match Avery by at least one Manitowoc Sheriffs
Department employee. 279  He was taken to the police station for a
lineup, which he thought would be "a good thing ... [he] would be out
in a minute."28° What he did not know was that he had been previously
identified by the victim in a photo array, and that he was the only
person in the lineup whose picture had also been included in the photo
array. 28' Both the photo array and the lineup contained additional
suggestive features.282
Once Avery was arrested and identified, the search for other
suspects came to a grinding halt. For two weeks prior to the assault,
Manitowoc city police had Allen, the man whose DNA eventually
matched hair samples from the crime scene, under surveillance for sex-
related crimes. 283 However, efforts by Manitowoc city police to get the
county sheriffs department to consider Allen as a suspect were to no
avail.2 4  With the victim's identification of Avery in hand, the
277. Associated Press, Cops Had Eye on Man Linked by DNA to Rape: But
Avery Was Nabbed Instead, CAP. TIMES (Madison, Wis.), Oct. 20, 2003, at 1C
[hereinafter Cops Had Eye on Man].
278. Id.
279. Kertscher, supra note 275. Six months before the attack, Avery had been
charged with harassing the wife of a Manitowoc sheriff's deputy, perhaps drawing the
attention of police to him. Cops Had Eye on Man, supra note 277.
280. Anita Weier, Wrongly Accused Man Tells His Story, CAP. TIMES
(Madison, Wis.), Dec. 22, 2003, at 3A.
281. Id.
282. The victim had been told prior to the photo array that the man suspected
by the sheriffs department of being her attacker might be in the collection of images
shown to her. Nonparty Brief of the Wis. Innocence Project of the Frank J. Remington
Ctr., Univ. of Wis. Law Sch., State v. Dubose, 2005 WI 126, 285 Wis. 2d 143, 699
N.W.2d 582 (No. 03-1690-CR). At the lineup, Avery was the "youngest, fairest and
shortest person in the lineup and the only one with straight hair; other participants in
the lineup were well-dressed; and one participant turned toward [Avery] during most of
the lineup." Id.
283. Cops Had Eye on Man, supra note 277.
284. Because the attack occurred just outside the city limits, the Manitowoc
county sheriff had jurisdiction over the investigation. Id. After Avery's arrest,
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investigation had focused on proving Avery guilty, not on figuring out
who else could have assaulted Beernsten on the beach.
Like many eyewitnesses, Beernsten became certain not only that
her identification of Avery was correct, but that it was based on her
independent and unaffected memory of the attack itself.285 Recounting
the rape later, she said she had "made a special effort to look at her
attacker's face."286 She testified, "It's as if [she had] a photograph in
[her] mind."287 These expressions of certainty, and their attribution by
the victim to her original opportunity to view her perpetrator during the
attack, would shield even a concededly unduly suggestive identification
procedure from exclusion under the BrathwaitelBiggers reliability
test.288 In fact, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals rejected a challenge to
the identification procedures in Avery's case, ruling that "the photo
array constitutes one of the fairest ones this court has seen. '289
Like many DNA exonerations, the Avery case rocked Wisconsin
residents' belief in the fairness of their criminal justice system.9u The
clarity of the verdict that Avery's exoneration delivered had what might
be described in democratic experimentalist terms as a "destabilizing
effect" on the state criminal justice system.291 The Avery exoneration
stigmatized the status quo, brought public scrutiny to the problem of
wrongful convictions, and shifted the power dynamics between criminal
justice stakeholders in a way that delegitimized law enforcement
Manitowoc city police approached the sheriff's department to see if it was considering
Allen as a suspect, but city police were rebuffed. Id. A few weeks after the assault,
city police approached the victim directly and told her that they had another suspect in
mind who matched the description she had given of her assailant. Ingersoll, supra note
272. However, when the victim approached the county sheriff's department with this
information, she was told not to talk to city police because they did not have
jurisdiction over the investigation and it "would only confuse [her]." Id. She was later
told that the sheriffs department had looked at other suspects and ruled them out. Id.
285. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
286. Kertscher & Garza, supra note 276.
287. Id.
288. See supra notes 113-16 and accompanying text.
289. State v. Avery, No. 86-1831-CR, 1987 WL 267394, at *5 (Wis. Ct. App.
Aug. 5, 1987).
290. See Liebman, supra note 4, at 543 (describing the effect of DNA
exonerations as "divine intervention" that undermines faith in the system to correct its
own errors procedurally).
291. See Sabel & Simon, supra note 11, at 1062-67. Studying the remedies
pursued in public law litigation over a number of years, Sabel and Simon have noted a
trend away from top-down court oversight through detailed consent decrees toward a
more experimentalist approach. Id. at 1067-73.
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concerns in favor of criminal defense interests. 2  As analysis of the
experimentalist potential of public law litigation has shown, such
destabilizing effects can create conditions of uncertainty about both past
practices and future positions that motivate deliberation and problem
solving between parties with previously entrenched and antagonistic
293positions.
However, the step from viewing a DNA exoneration as an
individual wrong to viewing it as a collective problem that needs to be
solved does not happen on its own.Y Institutional actors who bear
some responsibility for a wrongful conviction may be reluctant, rather
than eager, to have their actions subjected to further scrutiny.295 Public
officials sometimes respond that the fact of an exoneration proves that
"the system works" to correct its own mistakes, obviating the need to
address deeper systemic issues.296 The next section explores how
Wisconsin reformers were able to use the destabilizing event of the
Avery exoneration to engage a problem-solving approach resulting in
legislative reform to eyewitness identification and custodial
interrogation law.
C Building Problem Solving in the Wake of the A very Exoneration
Wisconsin reformers were able to use the Avery exoneration as a
catalyst for change by focusing the public debate on systemic problems
292. See id. at 1075-78 (describing the destabilizing effects of a liability
determination in a lawsuit against a chronically underperforming public institution that
has become immune to political and market pressures).
293. Id. at 1073-74.
294. As innocence reformers Barry Scheck and Peter Neufeld have persistently
noted, in contrast to well-established systems for undertaking diagnostic studies of
tragedies like plane or train accidents, "[t]he American criminal justice system ... has
no institutional mechanism to evaluate ... the conviction of an innocent person."
Barry C. Scheck & Peter J. Neufeld, Toward the Formation of "Innocence
Commissions" i America, 86 JUDICATURE 98, 98 (2002). The American system also
stands in contrast to two models from other countries: the Canadian Royal
Commissions that have been used to investigate the causes of two postconviction DNA
exonerations, and the British Criminal Case Review Commission established in 1997 to
investigate claims of false conviction. Id. at 100. These models are discussed in more
detail in Findley, supra note 1, at 342-48.
295. Ronald Earle & Carl Bryan Case, Jr., The Prosecutorial Mandate: See
that Justice is Done, 86 JUDICATURE 69, 73 (2002).
296. Lawrence C. Marshall, Do Exonerations Prove that "the System
Works"?, 86 JUDICATURE 83, 84 (2002) (noting that after thirteen Illinois exonerations
in death penalty cases, some death penalty supporters "respond[ed] that, far from
exposing a system that is broken, these exonerations prove that the current system
works exceedingly well at uncovering errors prior to executing innocent defendants");
Scheck & Neufeld, supra note 294, at 99.
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within the criminal justice system and focusing attention on forward-
looking problem solving, rather than backward-looking condemnation
and blame. When the opportunity for legislative change arose, the
groundwork already laid for the creation of a criminal justice study
commission transferred to the newly formed Avery Task Force, and the
consensus-building and problem-solving methods utilized in the national
AJS and JMI conferences-which rely on face-to-face meetings between
credible criminal justice insiders-were imported into the deliberations
of that task force.
1. A PUBLIC RHETORIC OF COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY AND
INCLUSION
Aware of each exoneration's potential to be a "learning
moment, , 297 the Wisconsin Innocence Project used the publicity of the
Avery exoneration to help begin a public dialogue about systemic
problems in the criminal justice system. The first step in the Wisconsin
Innocence Project's public relations campaign was to dispel the notion
that the Avery exoneration exemplified systemic triumph over
individual wrongdoing. "Do not take Mr. Avery's release today as an
indication that the system does work," Wisconsin Innocence Project
codirector Keith Findley said to the press on the day of Avery's
release. "It does not work." 29" Findley went on to call for the
formation of a commission to study wrongful convictions, 99 a measure
he had long advocated,3" and a request he continued to repeat in
subsequent press appearances associated with the Avery exoneration. 1
The public rhetoric employed by Findley and the Wisconsin
Innocence Project drew diverse constituents into the problem-solving
effort by detailing the multiple harms caused by Avery's wrongful
conviction, and referring to it as a tragedy in which victims,
297. Scheck & Neufeld, supra note 294, at 101.
298. Kertscher, supra note 275.
299. Id.
300. Findley, supra note 1, at 351.
301. David Callender, DNA Test Frees Imprisoned Man, CAP. TIMES
(Madison, Wis.), Sept. 11, 2003, at 1A ("Findley said he will push for an official
inquiry to review the mistakes made in Avery's case as well as the creation of a new
study committee for the use of DNA evidence in criminal cases"); Robert Imrie, Avery
Attorney Pleased with Attention Case Is Getting, WIS. STATE J., Sept. 23, 2003, at B3
("Findley said he hopes Avery's plight will be the impetus for a criminal justice study
commission to more broadly examine flaws in the justice system and reform them.");
Kertscher & Garza, supra note 276 ("Findley, who directs the Wisconsin Innocence
Project with fellow UW law professor John Pray, called for an independent probe of
the investigation of the attack.").
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prosecutors, and the public all had a stake. The victim, Findley pointed
out to the press, "has had to come to grips with the fact that she
identified the wrong man. 30 2 Describing the victim as "sincere and
well-respected," Findley told the press, "'I have no doubt that this was
absolutely an honest mistake on her part.""303 Findley pointed out the
tragic consequences for Steven Avery who "lost 18 years of his life that
he will never be able to recover." 3°4 Findley also pointed out the law
enforcement consequences of convicting the wrong person, emphasizing
that the actual perpetrator had gone on to victimize others. 3°s
Although it was clear in Avery's case that most of the fault lay
with police investigators, Findley's public statements on the day Avery
was released from prison minimized blame and focused on the
collective responsibility to learn from mistakes. He described the
problem and its solution in collective terms, saying, "We've made a
mistake here.... Surely we can learn from this tragedy." 30 6  "My
sense is that Wisconsin has a pretty good justice system, but we have
our share of mistakes," he opined in another interview.37 "I hope [the
Avery case] reminds us that we need to seize the opportunity to learn
what caused the system to misfire in such a serious way and to
minimize the risk of such errors in the future. "308
Although the Avery exoneration was not the first time the
Wisconsin Innocence Project had deployed the rhetoric of systemic
problems and collective responsibility,3° it was followed by a concrete
opportunity for action when State Assembly Representative Gundrum
took up the cause. Gundrum initially proposed legislative hearings to
investigate Avery's wrongful conviction3 0 and challenged the State's
$25,000 cap on compensation for those who were wrongfully
302. Kertscher & Garza, supra note 276.
303. Id. The Wisconsin Innocence Project had also apparently educated its
client about the systemic rather than personal causes of his wrongful conviction. An
early article reporting on the day of Avery's release states, "Avery expressed no anger
toward the victim, who had repeatedly identified him as her attacker. 'It ain't her
fault," he stated simply.... They put it mostly in her head."' Kertscher, supra note
275.
304. Anita Clark, DNA Tests Overturn Man's Conviction: He Served 18 Years
for Crime He Didn't Commit, Wis. STATE J., Sept. 11, 2003, at B3.
305. Kertscher, supra note 275.
306. Id. (emphasis added).
307. Callender, supra note 301.
308. Id. (emphasis added).
309. See Findley & Pray, supra note 274, at 34-35 (urging collective learning
about mistakes in the criminal justice system in the context of the exoneration of Texas
inmate Chris Ochoa).
310. Imrie, supra note 301.
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convicted.3 ' In a meeting with Gundrum, Wisconsin Innocence Project
codirectors Keith Findley and John Pray pressed this new ally to move
beyond an assessment of past wrongdoing and toward a more
comprehensive examination of the underlying criminal justice
procedures that lead to wrongful convictions.3"2 Gundrum responded
by forming the Avery Task Force, not to assign blame, but to use the
Avery case as a starting point from which to tackle the underlying
systemic problems implicated by his wrongful conviction.3"3
2. THE AVERY TASK FORCE AS A FORUM FOR STAKEHOLDER
DELIBERATION
Although they differ somewhat in makeup and focus, the
coordinated efforts at innocence reform in most states have grown out
of the creation of a commission or task force comprised of diverse
criminal justice stakeholders and devoted to studying systemic flaws in
the criminal justice system, the most famous of which is Governor
Ryan's Task Force on Capital Punishment.314 Findley had advocated a
311. Gundrum's concerns initially focused on compensating Avery for the
wrong that was done to him, challenging the State's $25,000 cap on compensation for
those who are wrongfully convicted, and suggesting that "the unit of government that
pursued a prosecution leading to a wrongful incarceration be required to cover
compensation costs." Editorial, Gundrum Steps Up, CAP. TIMES (Madison, Wis.),
Sept. 23, 2003, at 8A.
312. Interview with Keith Findley, supra note 75; Telephone Interview with
Wis.. State Assembly Representative Mark Gundrum (Feb. 6, 2006).
313. New Task Force to Look at State's Justice System, Wis. STATE J., Dec.
11, 2003, at B4 (describing the task force as a diverse group of "judges, criminal
defense attorneys, prosecutors, law enforcement officials and lawmakers" created "to
study advancements in law enforcement technology and techniques on the use of things
like eyewitness identifications to see if they should be implemented here").
314. In Illinois, the George C. Ryan Governor's Task Force on Capital
Punishment was created by executive order following Governor Ryan's moratorium on
the death penalty to "study and review the administration of the capital punishment
process in Illinois to determine why that process has failed in the past, resulting in the
imposition of death sentences upon innocent people." Executive Order by Governor
George Ryan Creating the Commission on Capital Punishment,
Exec. Order No. 4 (Ill. 2000), available at http://www.idoc.state.il.us/ccp/ccp
/executiveorder.html. It issued its report, Report of the Governor's Commission on
Capital Punishment, on April 15, 2002, making eighty-five specific recommendations
for reform based on a study of thirteen exonerated death row inmates in Illinois.
COMM'N ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 78, at 7-9, 20-192.
The Innocence Commission of Virginia was a "nonprofit, nonpartisan
organization dedicated to improving the administration of justice in Virginia" formed in
2003 by a collaboration between three projects: the Mid-Atlantic Innocence Project,
housed at American University's Washington College of Law; the Administration of
Justice Program at George Mason University; and the Constitution Project, based at
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local criminal justice study commission with the "official sanction [and]
involvement of players with a direct stake in the system" as the optimal
vehicle for reform." 5 Findley suggested that each state should form
such a commission and "need not await ... a high-profile exoneration
within their borders to begin the study."3 1 6 Consistent with this view,
plans for a Criminal Justice Study Commission in Wisconsin were
already under way prior to the Avery exoneration, and support for
those efforts had been identified as one of the AJS team's three goals.
By the time of the Avery exoneration, Findley had gained the
sponsorship of the Criminal Law Section of the Wisconsin State Bar as
well as the support of each of the two law schools in the state."'
The creation of the Avery Task Force did not substitute for the
Criminal Justice Study Commission. Instead, the Avery Task Force
served as an interim study commission with limited legislative goals,
Georgetown University's Public Policy Institute. THE INNOCENCE COMM'N FOR VA.,
supra note 78, at vii. It was made up of a five-member steering committee comprised
primarily of innocence project directors and was supported by a seven-member
advisory board that included representatives of law enforcement, criminal defense, and
prosecution interests. Id. at ix, xv. In 2005, the Innocence Commission of Virginia
issued its report, A Vision for Justice: Report and Recommendations Regarding
Wrongful Convictions in the Commonwealth of Virginia, which included specific
reform recommendations in several areas, such as eyewitness identifications,
interrogation procedures, discovery practices, the problem of "tunnel vision," the
quality of defense counsel, scientific practices, and postconviction remedies. Id. at
xviii-xxii. Because it was a nonprofit entity, the Virginia commission lacked some of
the investigatory power of a legislative or gubernatorial task force. Jon B. Gould,
After Further Review. A New Wave of Innocence Commissions, 88 JUDICATURE 126,
130 (2004) (reporting on the Innocence Commission's work).
In North Carolina, State Supreme Court Chief Justice I. Beverly Lake, Jr. created
the North Carolina Actual Innocence Commission. Christine C. Mumma, The North
Carolina Actual Innocence Commission: Uncommon Perspectives Joined by a Common
Cause, 52 DRAKE L. REv. 647, 648-49 (2004).
315. See Findley, supra note 1, at 351. Consistent with his public rhetoric of
inclusion, Findley's vision of the ideal local criminal justice study commission was an
inclusive and deliberative body of diverse stakeholders, which would include
.prosecution and defense attorneys, members of the judiciary, representatives of police
groups, victims rights groups, academics, and, importantly, nonlawyers and individuals
outside the criminal justice system" to "bring a fresh perspective and common sense"
to deliberations among experts and insiders. Id. at 353. And in line with his careful
choice of language, Findley recommended that these commissions be called Criminal
Justice Study Commissions, rather than Innocence Commissions, because
"[p]rosecutors and victims rights advocates ... are more likely to feel they have a
stake in the enterprise if the language used does not carry implicit judgments hostile to
their interest in punishing the guilty." Id. at 353 n.101.
316. Id. at 351.
317. At the time his article was published in Spring 2002, efforts were already
under way in Wisconsin to form a committee through the Wisconsin State Bar and the
deans of the two Wisconsin law schools. Id. at 353; Findley, supra note 260, at 13.
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while plans for a more expansive study commission continued.318
However, the Avery-Task Force benefited from Findley's nascent
efforts because the constituents Findley had assembled temporarily
turned their attention and resources to the work of the Avery Task
Force. In particular, the Wisconsin State Bar funded the expenses of
many of the out-of-state experts and practitioners from other
jurisdictions who came to testify for the task force.319
The Avery Task Force combined the characteristics of an
innocence commission with a mission to deliberate and gain consensus
from diverse stakeholders and a legislative task force with the power
and resources to effectuate immediate statewide legal reform.32°
Because it was created within the auspices of the legislature, the work
product of the Avery Task Force was not a report to be considered by
lawmakers at their leisure, but concrete legislation sponsored by
Gundrum and other legislative members of the Avery Task Force that
was submitted for action and decision .2' The question was whether the
318. Id. at 14. The Wisconsin Criminal Justice Study Commission has now
been formed as a partnership between the Wisconsin State Bar Association, the
Wisconsin Department of Justice, and the two Wisconsin law schools. Wisconsin
Criminal Justice Study Commission: Charter Statement, available at
http://www.law.wisc.edu/webshare/02i0/commission charter statement.pdf. It has a
more expansive mission to "examine cases nationwide with the goal of identifying
problems and developing policies for application in Wisconsin," and a preliminary list
of nine initial topics for study: eyewitness identification procedures, false confessions
resulting from police interrogation techniques, indigent defense, forensic science,
jailhouse informants, the role of race and ethnicity, police investigation techniques, the
role of the prosecutor, and appellate review and postconviction remedies. Findley,
supra note 260, at 14-15.
319. Interview with Keith Findley, supra note 75.
320. In addition to Keith Findley of the Wisconsin Innocence Project, the
Avery Task Force consisted of four district attorneys, one victim witness coordinator,
one public defender, three trial judges, three law enforcement officers, and two
attorneys. Task Force to Look at Ways to Reduce Wrongful Convictions, Wis.
DEFENDER, Winter 2004, at 10, 10. In addition to Representative Gundrum, it also
included two Democratic and two Republican legislators. Id. Although all members of
the task force were ground-level criminal justice system actors (prosecutors, trial
judges, law enforcement agents, etc.) with a direct stake in the system, the task force
did not contain any community members from outside the criminal justice system. See
id. Interestingly, one judicial member of the Avery Task Force, Milwaukee Circuit
Court Judge Louis Butler, went on to be appointed to the Wisconsin Supreme Court
mid-way through the work of the task force. Although he resigned from the task force
after his appointment, he became a voice in favor of reform on the Wisconsin Supreme
Court, joining the four-three majority that ruled in favor of innocence reforms in both
Jerrell and Dubose. See In re Jerrell C.J., 2005 WI 105, 283 Wis. 2d 145, 699
N.W.2d 110; State v. Dubose, 2005 WI 126, 285 Wis. 2d 143, 699 N.W.2d 582.
321. New Task Force to Look at State's Justice System, supra note 313 ("The
task force will meet for the first time Dec. 22. Gundrum said he hoped it would meet
2006:645 Wisconsin's New Governance Experiment
Avery Task Force could build not only the consensus of its members,
but also the political will to enact the reform measures it proposed. In
this effort, Gundrum's political savvy, combined with national
strategies of face-to-face meetings between criminal justice insiders,
proved to be a powerful combination.
3. PROBLEM-SOLVING METHODS IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS
Although its goal was broad systemic reform, the methodology in
the Avery Task Force was built around humanizing both the problems
that lead to wrongful convictions and the solutions proposed to address
them. It relied on methods such as those used in the national AJS and
JMI conferences: face-to-face encounters designed to win personal
investment in problem solving, across ideological division and
institutional entrenchment, one person at a time."2 The initial
collaboration between Gundrum and Findley was itself a microcosm of
this approach. Gundrum is well-known for his conservative views,323
and is a self-described "law and order" person.324 Findley, on the other
hand, came to his work in the Wisconsin Innocence Project from a
career in criminal defense animated by liberal social justice values and
a leftist activist upbringing. 32
5
Gundrum knew from the beginning that the methodology of the
task force was going to be "defense people bringing forward ideas and
law enforcement reining them in.",3 26 He also knew that gaining the
buy-in of hard-line law enforcement was going to be the key to political
success for any proposed legislative reforms. Gundrum thus
approached the work of the Avery Task Force with an attitude of open-
minded skepticism toward defense-oriented reform proposals, which set
five or six times over the next year before forwarding its recommendations to the
Legislature and law enforcement officials.").
322. See supra notes 260-61 and accompanying text.
323. Editorial, Gundrum Steps Up, supra note 311 ("Assembly Judiciary
Committee Chair Mark Gundrum does not always win praise from this column. But
the conservative Republican from New Berlin has earned it with his wise response to a
clear case of injustice.").
324. Interview with Mark Gundrum, Wis. State Assembly Representative (Feb.
6, 2006).
325. Erik Christianson, Prison Work Fuels Professors' Passion for Justice,
http://www.news.wisc.edu/story.php?get=5734 (describing the legal work of both
Findley and Wisconsin Innocence Project codirector John Pray as rooted in the social
justice values of their upbringing by activist parents) (last visited Mar. 23, 2006).




the tone for the task force's deliberations.32 As a result, it was up to
the Wisconsin Innocence Project to persuade the law enforcement
stakeholders, including Gundrum, that what they proposed would
benefit the goals of criminal investigation and could feasibly work.329
The very first meeting of the Avery Task Force began with
testimony from Avery about the human consequences of wrongful
conviction, 330 which naturally focused the task force on the problem of
mistaken identification that had played such an important role in his
conviction. 331  Transformed by her experience into an outspoken
advocate for innocence reforms, Penny Beernsten, the rape victim who
had mistakenly identified Avery, gave a particularly powerful
testimonial to the Avery Task Force and later testified before the
Wisconsin State Legislature. 32 Her firsthand account put a human face
on the social scientific findings about the malleability of eyewitness
memory and confidence. She recounted how sure she had been that she
had gotten a good look at her attacker, and how through successivw
identification procedures, she had grown to be "'100 percent' certain
Avery was the assailant by the time she testified." 33  She was also able
to articulate the personal burdens of conscience she bore as a result of
having identified the wrong man, building the sense of collective harm
by reminding reformers that it is not only the wrongfully convicted
person who is victimized when police employ a suggestive
334identification procedure.
The task force continued its study of mistaken identification
through meetings with experts, affected individuals, and officials from
jurisdictions that had implemented reforms under consideration by the
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. Weier, supra note 280 ("Avery choked up with tears today as he told the
task force that the hardest thing was the effect on his family relationships.").
331. Findley, supra note 260, at 14.
332. Phil Brinkman, "I Wanted the Earth to Swallow Me": Rape Victim Upset
She Helped Convict Wrong Man, WIS. STATE J., Sept. 8, 2005, at B1; Ingersoll, supra
note 272.
333. Brinkman, supra note 332.
334. "Not a day goes by that I don't think about Mr. Avery, his family and the
suffering they endured," she told the Avery Task Force. "My heart aches equally for
the Green Bay woman who was brutally attacked in 1995 by ... my actual assailant."
Ingersoll, supra note 272. She later testified in the legislature, "The day [my attorney]
told me [that DNA had excluded Avery as her assailant] was much worse than the day I
was assaulted. I just wanted the earth to swallow me." Brinkman, supra note 332. At
the conclusion of her "sometimes tearful" testimony in favor of the legislation proposed
by the Avery Task Force, the joint session of the Senate and Assembly judiciary
committees gave Beernsten "a rare standing ovation." Id.
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task force.335 In its second meeting, Dr. Gary Wells spoke to the task
force regarding his research into eyewitness identification procedures
that has formed the basis for many of the proposed innocence
reforms.336 New Jersey Assistant Attorney General Lori Linskey also
spoke to the task force about what it was like to actually implement
eyewitness identification procedures based on cutting-edge social
scientific research.337  Closer to home, representatives from the
Madison Police Department testified about the implementation of their
pilot project on eyewitness identification.338
These face-to-face meetings with a variety of stakeholders and
affected individuals may have helped to overcome some of the
traditional distrust that exists between law enforcement, prosecution,
and criminal defense advocates that is bred by their experience of
seeing criminal justice procedures used for adversarial rather than
mutual gain.339 Reassurance from criminal justice insiders that the
innocence reforms are not just another "defense tactic" being imposed
on law enforcement and prosecution may have been especially
important in refraining this traditionally adversarial stance and building
the foundation for a spirit of mutually advantageous problem solving to
take hold.i




338. Interview with Keith Findley, supra note 75.
339. Jody Freeman makes a similar point about the effect of face-to-face
deliberations between environmentalists and industry representatives in negotiated
rulemaking over plant emissions. Freeman, supra note 13, at 44, 48-49.
340. For example, in his work on the committee formulating the U.S.
Department of Justice Guidelines for Eyewitness Identification, eyewitness
identification researcher Dr. Gary Wells reported that he was surprised at the resistance
of prosecutors to embrace social scientifically based eyewitness identification reforms.
Wells et al., Lab to Police Station, supra note 28, at 591. As Wells speculated,
prosecutors' distrust of social scientific findings about mistaken identification may be
due in part to the fact that prosecutors typically encounter psychologists when they
testify as expert witnesses for the defense, and prosecutors typically oppose their
testimony on the ground that it is unnecessary to assist the jury. Id. at 592. Moreover,
prosecutors' litigation perspective on the implications of police guidelines may lead
them to view guidelines less in terms of how they would help police improve their
practices, and more in terms of how they would hurt prosecutorial arguments in
suppression hearings in the event that police failed to follow the guidelines. Id. at 591.
In light of the animosity and distrust engendered by experience within the adversarial
context of suppression hearings, the ability to ask questions directly of someone with a
prosecutor's perspective on how eyewitness identification standards have been working
in practice would predictably be more helpful than testimony by the experts themselves.
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The power of face-to-face meetings with credible law enforcement
insiders from other jurisdictions is perhaps best illustrated by the
process through which the Avery Task Force reached an agreement on
reforms regarding electronic recording of custodial interrogations. By
early January 2005, the Avery Task Force had reached a consensus on
a package of reforms to address the problem of mistaken identifications
and the preservation and testing of biological crime-scene evidence."'
However, the task force had failed to reach a similar consensus on
reforms to custodial interrogation practices.342 After deliberating for a
little over a year, discussions in the Avery Task Force about measures
to combat false confessions had stalled over whether legislation
proposed by the task force should recommend or require law
enforcement agencies to record all custodial interrogations, or whether
it should address custodial interrogation at all."' Although some
members of the task force advocated for mandatory electronic
recording of all custodial interrogations, other task force members
disagreed about the importance and effectiveness of recording or were
concerned about its cost. 3" Gundrum had all but concluded that
mandatory recording was simply not going to fly because it was an
unfunded mandate on local law enforcement agencies that was so
unpopular it threatened to drive law enforcement away from the table
and kill the entire bill. 34
In the face of this resistance, the task force moved on to another
topic that was more central to Avery's conviction: the problem of
"tunnel vision," or confirmatory bias, in police investigation. 346  To
address the problem of tunnel vision, the task force invited Thomas
Sullivan, who had been the Co-chair of Illinois Governor Ryan's Task
Force on the Death Penalty, to testify.3 47  However, Sullivan's
341. Despite the Avery Task Force's mandate to study broader causes of
wrongful convictions, the first package of reforms that came out of the task force
focused on proposing legislative changes that were "clearly connected to the Avery
case," thus initially passing on reforms directed at the problem of false confessions.
Anita Weier, Task Force Backs Shifts to Deter False Convictions, CAP. TIMES





345. Interview with Mark Gundrum, supra note 312.
346. Findley & Scott, supra note 120.
347. Sullivan had been advocating nationally for the adoption of reforms in line
with the recommendations of the Ryan Task Force, including measures to combat
tunnel vision. See Thomas P. Sullivan, Preventing Wrongful Convictions, 86
JUDICATURE 106, 108 (2002). Sullivan was not the only one to testify about tunnel
716
2006:645 Wisconsin's New Governance Experiment
testimony quickly turned to the issue of electronic recording, another
subject on which he had become an outspoken advocate.348 Sullivan
had previously prepared a report based on an extensive survey of agents
from 238 law enforcement agencies in thirty-eight states that record
custodial interviews of suspects in felony investigations .349 Although
not a scientific study, the report gives a voice to the overwhelming
consensus of the surveyed agents that recording is a beneficial law
enforcement tool, that it does not impede their ability to obtain
confessions from suspects, and that it is neither prohibitively expensive
nor logistically difficult to employ. 30  Task force members pressed
Sullivan with so many questions about electronic recording that he
never got around to discussing the problem of tunnel vision. 5
After Sullivan's testimony, electronic recording was back on the
table and the task force heard from law enforcement agents in other
jurisdictions that utilized it. One particularly effective presentation
came from John Priest, of the Denver Police Department, who brought
examples of videotaped interrogations to demonstrate how taping had
assisted some specific police investigations by capturing both factual
information and details of a suspect's demeanor that would have been
lost if the interrogation had not been recorded.352 However, the task
force also wanted to hear from law enforcement representatives in
neighboring Minnesota, who had been living under a court-ordered
mandate to record custodial interrogations since 1994. 353 Minnesota
Sergeant Neil Nelson answered this call, reassuring skeptical task force
members that mandatory recording was "the most powerful law
enforcement tool ever forced down [their] throats. "
31
A 2004 case from Massachusetts gave the Avery Task Force the
solution it needed to move forward on the mandatory recording issue.
In Commonwealth v. DiGiambattista, the Massachusetts Supreme Court
examined at length the problem of false confession and the remedy of
mandatory recording.355  While it stopped short of requiring the
vision. The Avery Task Force had also hosted a visit from former U.S. Attorney
General Janet Reno. Tom Sheehan, Reno Has Living Proof in Audience: It's About
Not Convicting the Innocent, Wis. STATE J., Apr. 23, 2004, at B1.
348. Interview with Keith Findley, supra note 75; Interview with Mark
Gundrum, supra note 312.
349. Sullivan, supra note 76, at 4.
350. Id. at 14-15, 23-24.
351. Interview with Keith Findley, supra note 75.
352. Interview with Mark Gundrum, supra note 312.
353. Id.
354. Findley, supra note 45.
355. 813 N.E.2d 516, 518 (2004).
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recording of custodial interrogation, it ruled that when an unrecorded
custodial interrogation was introduced into evidence, a defendant had
the right to request that the jury be instructed to weigh the confession
evidence with "great caution and care."356 The idea of instructing the
jury to discount the weight of an unrecorded confession, rather than
outright excluding it from evidence, provided the Avery Task Force
with a compromise position that it could endorse. Moreover, after the
Wisconsin Supreme Court decided Jerrell, which mandated recording
of police interrogations of juveniles in custody,3 57 the logistical
questions about recording became less of a barrier because local
agencies were going to have to address them anyway.
The Wisconsin legislative reforms to eyewitness identification and
custodial interrogation represent a significant achievement in the
direction of the first challenge of experimentalist reform: gaining
genuine buy-in by a diverse group of stakeholders who come to
perceive the reforms to be to their mutual advantage. The reform effort
in Wisconsin relied on loosely organized national networks that
coordinated information about ongoing reform in other jurisdictions and
facilitated face-to-face encounters that both humanized the problem and
helped criminal justice stakeholders envision workable solutions. As
previously discussed, the institutional infrastructure created by the
Wisconsin innocence reforms is also promising from a democratic
experimentalist perspective.359
However, the potential for experimentalist governance is not the
same thing as its realization. Like other case studies documenting the
emergence of democratic experimentalist governance, the Wisconsin
innocence reforms do not exemplify a fully functioning experimentalist
governance regime characterized by a process of continuous localized
improvement within larger structures of information-sharing and
accountability. Part IV discusses the obstacles facing a full realization
of that ideal.
356. Id. at 533-34.
357. In re Jerrell C.J., 2005 WI 105, 3, 283 Wis. 2d 145, 3, 699 N.W.2d
110, 3.
358. The legislation also enabled local law enforcement agencies to apply for
grants "for the purchase, installation or maintenance of digital recording equipment for
making audio or audio and visual recordings of custodial interrogations or for training
personnel to use such equipment." Assemb. B. 648, 2004-2005 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1
(Wis. 2005) (codified at Wis. Stat. § 16.964(10)(2005-2006)).
359. See supra Part H.C.
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IV. THE CHALLENGES OF SUSTAINING INNOCENCE REFORM
The Wisconsin innocence reforms of 2005 created an institutional
architecture conducive to democratic experimentalist governance. The
reforms decentralized and localized the development of investigatory
practices, legislatively encouraging local law enforcement agencies to
learn through experimentation what procedures work best to gather
reliable eyewitness identification and confession evidence. The
Madison Police Department's development of a pilot project on
eyewitness identification procedures exemplifies the kind of local
experimentation that the democratic experimentalist paradigm hopes to
spark.
360
However, the promise of the Madison Police Department's process
is matched by an equally plausible tendency in a non-experimentalist
direction. For example, it is just as possible under the Wisconsin
reforms for a local agency to decline the invitation to engage in careful
reflective study and unreflectively adopt the model policy on eyewitness
identification promulgated by the Wisconsin Department of Justice.
Such a response might still be said to improve the quality of criminal
justice in the state by promoting the widespread promulgation of
eyewitness identification procedures that are based in sound social
science, even if they are unreflectively adopted by local agencies.
However, such a result would differ little from a traditional regulatory
regime in which experts dictate known best practices from the top
down. The problem with such a non-experimentalist response is that it
does not promise the legitimacy gained through genuine buy-in by local
agencies embracing reform on their own initiative. Without genuine
buy-in, the policies adopted by local agencies may simply sit on the
shelf, rather than being incorporated into the actual investigatory
practices of law enforcement agencies.
In this regard, the Wisconsin reform effort may fall victim to its
own success. The slower-moving incremental reform process that was
underway prior to the Avery exoneration relied on reform to percolate
from the bottom up, as local officials became personally invested in
reforming their procedures to prevent wrongful convictions. With the
process overtaken by faster-paced statewide legislative and judicial
reforms, it becomes perhaps too easy for local agencies to formally
comply with the legislative mandates for written policies and electronic
recording without engaging the experimentalist goals of continuous
innovation and cross-jurisdictional learning.
360. See supra notes 262-68 and accompanying text.
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Of course, fast-paced and slow-growth reform processes do not
present mutually exclusive options. The legislative mandates for local
law enforcement agencies to create internal written policies can be
symbiotic with, and supportive of, local engagement in reform directed
toward preventing wrongful convictions. The question is whether the
structures of accountability that the Wisconsin reforms set up can be
used to promote not only formal compliance with mandates, but also
engagement on the part of local agencies with the experimentalist goal
of continuous and cross-jurisdictional learning about criminal
investigatory practices. Unfortunately, the only institutional
mechanism that the Wisconsin reforms currently provide is the
exclusionary rule in individual criminal cases. For reasons spelled out
in the next section, the exclusionary rule is an inadequate mechanism to
achieve experimentalist goals and may tend to undermine the forces that
promote experimental reform.
A. The Challenge of Experimentalist Reform in an Adversarial
System
The new requirements in Wisconsin that law enforcement agencies
develop and comply with sound eyewitness identification procedures
and that they record custodial interrogations are enforced with a single
remedy: the suppression of evidence."' Hence, it is in individual
criminal cases, in rulings on defense motions to suppress evidence of
guilt, that law enforcement agencies will be held accountable for their
engagement in the continuing process of reform. Two characteristics of
contested suppression hearings, each of which is the mirror opposite of
the conditions that have made DNA exonerations effective rallying
points for criminal justice system reform, undermine their ability to
motivate the experimentalist goals of continuous improvement and
cross-jurisdictional learning. First, because actual guilt or innocence is
361. Following State v. Dubose, courts may now suppress evidence of an
identification that was "unnecessarily suggestive." 2005 WI 126, 33, 285 Wis. 2d
143, 33, 699 N.W.2d 582, 33. As previously discussed, the experimentalist
potential of this remedy is that an identification may be considered "unnecessarily"
suggestive if: (1) it fails to comply with a local law enforcement agency's written
policy; or (2) the written policy itself creates protocols that are unnecessarily suggestive
when compared with the protocols in other jurisdictions. See discussion supra Part
II.C. 1. Following State v. Jerrell and the Avery Task Force legislation under which it
was codified, courts must suppress statements gained as a result of custodial
interrogations of juveniles that were not recorded. See supra notes 217-22. The
remedy in adult felony cases is not suppression, but an instruction to the jury that it
may take into account the failure of law enforcement to record the interrogation, in
derogation of state policy. WIS. STAT. § 972.115 (2005-2006).
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most often unclear, success in a suppression hearing is an ambiguous
result. It is difficult to tell whether suppressing questionable
identification evidence in a particular case will actually prevent a
wrongful conviction or contribute to a wrongful exoneration. The
clarity that DNA brings to questions of innocence and guilt, which has
served as a rallying point for buy-in to the innocence reforms, is absent
in a contested suppression hearing in an individual criminal case.
Second, criminal justice participants-law enforcement officers, defense
attorneys, and prosecutors-are pursuing divergent goals in suppression
hearings, which are only incompletely committed to truth-seeking.
Hence, the sense of mutual gain achieved among criminal justice
system participants in their problem-solving reform efforts is likely to
devolve in suppression hearings into obfuscation and procedural
ganing.
1. LACK OF CLARITY ON INNOCENCE AND GUILT
The DNA exonerations of the past decade-and-a-half have
provided the opportunity for systemic soul-searching because of the
clarity with which they deliver a verdict on the workings of the criminal
justice system in a particular case.362 A DNA exoneration is currently
the "gold standard" of proof that a miscarriage of justice has occurred,
allowing the opportunity to examine what went wrong in specific cases
of wrongful convictions and the implications that diagnosis might have
for larger systemic reform.363 In the context of a suppression motion in
a contested criminal case, however, guilt and innocence are unclear.
This lack of clarity about whether the suppression of evidence in a
particular case will advance or undermine the truth-seeking goals of the
criminal justice system turns the incentives that have motivated
innocence reform on their heads.
Taking the example of mistaken eyewitness identification, the
power of face-to-face confrontation-such as testimony by victims like
Penny Beernsten about their experiences identifying the wrong man-
helped to build consensus for innocence reform. However, the power
of such personal experiences is equally likely to undermine courts'
willingness to deploy the exclusionary rule in individual criminal
cases.3" An individual victim who wants to identify the defendant-
who the victim is confident is the perpetrator of a crime-will get little
comfort from being told that because police could have employed a
362. Findley, supra note 1, at 337; Liebman, supra note 4, at 543, 547-48.
363. Findley, supra note 1, at 335-36.
364. Richard A. Rosen, Reflections on Innocence, 2006 Wis. L. REV. 237.
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better identification procedure; such testimony is now the equivalent of
contaminated evidence that the jury should not hear.36 5 Without the
clarity of a DNA test excluding the defendant as the perpetrator,
denying a victim the opportunity to voice his or her identification will
seem like a miscarriage of justice.
In the context of individual cases, courts will be tempted to admit
the eyewitness identification evidence and allow the jury to decide the
question of its reliability, and the newly articulated Wisconsin due
process standard allows courts two options for accomplishing this end.
Courts can admit evidence of a concededly suggestive out-of-court
identification under the new standard by finding that the use of the
suggestive procedure was necessary under the circumstances. 366  A
court can also allow an in-court identification if it finds that the in-court
identification was independent of the suggestive out-of-court procedure
that police employed.367 The deployment of these options over time is
likely to create a body of case law, like the various doctrines that the
U.S. Supreme Court has developed to avoid the harshness of the
exclusionary rule, that will undermine and erode the effectiveness of
the "unnecessarily suggestive" standard as a meaningful sanction when
police fail to comply with their own written policies on eyewitness
identification. When police have complied with their own policies, but
the policies themselves come under attack as unnecessarily suggestive,
the likelihood of the court using the exclusionary rule is even more
remote.
Likewise, the ability to exclude or instruct a jury that it may
discount the evidentiary weight of confessions gained in unrecorded
custodial interrogations promotes compliance with the practice of
365. See Wis. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 199, at 6, 22, 26.
366. State v. Dubose, 2005 WI 126, 33, 285 Wis. 2d 143, 33, 699 N.W.2d
582, 33.
367. Though the BrathwaitelBiggers reliability determination is no longer a part
of the Wisconsin due process test for whether an out-of-court identification is
admissible, the court ruled that an in-cout identification could still proceed as long as
the state could prove by clear and convincing evidence that that witness's in-court
identification was based on an independent source. Id. 33. The use of the
independent-source doctrine runs the risk of reintroducing the BrathwaiteBiggers
reliability factors. Indeed, it was a criticism of Brathwaite that by incorporating
considerations of "reliability" into the test for admissibility of out-of-court
identifications, it conflated that test with the independent-source rule for in-court
identification. Manson v. Brathwaite, 431 U.S. 98, 121-23 (1977) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). If the social science on which the court's Dubose rule is based is taken
seriously, it would be quite unlikely that an in-court identification could truly be
independent, and it would be a rare occasion in which the state could meet its burden of
showing that a witness's in-court identification was untainted by suggestive out-of-court
procedures.
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electronic recording, and that practice creates transparency about what
occurs in the interrogation room. However, transparency does not in
itself ensure that cross-jurisdictional learning about the effectiveness of
particular interrogation techniques will occur. Even with a videotaped
record, it may be difficult, without the clarity provided by a DNA
exclusion, to assess police practices against their outcomes because it
will be difficult to know whether the practices employed in any
particular case have resulted in a false confession or a true one.
2. INCOMPLETE COMMITMENT TO THE GOAL OF TRUTH-SEEKING
In addition to providing clarity about outcomes, DNA exonerations
have served as a rallying point for problem-solving approaches to
criminal justice reform because they remind diverse stakeholders,
whose interests and viewpoints are most often at odds in the highly
adversarial context of the criminal justice system, of their common
interest in ensuring accurate convictions.36 The wrongful conviction of
an innocent person is not only an affront to that individual, but a
concomitant failure to capture and convict the guilty party. 3 69 It thus
implicates a common concern between law enforcement, criminal
defense, and prosecution interests.
However, this point of mutual agreement masks a deeper
divergence in the perspectives of law enforcement, criminal defense,
and prosecution on the basic goals and legitimacy of the criminal justice
system. Although each is committed in some degree to accurate fact-
finding, the commitments arise from different sources. The truth-
seeking mission of the criminal justice system can be-and sometimes
is-undermined by influences such as corruption, ambition, and
unethical behavior. 37" However, it is also threatened by the pursuit of
the more noble goals and professional commitments of law enforcement
agents, criminal defense attorneys, and prosecutors, whose professional
commitments leave them only partially committed to seeking the truth
in each case.
Law enforcement's primary professional commitment is to public
safety, which may lead to the desire to get dangerous criminals off the
368. Stookey, supra note 254, at 159.
369. See Findley, supra note 1, at 337-38.
370. Wrongful convictions have also resulted from fraudulent behavior, such as
fabrication of forensic evidence, DWYER, supra note 2, at 119-25, and prosecutorial
misconduct, such as withholding exculpatory evidence from the defense, id. at 172-82.
Fabricated evidence claims, such as those concerning the use of false lab results and
known perjury, are increasingly common in constitutional tort cases arising from
wrongful convictions. Garrett, supra note 11, at 93-97.
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street by any means possible. In the law enforcement worldview,
society tends to be divided between law-abiders and lawbreakers, with
clear moral imperatives to punish lawbreakers.37 Studies of police
interrogation techniques have shown that commitments to truth-telling
give way to the expedience of protecting public safety when it comes to
gaining a confession from a suspect in custody.372 It is simply not a
moral imperative to be truthful during interrogation. The moral
imperative to protect public safety also works to override respect for
the exclusionary rule. Even though the exclusionary rule is sometimes
at least partially based on the global correlation of investigatory
practices with truth-seeking,373 it may be perceived as a "loophole" in
the context of an individual case.374 Thus, the law enforcement
commitment to truth-seeking in individual suppression hearings may be
particularly precarious.
The primary commitment of criminal defense lawyers is to the
individual client, whether innocent or guilty. 7 ' This includes a concern
for preventing the wrongful conviction of innocent clients, but it
extends further to include a concern for helping guilty clients avoid
punishment. While helping guilty clients avoid punishment may not
seem like a strong moral imperative, criminal defense work is often
based in a worldview that sees moral complexity in situations of
criminal behavior, viewing lawbreaking within the broader contexts of
societal ills, understandable human weakness, and tragic cycles of
harm.3 76 The worldview of criminal defense thus tends to minimize the
connection between lawbreaking and the need for punishment and does
not equate justice with criminal conviction. The humanitarian impulse
to get the client out of trouble, coupled with a normative vision that
weakens the link between punishment and justice, works to sanction
criminal defense attorneys' deployment of procedural advantage in any
way possible to gain a dismissal or acquittal. This tendency toward
procedural formalism is endorsed by the conceptual role of the defense
371. See, e.g., Robert K. Olson, Miscarriage of Justice: A Cop's View, 86
JUDICATURE 74 (2002).
372. See Ofshe & Leo, supra note 50, at 1108-41.
373. See supra Part I.B.
374. Olson, supra note 371, at 74.
375. Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Beyond Justifications: Seeking Motivations to
Sustain Public Defenders, 106 HARV. L. REv. 1239, 1246-48 (1993); Abbe Smith &
William Montross, The Calling of Ciminal Defense, 50 MERCER L. REv. 443 (1999)
(describing the roots of indigent criminal defense in Jewish and Catholic values of
compassion for the poor and oppressed).
376. See Barbara Allen Babcock, Defending the Guilty, 32 CLEV. ST. L. REv.
175, 178 (1983-1984) (describing the connections between the motivations of criminal
defense work and both political activism and social work).
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attorney within an accusatorial system: a defense attorney forces the
prosecution to meet its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt even
in cases where the defense attorney may be personally convinced that
the client is factually guilty.
Prosecutors, like criminal defense attorneys, are professionally
committed to compliance with procedure, but bear the additional
professional commitment to advancing substantive justice .1 7  This dual
commitment to procedural formality and substantive justice would seem
to make prosecutors a natural arbiter between law enforcement and
criminal defense interests. In reality, it makes them allies of neither,
isolating them within a realm of virtually unreviewable prosecutorial
discretion that they must ultimately exercise based on sometimes
difficult personal judgment calls. 378
The prosecutor's responsibility to exercise discretion creates two
kinds of fissures within the goals of truth-seeking. First, because of the
commitment to procedural justice, the exercise of a prosecutor's
discretion to drop or reduce criminal charges is sometimes based-
despite a personal assessment of guilt-on a professional assessment of
the weakness of the admissible evidence against the defendant.379 This
puts the prosecutor at odds with the law enforcement interest in
protecting public safety by any means possible, and creates incentives
for police to shield prosecutors from information that may undermine
prosecutorial confidence in the admissibility or strength of the evidence
against a suspect.
On the other hand, in making the choice to move forward to trial,
a prosecutor is compelled by the responsibilities inherent in the exercise
of discretion to invest professionally in what he or she personally
377. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (2004).
378. Robert L. Misner, Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 J. CRIM L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 717 (1996) (discussing at length the forces leading to the broad discretion
that prosecutors increasingly exercise in deciding which crimes to prosecute); Bruce A.
Green, Policing Federal Prosecutors: Do Too Many Regulators Make Too Little
Enforcement?, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 69 (1995) (canvassing the various sources and
general ineffectiveness of the laws governing the decisions and behavior of federal
prosecutors).
379. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE PROSECUTION
FUNCTION Standard 3-3.9(a) ("A prosecutor should not institute, cause to be instituted,
or permit the continued pendency of criminal charges in the absence of sufficient
admissible evidence to support a conviction."); see also Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring
the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice." Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L.
REV. 45 (1991) (discussing prosecutors' duties to ensure that the adversary system
works according to its internal logic, including duties to rebalance the scales when
defense advocacy is inadequate and to rely only on admissible evidence).
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believes to be true.38 The ability to drop charges at any time
differentiates prosecutors from defense attorneys, who can play their
professional role while remaining personally agnostic about what might
have "really happened."381 In contrast, by moving forward with a
prosecution in light of the discretionary power to dismiss charges,
prosecutors signal their personal conviction that a defendant is truly
guilty. 382  When this personal conviction is carried forward into the
adversarial context of a criminal trial, in which a defense attorney is
deploying any procedural advantage available to gain an acquittal, the
strong temptation is for the prosecutor to fight back by any means
possible to ensure a conviction.383
In this rough-and-tumble context of contested suppression motions
and criminal trials, the fragile consensus gained for the importance of
truth-seeking is likely to unravel into obfuscation and procedural
gaming as criminal justice participants pursue their divergent
agendas."' More ominously, the adversarial nature of contested
suppression hearings threatens to undermine the consensus between law
380. See Kenneth J. Melilli, Prosecutorial Discretion in an Adversary System,
1992 B.Y.U. L. REv. 669, 681-82 (1992) (arguing that prosecutors' duty to do justice
requires them to base discretionary decisions on personal assessments of guilt and
innocence); Zacharias, supra note 379, at 50 ("'[Tlhe heart of the codes' mandate to do
justice seems clear: the prosecutor should exercise discretion to prosecute only persons
she truly considers guilty, and then only in a manner that fits the crime.").
381. See Abbe Smith, Defending the Innocent, 32 CONN. L. REv. 485, 509-12
(2000) (describing the "liberating" relationship that not having to worry about "the
truth" has on criminal defense work, and the difficult-even desperate-quality of
defending a client you believe to be actually innocent).
382. As noted in reflecting on three DNA exonerations in Travis County,
Texas, "Prosecutors had thought that the sun would come up in the West before an
innocent person would have been convicted of a crime in their jurisdiction. They were
wrong." Earle & Case, supra note 295, at 73.
383. See generally Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. Prrr. L.
REv. 393 (1992) (detailing a trend of aggressive adversarial tactics in criminal
prosecution); Melilli, supra note 380, at 686-92 (discussing the myriad factors and
pressures that lead prosecutors to develop a "conviction psychology," including
distance from criminal defendants, closeness to victims and police, and incentives
toward victory in adversarial litigation).
384. The Wisconsin reforms to the legal standards governing eyewitness
identification and custodial interrogation go some distance in reducing the range of
obfuscation and procedural gaming that can occur. Police agents, for example, may
have a harder time explaining why they failed to use a less suggestive eyewitness
identification procedure when it would have been appropriate under the circumstances
according to their own written policies. And, an electronic recording of an
interrogation session eliminates the ability of both police and criminal defendants to
obfuscate what actually occurred for purposes of winning a suppression motion.
Reducing the opportunities for obfuscation and gaming, however, does not change the
underlying character of the proceedings or the incentives of the participants.
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enforcement, criminal defense, and prosecution that gives the innocence
reforms their legitimacy, and thus threatens the incentives for
continuous learning outside the courtroom as well.
B. The Challenges of Accountability by Keeping Count
If the exclusionary rule is inadequate to stimulate and support the
experimentalist goals of continuous improvement and cross-
jurisdictional learning, and if it may actually undermine the spirit of
experimentalist reform, it is fair to ask what kind of institutional
structure might provide better support. The democratic
experimentalists have an answer to this question: create structures that
coordinate information. In the age of computers and digital recording,
a vast amount of information has become readily accessible, and
powerful research tools have been developed for organizing and
analyzing it. Regulation within the democratic experimentalist
paradigm exploits the possibilities of the information age by proposing
structures of compliance and accountability that pool and disseminate
information about what localities are doing, coupled with systems of
assessment that permit the relative effectiveness of different practices to
be measured and compared according to their outcomes." 5
The Wisconsin innocence reforms have created new duties for
local law enforcement agencies to gather information about their
practices by requiring local agencies to adopt written policies on
eyewitness identification procedures and by strongly encouraging-and
in the case of juveniles requiring-electronic recording of custodial
interrogations.8 6  This new body of information provides rich
opportunities for Wisconsin to pursue the experimentalist goals of
continuous improvement, public accountability, and cross-jurisdictional
learning. However, under the reforms as they currently stand, this
information will remain scattered among various local jurisdictions.
385. Information is used in different ways in different experimentalist case
studies. See Sturm, supra note 15 (describing through three case studies how firms
addressed structural employment discrimination problems by instituting data collection
systems); Garrett, supra note 18 (describing the potential for using the vast amount of
data gathered about police stops to set up systems for remedying racial profiling);
Karkainnen, supra note 13 (describing the potential of public reporting laws on plant
emissions to spur experimentalist regulation of environmental safety).
386. Assemb. B. 648, 2004-2005 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2005).
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A state agency, like the Wisconsin DOJ, is the most logical
institution to take the role of information coordination.387 If the
Wisconsin DOJ saw its role as coordinating and promoting cross-
jurisdictional learning by local law enforcement agencies, it could set
up systems to collect and disseminate information among local agencies
about what each is doing and how well it is working. However, if an
agency like the Wisconsin DOJ is to play the role of pooling and
disseminating information about evolving local law enforcement
investigatory practices and assessing their effectiveness, it will face
additional challenges presented by unresolved tensions within the
democratic experimentalist paradigm itself. These challenges surround
two tasks: (1) finding a common metric by which outcomes can be
measured; and (2) determining who will have access to information that
is gathered and for what purposes.
1. THE CHALLENGE OF FINDING A COMMON METRIC
A fully developed experimental governance regime promotes the
goals of continuous improvement and cross-jurisdictional learning
through comparing the performance of different localities on the basis
of a common metric that measures the success of their efforts based on
the outcomes of those efforts.388 Outcome-based metrics serve the goal
of continuous improvement by allowing "leaders and laggards" to be
identified, spurring a "race to the top" by competing jurisdictions, and
providing information by which poorly performing jurisdictions can be
held accountable.389
However, the task of finding an outcome-based metric for
measuring the success of local experimentation with police eyewitness
identification and interrogation practices is elusive. As previously
noted, contested criminal cases produce ambiguous results regarding
actual innocence, and it is difficult to envision an effective measure
against which the accuracy of verdicts in criminal cases can be tested.
DNA exonerations have provided clarity on the question of actual
innocence in a collection of high-profile postconviction victories. As
DNA testing moves from the postconviction to the pretrial stage of
criminal investigations, less public pretrial exonerations will still occur
387. See Doff & Sabel, supra note 11, at 340 (describing the role of
administrative agencies in a democratic experimentalist regime as "provid[ing] the
infrastructure of coordination" needed to support localized reform).
388. See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 11, at 345-48.
389. Liebman & Sabel, supra note 17, at 294; Karkainnen, supra note 13, at
328-31.
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when DNA samples are sent to crime labs for testing. The data
generated in these pretrial DNA exonerations are within the hands of
the state and hold some potential for checking the outcomes of law
enforcement investigatory practices. For example, crime lab testing
could identify cases in which a suspect is cleared by pretrial DNA
testing even though the suspect had been identified by an eyewitness or
had made a confession as the result of a police interrogation.
However, the experimentalist potential of pretrial DNA testing as a
common metric is limited. Postconviction DNA exonerations have
always been more powerful in their emotional appeal than in their
scientific value, in part because they occur in the limited kinds of cases
likely to leave biological trace evidence behind.3" Moreover, although
pretrial DNA exonerations might create a pool of cases in which it is
clear that the wrong suspect was initially targeted for investigation, they
are unlikely to generate enough data from each local law enforcement
agency to allow for statistically significant comparisons of the
effectiveness of different agencies' policies. Pretrial DNA exoneration
evidence may promise clarity as to guilt or innocence in an area rife
with ambiguity, but it provides only limited potential for cross-
jurisdictional comparison, at least in a manner robust enough to serve
experimentalist goals.
Although finding a common metric presents unique difficulties in
criminal cases, other case studies in democratic experimentalism
demonstrate that finding a common metric is never an easy task.
Choosing a metric inevitably involves a trade-off between rich and
detailed information that paints a nuanced picture of what is occurring
in local jurisdictions and less nuanced information that can be more
easily measured and compared. For example, in a case study of
Kentucky school reforms, the desire to measure the outcome of
educational methods by the common metric of test scores has arguably
led to conformity rather than experimentation as more nuanced
portfolio-based assessment techniques have given way to less nuanced,
but more easily comparable, multiple-choice tests.391 As another case
study shows, even something as simple and easily measured as plant
emissions can result in ambiguities and trade-offs when used as an
outcome-based measure of environmental safety.
390. For example, DNA is more likely to exonerate a suspect charged with
rape or murder, than it is to exonerate a robbery suspect. See, e.g., Gross et al., supra
note 2, at 529-33 (analyzing the prevalence of exonerations in rape and murder cases).
391. Liebman & Sabel, supra note 17, at 261-65.
392. See Karkkainen, supra note 13, at 331-32 (describing the flaws of using
plant emissions reported under the Toxics Release Industry requirements that make it a
"potentially misleading and possibly counterproductive" measure of environmental
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Moreover, the challenges of finding a common metric indicate a
deeper tension in experimentalist governance between the drive toward
uniformity and the maintenance of flexibility that is necessary for fully
experimental practices to flourish. A common metric provides the
definition of success or failure in experimental efforts, and provides
impetus for ratcheting the benchmarked standards of success upward.
However, as experimentalists point out, systemic reform is also
promoted by defining problems fluidly so that local decision-makers
can respond as the process of solving one problem reveals the need to
solve different but related problems.393 Supporting this fluid problem-
solving process requires flexibility in the institutional structures that
mandate and support local reform.394 The focus on results in an
experimentalist governance regime provides some of the needed
flexibility. Rather than dictating specific practices from the top down
based on assumptions about what will work best, the focus on results
allows governed entities to experiment with divergent practices as long
as those practices can be shown to be effective. However, the drive
toward a common metric to measure results for the purpose of cross-
jurisdictional comparison has a tendency to focus governed entities
narrowly on the standard of success that the metric defines. These
narrowing effects of common measurement threaten to stultify rather
than support the fluid problem-solving process that experimentalism
envisions."'
performance "if it is not matched and counterbalanced by a set of equally powerful
metrics").
393. As democratic experimentalists point out, "problems have a tendency to
expand" from one area to another. Simon, supra note 11, at 184 (citing as an example
how "discussion of police responses to street crime ... may implicate a landlord's
toleration of drug dealing or the housing code agency's failure to cite the landlord for
code violations, or the park department's failure to light a neighboring public facility at
night"); see also Sabel & Simon, supra note 11, at 1080-82 (discussing the "web
effect" created by public law litigation).
394. See Freeman, supra note 13, at 67-69 (discussing how the delegation of
negotiated rulemaking authority limits the ability of stakeholders to respond when
deliberations reveal that the "real" problem is something other than they anticipated).
395. Proponents of experimentalist governance argue that achieving a balance
between nuanced and measurable information is important but difficult to strike; it is
best to proceed in experimental fashion-provisionally and incrementally-to devise the
most appropriate metrics. Karkainnen, supra note 13, at 369; Liebman & Sabel, supra
note 17, at 264-65 (noting that while the Kentucky school reform example may better
support the "pessimistic interpretation" that the change in metrics is evidence of top-
down control, the efforts also demonstrated that the system may still be in development
and shows signs of self-correction). This is a fair response, and I do not argue that the
tension between uniformity and flexibility is a definitive or show-stopping concern that
proves experimentalist governance can never work. However, it does defuse a
challenge and an obstacle to the practical implementation of experimentalist governance
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2. THE TENSION BETWEEN TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY
Another tension already noted in the democratic experimentalist
paradigm is that between the competing needs for transparency and
accountability. For continuous improvement and cross-jurisdictional
learning to take place, governed entities must feed information about
their practices transparently back to the central governing authority.
Obfuscation and self-interested gaming of the data used to measure
performance threaten the systems of internal learning and external
monitoring upon which the democratic experimentalist paradigm
depends. However, accountability and sanction of poorly performing
entities are also needed even though they are necessarily at odds with
the need for transparency. As previously noted, this tension is
acknowledged in the democratic experimentalist literature, with a bias
toward transparency and against sanction except in the most egregious
cases of noncompliance or substandard performance.
The tension between promoting transparency and the need for
accountability becomes particularly acute in deciding who will have
access to the information pooled for the purpose of cross-jurisdictional
learning, and for what purposes that information can be used.
Networks of information-pooling-especially if available to the public-
can create systems of accountability and public pressure to support and
supplement institutional motivation for continuous improvement.396
However, knowing that the information will be available to the public
for this purpose may provide incentives to "game" the data in ways that
defeat genuine engagement in cross-jurisdictional learning, especially if
the public is going to use the data as fodder for lawsuits against poorly
performing local agencies."'
on a large scale. Given that most examples of experimentalism to date are tentative,
local, incomplete, or voluntary, the practical obstacles revealed by experimentalist case
studies are worthy of attention.
396. See Liebman & Sabel, supra note 17, at 276-77 (describing the emergence
of citizen groups that analyze publicly available statistics on school performance to
assist local advocacy); Karkainnen, supra note 13, at 309-10 (describing the potential
for citizen groups to advocate for changes in environmental standards).
397. For example, Liebman and Sabel discuss the potential for data reported in
school reforms to be used in establishing proof of discrimination under either a
disparate impact or disparate treatment claim. See Liebman & Sabel, supra note 17, at
297-98. However, as Susan Sturm points out, the fear of the use of information about
internal operations in civil litigation can create incentives against gathering information
needed for innovative problem solving. Sturm, supra note 15, at 521-22. One solution
would be to make information about the performance of localities only selectively
available to central coordinating authorities for internal evaluation. Sturm, supra note
15, at 560-61 (discussing the possibility of privileging information gathered for the
purpose of self-evaluation). Andrew Taslitz recommends a two-stage process in which
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In the context of criminal cases, the tension between transparency
and accountability collides with another tension between the efficiency
of law enforcement practices and the protection of individual rights. As
previously discussed, the exclusionary rule operates in ways that tend to
unravel the consensus over the value of truth-seeking in the criminal
justice system, making it a poor institutional mechanism for engaging
local law enforcement agencies in a process of continuous
experimentalist reform. Yet the exclusionary rule provides more than
just a sanction directed at underperforming local police agencies. It is
also the best protection of the rights of individuals who are affected by
a poorly performing local law enforcement experiment. If protecting
the rights of individuals against state interference is a legitimate goal of
the criminal justice system-which few would dispute-then criminal
defense lawyers have a strong claim for access to any information that
has been collected and analyzed bearing on the effectiveness of local
agency policies.
If innocence reform is to proceed as an experimentalist venture of
continuous improvement and cross-jurisdictional learning, it must do so
in tandem-but to some extent at cross-purposes-with the traditional
protections of criminal procedural rules.398 It proceeds in tandem
because, as we have seen, the shared truth-seeking mission of police
and the courts provides a powerful justification for excluding evidence
from trial that has been tainted by flawed law enforcement practices.
However, it proceeds at cross-purposes because to protect their clients
from poorly performing systems, criminal defense lawyers must have
access to the information necessary to judge the effectiveness of local
agency policies. And knowing that the information they report can and
will be available for use by criminal defense attorneys in contested
suppression hearings will provide a powerful disincentive for local law
enforcement agencies to provide information in ways that are truly
transparent rather than strategic.
399
police and prosecutors can engage in internal deliberation about eyewitness
identification policies before opening the process to other stakeholders like defense
attorneys. Taslitz, supra note 206. However, while selective disclosure might promote
the goals of cross-jurisdictional learning by increasing the reliability of the data, it
would undermine the goal of public accountability. Sturm, supra note 15, at 561.
398. See generally Simon, supra note 11 (discussing several tensions between
focusing on individual rights and the pragmatism of democratic experimentalism).
399. Andrew Taslitz recounts that prosecutors in Brooklyn were considering
conducting an experiment in which some police districts would use simultaneous and
others sequential eyewitness identification procedures, but were concerned by the
prospect of the defense suppression motions that might result. Taslitz, supra note 206.
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C. The Efficacy of Experimentalist Innocence Reform
As stated at the outset, the purpose of exploring the Wisconsin
innocence reforms through a democratic experimentalist lens was to
reveal both the promise of experimental governance and the obstacles to
achieving experimental reform. The promise is that experimentalism
might provide a new way of pursuing criminal procedural reform-a
way that builds on the common truth-seeking mission of law
enforcement and courts and responds more effectively to the problems
that lead to wrongful convictions. The progress toward systemic
reform in Wisconsin demonstrates that this promise can bear the fruit of
genuine buy-in by both local agencies and state-level policymakers. It
also demonstrates, through the methodology of these reforms, the
potential that deliberation among diverse stakeholders holds for
reaching consensus, the importance of interaction between local
experimentation and networks of national coordination, and the power
of face-to-face meetings with those who have experimented with
something different and can speak from their experience about how it
works.
Just as the promise of Wisconsin's experimental reform reveals the
power of personal connection, the obstacles that Wisconsin faces to
full-blown democratic experimentalist governance reveal the problems
that distance creates. Elaborate infrastructures of accountability with
common metrics and clearinghouses of information provide a model for
how a continuous improvement regime could operate. Yet their very
grandiosity abstracts from the forces that stimulated engagement in
problem solving and created genuine buy-in at the local level in
Wisconsin. As the experiences in the Madison Police Department and
the Avery Task Force teach, reform proposals were met initially with
skepticism. This skepticism evolved into buy-in only through a gradual
process of careful study and face-to-face testimonials from criminal
justice insiders whose credibility was grounded in their personal
experience.
If the promise and the obstacles of experimentalist reform point to
a challenge for continued innocence reform in Wisconsin, it is the
challenge to keep the process of incremental reform alive within the
larger experimental structures that the Avery Task Force legislation has
created. Democratic experimentalism brings two important insights to
continued reform efforts. First, it teaches that reform should be viewed
as a continuous process, and that current understandings of best
practices should be viewed as provisional and revisable in light of
experience. Regulation should be viewed as a project of supporting and
encouraging local experimentation to continue. Second, it teaches
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about the power and potential of information coordination to assist in
continuous reform.
The lessons of democratic experimentalism may be best
implemented in the Wisconsin innocence reforms, not by attempting to
build an elaborate institutional apparatus for measuring the performance
of local law enforcement agencies based on the outcomes of their
practices, but by marshaling information to serve the purposes of
slower-growth incremental reform already in process prior to the Avery
exoneration. For example, Wisconsin could build on the welcoming
environment it already provides for partnerships between academics
and policymakers by allowing social science researchers access to
information about police investigatory practices that the new legislation
creates. 4°  It could also build on the engagement and investment of
local law enforcement agencies that have tried something new-like the
Madison Police Department-to help stimulate similar engagement and
dialogue in other jurisdictions. Movement in either of these directions
would help to sustain the process of building knowledge and gaining
buy-in by local law enforcement agencies without succumbing to either
the narrowing effects that a common metric creates or the defensive
posturing of anticipated litigation.
EPILOGUE
The unfolding story of innocence reform in Wisconsin would be
incomplete if it did not include recent developments that make the task
of attaining genuine local buy-in both more difficult and more important
to continued reform efforts. On the very day that the Avery Task
Force legislation was being voted into law, the story of Steven Avery-
whose wrongful rape conviction was so closely intertwined with the
Wisconsin reforms-was unfolding in a disastrous new direction that
has shaken the state once again.
On October 31, 2005, the day before the legislation passed the
Wisconsin legislature, a photographer named Theresa Halbach
disappeared.4 ' In the course of the next week, efforts to locate




400. One possibility that is already being explored is the use of interrogation
tapes from local agencies that are implementing electronic recording for the first time to
study whether and how the presence of recording equipment changes the nature of
interrogation over time. Interview with Keith Findley, supra note 75.
401. Carrie Antlfinger, Photographer Is Feared Sain; ID Sought for Bones
Found on A very Land, CAP. TIMES (Madison, Wis.), Nov. 11, 2005, at IA.
402. On the day she disappeared, Halbach had three scheduled appointments to
photograph cars for Auto Trade magazine, one of which was at the Avery salvage yard.
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Halbach's blood-spattered car was found hidden by branches on the
salvage yard grounds, burned clothes were found in a barrel outside
Avery's trailer, and Halbach's car key was found in Avery's
bedroom. 13  Remains of what appeared to be a dismembered adult
female body were found burned in a fire pit behind Avery's garage.'
DNA, which had previously been Avery's salvation, now condemned
him as genetic testing linked him to blood spatters in Halbach's car and
genetic material on her car key.' On November 15, 2005, Avery was
charged with homicide and mutilation of a corpse.' °6
Previously portrayed in the press as a family man who had been
snatched from an ordinary life by a wrongful conviction, Avery was
now suddenly portrayed as a dangerous and deviant felon. At the time
he was exonerated, Avery had been touted in the media as a married
father of five, with twin sons born only six days before his arrest.4
News stories painted the picture of his return to loving family members
who had always believed in his innocence, complete with details of
homemade signs on the garage door, sheet cakes, watery eyes, and bear
hugs."8 After his homicide arrest, stories of prior misdeeds surfaced in
the press: Avery was a convicted felon with a spotty record dating back
to 1981;' 09 he had been convicted of cruelty to animals for pouring
Carrie Antlfmger, Missing Woman's Family Hopeful; No News... Is Good News,
CAP. TIMES (Madison, Wis.), Nov. 8, 2003, at 3A; Antlfmger, supra note 401.
403. Carrie Antlfmger, Avery Is Charged in Halbach Killing, CAP. TIMES
(Madison, Wis.), Nov. 16, 2005, at 3A.
404. Id.
405. Carrie Antifinger, Murder Charge for A very; DNA Is Alleged Link in
Woman's Death, CAP. TIMES (Madison, Wis.), Nov. 12, 2003, at IA.
406. Antlfinger, supra note 403. Avery has since been charged with first-
degree sexual assault, kidnapping, and false imprisonment after his 16-year-old
nephew, Brendan Dassey, gave a statement to investigators claiming to have witnessed
and participated with Avery in Halbach's sexual assault and murder. More Charges for
Steven Avery, WIs. STATE J., Mar. 9, 2006, at B5. In accord with the new Wisconsin
legislation, Dassey's four-hour custodial interrogation was videotaped. Carrie
Antlfinger, Avery Says Nephew Was Forced to Confess, CAP. TIMEs,(Madison, Wis.)
Apr. 1, 2006, at A4.
407. Robert Imrie, Sprung! After 18 Years in Prison, Man Is Released Due to
DNA Evidence, Wis. S. J., Sept. 12, 2003, at Cl.
408. Id.; see also Associated Press, Freed by DNA Proof, Man Savors His
New Life, CAP. TIMES (Madison, Wis.), Sept. 12, 2003, at 3A.
409. Carrie Antlfinger, Avery Gives DNA in Disappearance, CAP. TIMES
(Madison, Wis.), Nov. 10, 2005, at 3A (reporting burglary convictions in 1981 and
1982, cruelty to animals in 1982, and endangering safety and being a felon in
possession of a weapon in 1985); see also Doug Erickson, Mishicot Area Residents
Upset by Grisly News, Wis. S. J., Nov. 13, 2005, at Al (detailing the timeline of
Avery's convictions and reporting on neighbors' reactions).
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gasoline on a cat and throwing it into a bonfire in 1982;4' ° he had been
accused of running a deputy sheriffs wife off the road at gunpoint in
1985;411 and his brothers had been "in and out of trouble with the law"
for years on charges of sexual assault and domestic violence.412
But for biological evidence that had survived seventeen years to be
tested with new DNA technology, Avery would have remained in
prison for a crime he did not commit. At the time of his exoneration,
that thought had shaken Wisconsin public confidence in the fairness of
its criminal justice system and galvanized a consensus around reform.
After Avery was arrested for homicide, the same thought-that Avery
might still be in prison-splintered public consensus. The police,
whose investigation of the Manitowoc rape had narrowed in on Avery
so quickly, albeit wrongly, now appeared prescient rather than hapless
or vindictive. For some observers, getting Avery out of prison seemed
a more tragic mistake than sending him to prison for a crime he did not
commit.
The poster child for innocence reform in Wisconsin suddenly split
the public's moral view of the criminal justice system in ways that
mirror the split moral viewpoints of law enforcement and criminal
defense advocates in the criminal justice system. Those who see the
world as divided into lawbreakers and law-abiders saw Avery as
someone who had always been dangerous and was better off behind
bars; the niceties of finding him guilty of something before sending him
to prison diminished in face of the grisly facts of a brutal murder.
Those who see criminal behavior as arising from a complex interplay of
personal weakness and societal failure questioned how eighteen years of
wrongful imprisonment might contribute to antisocial violence. The
fragile coalition between law enforcement and defenders of the accused,
and the public consensus over the importance of accurate convictions on
which it is based, suddenly seemed under siege. Avery, whose
exoneration had been a destabilizing event in the Wisconsin public's
view of the criminal justice system, now appeared poised to destabilize
public consensus around the value of innocence reform.
410. Todd Richmond & Carrie Antlfinger, A verys No Strangers to Law, WIs.
STATEJ., Nov. 13, 2005, at A10.
411. Antlfinger, supra note 409.
412. Richmond & Antlfinger, supra note 410. According to this report, Steven
Avery's older brother Chuck had been accused but acquitted of sexual assault in 1988,
had pleaded guilty to disorderly conduct in 1998, and had been accused by his former
wife of sexually assaulting her and wrapping a phone cord around her neck. Id. His
younger brother Earl had pleaded no contest to battery and sexual assault in 1996, and
in 1992 he had been convicted of battery for attacking his wife. Id.
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In the midst of this upheaval, Wisconsin innocence reform
continues. The newly formed Wisconsin Criminal Justice Study
Commission has begun meeting to address additional systemic issues
leading to wrongful convictions. The commission will pursue its work
in a changed political environment informed by a new appreciation for
the fragility of consensus around the problem of wrongful conviction.
Though the Avery arrest may seem a liability, in the long run it may
prove to be a benefit. It may force Wisconsin to face the challenges of
sustaining reform efforts through slower and more incremental methods
that do not depend on the existence of a widespread political consensus
that could have been predicted to unravel over time in the context of
contested individual criminal cases. As a partner in the creation of the
Wisconsin Criminal Justice Study Commission, the Wisconsin DOJ
should be well-positioned to take up the challenge of utilizing the
information created by the legislative reforms to further stimulate a
reform process through less politicized but perhaps more effective
channels. What Wisconsin does to further reform its criminal justice
system in light of the reality check that the Avery arrest provided may
help teach us all new lessons not only about how innocence reform can
be achieved through building political consensus around mutual gain,
but also about how reform can be structured in a way that will sustain it
meaningfully over time.
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